Why Nations Go To War, Instructor's Edition

by John G. Stoessinger

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• Format: Paperback
• Language: English
• ISBN: 0495381608
• ISBN13: 9780495381600
• Release Date: January 2008
• Publisher: Thomson
• Length: 430 Pages
• Weight: 1.08 lbs.

Customer Reviews

succinctly summarizes

I am going to order the udated version - I had this as textbook in Pol. Science years ago - fantastic. It succinctly summarizes and gives a great 'starting point' to understanding major world wars. A must-have on all bookshelves.

Pleased

The book was in perfect condition. Came to my house quickly. Def. worth it...It was about 15 dollars cheaper than at my college bookstore! So, Thanks!

Great idea and great book

This was one of the best textbooks I have read in college. It covers most of the major wars post world war 2 and gives the history leading up to them. You can see a clear dichotomy where the major power in the world leading up to the conflict causes the conflict through foolish colonization policies. Mostly British for the first half and then the United States. It is a good summary overall and is a must have for any student in International Relations or military history. It is a well written and quick read. 5 stars.

ENLIGHTENING!

If anyone reading this review is able to contact Dr. Stoessinger, it would be in his interest to suggest him to read Trevor Ravenscroft's "The Spear Of Destiny," for further understanding of Hitler's mind. Many thanks to the messenger!

Insight for Intelligence Analysts

Dr. Stossinger's book is a valuable contribution for intelligence analysts wrestling with the strategic intelligence considerations when preparing for war. Stossinger's review of 8 case studies (WWI, Hitler's attack on Russia, Korea, Vietnam, India and Pakistan, Israel and the Arabs, Saddam Hussein, and the Balkans) distills the following determinants as to why nations go to war: the crucial importance of the personalities of leaders, the four sources of misperception (leader's image of himself, his adversary, his adversary's intentions, and his adversary's capabilities and power), and an underestimation of the means and time necessary to win the war. Here, Stossinger contributes to the literature by reinforcing the need to look at war from the enemy's perspective. Strategic intelligence analysts supporting decision makers who are preparing for war should, at a minimum, be addressing seven issues: a clear understanding of the most basic, underlying, issues forming the basis for the problem under consideration; a clear appreciation of how the problem affects one's survival, vital, major and peripheral national interests; a clearly stated political objective that resolves the underlying problem which is complimented with a sound exit strategy and identifiable conditions for knowing when to exit; a strategic self appraisal that assesses one's internal military, diplomatic, and economic condition to determine whether or not the means exist to attain the political objective; a national power assessment comparing the conditions of the other belligerents and interested non belligerents with your previously assessed strategic self appraisal; an integrated political, military and economic strategy to best apply your strategic strengths in pursuit of the political objective; and, the identification and elimination of gaps between the desired political objective and the means to achieve those objectives. Stossinger gives analysts additional perspectives for assessing these seven issues. Each issue should be assessed through the lens of the personalities of each leader of each belligerent nation; assessed for how each of the four sources of misperception shapes each leader's view of the situation; and, assessed for how each leader estimates the means and time necessary to achieve their political and military objectives. This insight reduces the miscalculations characterizing war. Stossinger's book belongs on library shelf of the students and practitioners of strategic intelligence.