Winning the Long War: Lessons from the Cold War for Defeating Terrorism and Preserving Freedom

by James Jay Carafano

In Winning the Long War, experts on homeland security, civil liberties, and economics examine current U.S. policy and map out a long-term national strategy for the war on terrorism. Like the brilliant... This description may be from another edition of this product.

• Format: Hardcover
• Language: English
• ISBN: 0974366544
• ISBN13: 9780974366548
• Release Date: April 2005
• Publisher: Heritage Books
• Length: 292 Pages
• Weight: 1.44 lbs.
• Dimensions: 1.0" x 6.3" x 9.3"

Customer Reviews

Must read for Policy Makers, Hill Staffers, Military Officers and Analysts

This book was issued to The Johns Hopkins University students in the M.S. in Intelligence Analysis program. The book is a must read for all military officers in the rank of field grade or above, intelligence analysts, and policy makers and their staff. The authors have conducted an in-depth analysis of the current problems and offer solutions for the long term. It recommends a synergistic approach to winning the long war. The authors ideas and views are valid and realistic. I disagree with the authors on the need to integrate U.S. commands, PACOM and EUCOM with NATO. Unfortunately, NATO has too many members with different political agendas and views. The integration would significantly hamper U.S. commanders' efforts and significantly impact their ability to make quick and decisive decisions. It is important for the U.S. take into account input from our allies, but we should never let it affect a commander's ability to be decisive. We are good at winning wars because we are policy makers are well informed and thoughtful and our commanders are decisive.

Hits the Nail on the Head

Authors Carafano and Rosenweig present a thoughtful, provocative, and readable analysis of how America can win the war on Islamic terror. The crux of their analysis is that we must understand that, as with the cold war, the war on terror will be a strategic struggle of our ideals against theirs. We will win against the enemy's asymmetric forces because our democratic, libertarian ideals empower us and because of the endurance of our robust capitalist economy. The authors show that while there is much that we can do to strengthen our capabilities, the tumult of democratic discussion will also produce many ideas which could actually weaken us were they to become policy. This book is principally about making the right choices. Eisenhower's approach to the Cold War provides lessons that will not have to be re-learned, provided they are remembered: provide security, build a strong economy, protect civil liberties, and win the struggle of ideas. What Carafano and Rosenweig offer are the nuts and bolts of how these concepts become counter-terrorist policy. We already have the fundamentals in place, but we will have to adapt to a new enemy. Their suggestions include replacing the Unified Command Plan with a U. S. Engagement Plan, crafted by and reporting to the National Security Council rather than the Pentagon. And since redundancy must be built into any plan, they offer their concept of "layered security" to prevent attacks on our homeland. And as might be expected, the authors offer several ways to improve the Department of Homeland Security. The present incarnation results from a "scattershot, partisan" approach by Congress, making the DHS little more than an "intelligence end-user," or worse, just another entitlement program. The alternative: performance and threat-based funding. Winning the Long War also examines the weakness of a legal system which is incapable of dealing with actionable intelligence. We need a new preventive detention protocol for potential terrorists, one with more stringent standards. The measures now being used are vitally important, yet they are extralegal. We also get a thoughtful and well-documented pitch for trade versus aid as the more powerful tool of foreign policy. And some of the old Cold War tools, such as USIS, should be re-constituted and re-deployed against Islamic terror. The authors' methodical and academic approach is a refreshing change from the bombast this topic typically engenders. This book deserves to be read and it deserves to influence American policy. I'm going to send copies of this book to my senators, Dodd and Lieberman. Why don't you send copies to yours, too?

Essential reading about America's defense

It has become apparent that a revival of fundamental Islam has unleashed Jihad inspired terrorism that will not be defeated in the short term. The al Qaeda types are planning for a 50 to 100 year war to establish their caliphate, so unless we can find a fast path to victory we can expect them to continue their nefarious activities for at least our lifetimes. The bloody trail of conquest, raids, booty and slave taking inspired by Mohammad in the 620s continued for over a thousand years. One can only hope its revival is much shorter lived. It is not wise however to expect a short engagement with an enemy who espouses and believes in the support of Allah and his guarantee of magnificent rewards for any who fall during Jihad. In the West we have been slow to identify the enemy and even slower to appreciate the ugly truth that this war is likely to be very long. It is therefore encouraging to see more thinkers attempt to set out a strategy for a very long term struggle. Carafano and Rosenzweig take inspiration from George Keenan's February 22, 1946 long telegram in which he laid out the character of our Soviet enemies and suggested the approach that was eventually used with varying success by 7 Presidents to produce a stalemate that President Reagan was able to move over to success during his successors term. The authors emphasize the importance of taking the war to the enemy. Especially in a war of clandestine and suicide operations a good defense is no substitute for a consistent offense. They continually emphasize the importance of economic growth so that the engagements of the war do not weaken, but in fact strengthen over time. At the present time this has caused some bitter disagreements over troop strength in Iraq, the size of our army, the Bush tax rate reductions and many other maters that Carafano and Rosenzweig consider important to the strength of our country for the long war. They treat tax reform and elimination of low priority programs as essential to the long war effort. The 9/11 terrorists were just one operational team from groups networked across 60 countries. They defeated a group of U.S. intelligence organizations that were not permitted to even communicate across Washington. It is apparent that a major rebuild of our intelligence apparatus around the world will be critical to winning a long war. Intelligence may be costly, but warfare is more expensive yet. One of the major efforts of the Eisenhower administration was to gain the maximum possible information on Soviet capabilities so we did not spend our resources foolishly. Our initial efforts at homeland protection may well have represented inefficient flailing - because we knew so little about the motivations of the enemy and their capabilities. The authors also spend time considering the potential effect on our laws and warn against sacrificing our constitutional rights to gain some additional security. They include a careful review the Patriot act. Free trade is cri

The Legacy Lives on

Now that the author of the Long Telegram, George Kennan, has died there may be a tendancy to wonder if anyone is taking such a lofty worldview in our troubled times. By reading this well reasoned and enlighted book by two men who obviously were writing from the passion of their positions and the love of justice and what is right, I think we needn't worry. In the first chapter they remind us that it is easy to win a war and lose everything else. The lessons taught by the Cold War were simple. The fundamentals remain a sound security, economic growth, a strong civil society, and a willingness to engage in a public battle of ideas. It takes time. Now is the time to get it right.The rest of the book is about getting it right. In the name of fighting terrorism it is all too easy begin abusing civil liberities left and right. In Chapter 3, Between Liberty and Order, and Chapter 4, After the Patriot Act, the authors address how liberties and the war on terrorism can both be in balance. Trade and the war of ideas are not forgotten in the book. Other contributers, all specialists in their respective fields, weigh in on our government's foriegn poicy. Kennan in an interview with the New York Review of Books in 1999 had his view, "This whole tendancy to see ourselves as the center of political enlightenment and as teachers to a great part of the rest of the world stikes me as unthought-through. I would like to see our government gradually withdraw from its public advocacy of democracy and human rights." The authors may not agree with everything that Kennon stands for but they think "outside the box" as he did. The epilogue is A New (Shorter)Long Telegram--Strategy for a New Century. This is a policy for our new war. The War against Terrorism and tyranny from within our own government. I for one am comforted to know that we still have men of vision and passion who will fight for our rights and for justice and the American Way.