We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History

by John Lewis Gaddis

Book Overview

Did the Soviet Union want world revolution? Why did the USSR send missiles to Cuba? What made the Cold War last as long as it did? The end of the Cold War makes it possible, for the first time, to begin writing its history from a truly international perspective. Based on the latest findings
of Cold War historians and extensive research in American archives as well as the recently opened archives in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and China,...

• Format: Paperback
• Language: English
• ISBN: 0198780710
• ISBN13: 9780198780717
• Release Date: July 1998
• Publisher: Clarendon Press
• Length: 448 Pages
• Weight: 1.45 lbs.
• Dimensions: 1.2" x 5.9" x 9.5"

Customer Reviews

Volume I of the History of the Cold War

We Now Know by John Lewis Gaddis is a preliminary reevaluation of the first half of the Cold War (roughly 1945-62) based on information from the Soviet side that has become available since the demise of the Soviet Union. After presenting a wealth of material, Gaddis offers eight tentative hypotheses: 1. Diversification of power did more to shape the Cold War than did the balance of power. The Soviet Union rivaled the west in military power but lagged significantly in every other dimension, such as economic, cultural, moral, and ideological. 2. Both the US and Soviet Union built empires during the Cold War but they differed significantly. The Western European nations actively sought US support and involvement in the post-WWII years, leading to NATO and the Marshall Plan. In contrast, the Soviet Union had to put down numerous active revolts by members of the Warsaw Pact. 3. Many people did see the Cold War as a contest between good and evil, even if historians rarely did. Thousands of East Germans voted with their feet immediately after WWII, again in the 1950s (leading to the construction of the Berlin Wall), and again in 1989 (when Hungary opened its borders). 4. Democracy proved superior to autocracy in maintaining coalitions. Gaddis observes that many attributes of a nation's internal politics carry over into its foreign policy. The US was able to maintain its coalition by applying the consensus building techniques used domestically to managing its coalition. The Soviet Union's approach to coalition building, based on its approach to domestic politics, achieved unity within the Warsaw Pact only by smothering dissent. 5. Marxism-Leninism fostered authoritarian romanticism. At the end of WWII, Stalin believed that the next war would be between competing capitalist nations, that the workers of the world would unite, and that all the Soviet Union needed to do was to wait for capitalism to self-destruct. He failed to realize that his aggressive moves into central Europe had united the capitalist nations against him. 6. Nuclear weapons exchanged destructiveness for duration. Nuclear weapons rendered direct military conflict between the US and Soviet Union untenable, even in the years when the US had an overwhelming nuclear superiority. The result was that the Cold War continued unabated until the late 1980s. 7. As long as Stalin was running the Soviet Union, the Cold War was inevitable. If one imagines the changes in history that might have resulted from removing one key individual, the only such change that might have prevented the Cold War appears to be the removal of Stalin. His unique position is due to both his absolute power over the Soviet Union and his aggressive policies, exemplified by his moves into central Europe, his encouragement of Kim Il Sung to invade South Korea, and pressure on Mao to intervene when the US/UN forces had defeated the North Koreans. In contrast, removing any one western leader would not have produced any si

Outstanding

In this book, John Lewis Gaddis sets out to describe the major structural features of the Cold War, identify their causes, provide a narrative overview of the Cold War from its inception to the Cuban Missile Crisis, and embed the Cold War in the larger context of 20th century history. Gaddis succeeds in accomplishing all these ends in a well written book of less than 300 hundred pages. This is a considerable achievement. A good part of this book is driven by the fact that the end of the Cold War has resulted in access to Soviet, Chinese, and Eastern European sources that provide information about key events and decision makers. Much prior work concentrated one sidely on Western policies and policy makers. The new archival information allows reconstruction of important decisions and a more complete picture of the Cold War. It is important to note that not all the new information relates to Communist sources. For example, based on the availability of new documentation, Gaddis presents an account of John Kennedy's behavior in the Cuban Missile Crisis that varies considerably from the standard accounts. Gaddis addresses a number of key issues. Why did the Cold War begin? He sees the Cold War as a result of Stalin's insecurity and brutal Soviet conduct in Eastern Europe. Given the conduct of Soviet Armies and Stalin's aggressive foreign policy, the USA and its Western European Allies had no choice but to respond to Stalin in some form of confrontation. Was the Cold War a conflict just between the USA and the Soviet Union? Gaddis is careful to emphasize the autonomy of many decision makers during the Cold War. Some of these are surprising. An early and important event was the declaration of independence issued by Yugoslav communists in 1948. This event infuriated Stalin and played a large role in precipitating the Stalinist repression that occurred in many Eastern European Soviet satellites, further scaring Western European governments and pushing them closer to the USA. The emergence of NATO is presented very much as driven by Western European governments with the British playing a particularly important role. Gaddis contrasts the wisdom of American policy towards Europe and Japan with the ultimate failure of the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe. The Americans nourished European recovery with the Marshall plan, planted democracies in Germany and Japan, and tolerated a good deal of independence by important European partners. The Eastern European Soviet satellites, in contrast, were a chronic source of dissent and required diversion of considerable Soviet economic resources to maintain Soviet hegemony. This latter phenomena was actually predicted by the American diplomat George Kennan in the late 40s. Gaddis deals very well with the problem of divided Germany and the expansion of the Cold War into Asia. He treats the Chinese and North Koreans as important independent forces and describes nicely the complexity of relations betwe

outstanding

Professor Gaddis's course on the Cold War at Yale is, without a doubt, the most popular class offered, attracting probably 800-1000 (one-fifth of undergraduates) people before it must be capped at a still staggering 400, and rightfully so: an un-assuming fellow, he is a well-known and brilliant historian with a knack for writing and teaching. His book, We Now Know, is an outstanding piece of historical scholarship on the origins of the Cold War and how it played out in the years before the Cuban Missile Crisis. It is carefully argued and well-documented. He approaches all sides of the Cold War, including the sometimes overlooked role China played in the early Cold War, not to mention the attention he gives to nuclear weapons and the third world, for example. Gaddis's writing is very accessible, and he draws many insightful parallels and analogies which aid in understanding even the most complicated of events and theories. While I think those with at least a basic background in Cold War history would appreciate the book and its interpretations more, it could certainly serve as an introductory text. Gaddis is the don of modern Cold War historians, and this is nothing short of a masterpiece. I heartily recommend it.

Nicely Written Book

If anyone is in New Haven during the fall semester, they should definitely try to drop in on Gaddis' Cold War class for undergraduates - he is an amazing speaker with a very deadpan sense of humor. He also is passionate about Cold War History, and it shows through in this book - this was probably the most thoughtful and enjoyable book to read among a course reading list that has been described as a "best seller". The book is not meant to be a comprehensive overview of the Cold War, but a reflection on the major themes, causes, and ramifications of a war that polarized much of the 20th century world. Yes, Gaddis is a Reagan fan, but a very objective one if you hear him speak about it. And while he is very pro-USA, he remains very objective, for the most part, when describing the virtues and the faults of both sides. The book as a whole is very well written, with elegant and thoughtful prose, and stands as a powerful assessment of the Cold War.

Incisive, compelling arguments.

No, this book doesn't come too soon after the end of the Cold War. As Gaddis says at appropriate points, "we now know," suggesting we know much more and can evaluate much better than we could even at the end of the Cold War, but the "now" is just a temproary point. Obviously, we will eventually know more, perhaps much more. But, for now, Gaddis sheds new light on numerous events, and he does so in a serious but almost self-deprecating manner. For someone just plunging into the Cold War, this would be an excellent place to start. For those who lived through most of the Cold War as I did, and have studied it now and again, this work provides a wonderful reality check.