Why Would Anyone Believe in God? (Cognitive Science of Religion Series)

By Justin L. Barrett

Book Overview

Because of the design of our minds. That is Justin Barrett's simple answer to the question of his title. With rich evidence from cognitive science but without technical language, psychologist Barrett... This description may be from another edition of this product.

• Format: Paperback
• Language: English
• ISBN: 0759106673
• ISBN13: 9780759106673
• Release Date: April 2004
• Publisher: AltaMira Press
• Length: 152 Pages
• Weight: 0.57 lbs.
• Dimensions: 9.1" x 0.3" x 6.1"

Customer Reviews

atheism is the odd man out

As an atheist, it is easy to view those with traditional religious beliefs in a condescending manner. We atheists are very bright, scientific, rigorous, and advanced; those who believe in silly things like god(s) are primitive, dumb, and bigoted! Or so We like to tell ourselves. However, the relatively new field of cognitive anthropology has shown this view to be absolutely false. Most works in this field are turgid, slow moving, and difficult. (cf. works by Scott Atran and Pascal Boyer) This book is not. It is terse, to the point, and lucid. All jargon is explained in the text and it contains a glossary so you can refresh your memory if need be. Barrett's basic idea is that our minds have evolved in a way that makes religious belief natural. It is so natural because it fits nicely with many unreflective beliefs that our mind has. For example, all people have mental equipment which makes them hypersensitive to detecting agency, they also have mental equipment which makes them view other things as having minds. On top of this, people have intuitive moral concerns that are universal. Therefore, they easily view these morals as coming from somewhere. In short, as a hypersocial species, humans find it quite natural to posit minimally counterintuitive God concepts. These concepts are satisfying and spread easily among others. Here is an example of Barrett's mode of analysis. Suppose you talked to a guy named John a few days ago. John tells you that your house is known to be haunted. He recounts some tales that were told to him by the last owners of the home. You don't really believe it, but you do tuck it away in your memory. Now you are in your home alone at night. Suddenly the radio turns on in the other room. You get a little scared. Then you here creeks coming from the basement. Now your blood is getting hot and your palms are sweating. You don't believe in superstitious nonsense. All the same, you can't help the fear. Then you remember what John told you. What if it were true, you think to yourself. Why does this seem so plausible? According to Barrett this would occur for many reasons. 1) Humans gain social information from others and assume that non-interested parties are not purposefully decieving us. Therefore, John's tale is percieved as being relevant, even if it is first construed as nonsense. 2) Humans have artifact detection devices in their brains. We know that a radio is created for a specific function. 3) Humans have a hypersensitive agency detection device. We are always looking for evidence of agency, even where none exists. 4) Humans have a Theory of Mind (ToM). We are always trying to interpret things mentally. For example, my computer IS STUPID! 5) Combining 2-5, You know that your radio is turned on only when someone purposefully turns it on to listen to music. That it might turn on accidentally, or due to mechanical failure is not intuitive. Thus, your unreflective thought is: Who turned my radio on and why? If nob

Why indeed?

This is a truly excellent introduction to the cognitive study of religion. Justin Barrett has an amazing gift for communicating difficult ideas and concepts in very simple language. Indeed, as an educational reference it should become a classic in the field, but it is full of seminal and important ideas in its own right. It will surely challenge anyone's preconceptions about how religious beliefs are formed, whether theist or atheist. This is evidenced by the review of the ignoramus below who tries to cough up numbers to 'refute' Justin Barrett's claim that it is natural for the human mind to postulate supernatural persons as part of the world. It is not, as the one-star reviewer thinks, a work of apologetics. It is not intended to bolster the faith of believers. Even though Barrett is a Christian, the book is neutral (as any work of science should be) on the question of whether God actually exists. Indirectly, however, this book does provide a defense of theism in the following way. Barrett establishes, through a careful overview of the cognitive literature, that beliefs in God or gods are formed from the same cognitive machinery as that which produces our belief in other peoples' minds, the flow of time and other beliefs which we take for granted. You cannot isolate religious beliefs as an evolutionary by-product and not do the same for these other indispensable beliefs. That does not prove that there is a God, but it does effectively neutralize evolutionary criticism of religious belief. Barrett makes an interesting connection between the results of cognitive science and Alvin Plantinga's seminal work "God and other minds" which is well worth reading. Overall this book is a goldmine of insights and the best general overview of the cognitive science of religion for non-specialists.

Well written: scientific yet accessible without unnecessary jargon

Well written: scientific yet accessible without unnecessary jargon Justin L. Barrett presents a well-substantiated, yet very accessible thesis describing the psychological mechanisms involved in belief -- that is, both belief in general and belief in God in particular. Drawing on clinical research, Barrett demonstrates how from childhood, each of us is predisposed to view adults, such as our parents, as omniscient and omnipotent beings. Though we mature and abandon those beliefs about adults, these concepts still allow us to believe in the omnipotent and omniscient qualities of god (any god of any culture), as transmitted to us by our parents and by our society. Barrett demonstrates how ideas and stories that engender belief in such a god are more easily accepted and transmitted than other types of stories. The foundation of these beliefs stems ultimately from our instinctual ability to distinguish, often incorrectly, the difference between non-agents (for example, a leaf carried by the breeze) and agents (a live mouse) and to believe that they possess mental functions such as fear and desire (for food, for example) which cause them to act. In the final chapters, Barrett speculates somewhat sarcastically, but still effectively, why reason, logic, and factual evidence do not easily overcome belief. Reading past the sarcasm, there is much to be learned in this chapter. Finally, Barrett discloses his personal belief in Christianity and speculates that our innate capacity to imagine the divine was not the result of mere natural selection, but supernatural selection. I found the idea intriguing yet I wish the rational were a bit more transparent. Overall, I enjoyed the book and would recommend it to both believers and non-believers who want a better insight into the psychology of belief. Everyone will recognize within himself these psychological processes that Barrett describes and will find it easy to make the connection between that understanding and the phenomenon of belief.

Accessible, yet chock-full of relevant theories

I would recommend Barrett's book to anyone, academic or no, who has an interest in getting a concise and accessible cognitive explanation for religious belief. Throughout his book, Barrett manages to integrate a variety of current cognitive approaches, some of which were originally intended specifically for explanation of religious belief and some of which have been adapted (in ways that I do not think would be objectionable to their original authors) to this field. In particular, those familiar with the cognitive sciences will recognize elements of Cosmides and Tooby's theory of mental modularity, Pascal Boyer's theories on the signifiance of counter-intuitive agents and agency detection, and Harvey Whitehouse's concept of imagistic and doctrinal modes in religious ritual. But those of you who are unfamiliar with these theorizers, have no fear-- everything you need to understand this book is within the book itself. Barrett's basic thesis is that belief in God (or gods) is a natural byproduct stemming from two particular capacities of the human mind which have served us well in a variety of contexts throughout the evolution of the species. These capacities he calls Hyper Active Agency Detection, or HADD, and Theory of Mind, or ToM. Chapter by chapter, he explains how these capacities work in formulating beliefs generally, in what contexts (or people) they may be strengthened or weakened, and even how people in which they both function quite normally may still end up not believing in deities for one reason or another. Barrett argues that the mental equipment we as homo sapiens have evolved for myriad purposes ranging from detecting predators to romantic relationships to finding food actually end up working together in a fashion that causes us to find the existence of supernatural agents entirely plausible-- and not just plausible, but necessary. Of course, one's immediate response may be, "Well, that is all very good...but if that is the case, how do some of us end up not believing in gods?" And Barrett expects this objection. His penultimate chapter is entitled "Why Would Anyone Not Believe in God?" and in it he explains why even though religious belief may be natural, it is not inevitable in all of us. Personally, I feel that the book lets us down a bit at this point-- Barrett's answer is basically that atheists are generally people who have frequent occasion to challenge their own perceptions, specifically the ones that cause us to suspect that there are agents present when we can't be sure, or to attribute agency where there may actually be none. He surmises that this is most likely to occur in academic circles and/or in western, affluent societies, specifically urban areas, where the common understanding is that the environment is designed by humans, not supernatural entities, and intentionality may very well be ascribed not to deity but to more abstract entities such as the government, the market, or society. He describes ath