To the North Anna River: Grant and Lee, May 13--25, 1864

by Gordon C. Rhea

Book Overview

Rhea looks at the initial campaign between Ulysses S. Grant and Robert E. Lee between May 13 and 25, 1864--a phase that was critical in the clash between the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Northern Virginia. Rhea charts the generals' every step and misstep in their efforts to outfox each other. 12 halftones. 29 maps.

• Format: Hardcover
• Language: English
• ISBN: 0807125350
• ISBN13: 9780807125359
• Release Date: April 2000
• Publisher: LSU Press
• Length: 528 Pages
• Weight: 1.94 lbs.
• Dimensions: 1.4" x 6.5" x 9.4"

Customer Reviews

Same Quality As Rhea's Previous Books

To the North Anna R. is no worse than Rhea's previous books on the Overland Campaign, which means this is a fantastic book. Rhea meticulously covers the movements of the two armies to the south as well as the skirmishes and cavalry battles. He leaves no stone unturned, including Fitz Lee's cavalry being repulsed at Wilson's Wharf against black troops, and the subsequent denial of the nature of the repulse by embarassed Southerners. The story of the campaign itself is more of the same. Grant's maneuvers are skillfully stalemated by Lee's defense, with the inverted V being perhaps his most ingenius line of the entire series. Ultimately the two armies face the same problems that had been troubling them since the Wilderness. The Union command is not focused enough to properly reconnoiter, and Grant continues aggressive warfare without knowing the strength of Lee's lines. The Confederates continue to lose high ranking officers and do not have the manpower to seize the initiative from Grant. When Grant divides the army across the North Anna River, Lee's sickness keeps him from taking more direct command over his forces. And of course, the two armies disengage from the North Anna and continue toward Cold Harbor. Thankfully, Gordon Rhea follows them there to write about that campaign as well.

To the North Anna River: A Necessary Bridge

Gordon Rhea continues his study of Ulysses S. Grant's grinding Overland Campaign against Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia. The third volume continues where his the first two volumes left off. Like the first two books, the tone is lively and interesting. Rhea does an excellent job conveying the thought process and difficulties involved in the major decisions made by both Lee and Grant. Rhea makes clear the reasons Lee was losing faith in Hill and Ewell. He continues an excellent analysis of the fractured Union command structure from the first two volumes expanding on the rift between Meade and Grant and the lack of talent among the corps commanders. Rhea poignantly portrayed the misery and destruction in the Wilderness and at the Mule Shoe in his first two books. Those types of scenes are not in this work, but he successfully portrays the every day life of the common soldier on both sides. One such example is his vivid description of how fast the Confederate cavalry disintegrated after the disasterous battle at Yellow Tavern. For the individual interested learning about the Civil War and the men of the conflict, this book is a necessary bridge between Spotsylvania Court House and Cold Harbor. This period is marked more by confusion and maneuver than bloody fighting. This work is a pause from the effusive bloodshed of the Wilderness, Spotsylvania, and Cold Harbor where the reader can learn more about how Lee and Grant thought and how they adapted to the most competent foe either general faced in his career. We can only hope Mr. Rhea continues his study beyond Cold Harbor into the trenches of Petersburg.

To The North Anna River, Grant and Lee May 13-25, 1864

Gordon C. Rhea's account of the Civil War in Northern Virginia covering the period after the Wilderness Battle through the fighting south of the North Anna River in late May 1864 is well written. During this period, Lee and Grant took measure of each other. Grant had only experienced Confederate generals in the West and probably had limited respect for Lee's generalship. The general officers of the Army of the Potomac, having fought Lee since June 1862, had few reservations regarding Lee's ability prompting Grant to remark to his staff on May 6 to "Think what we are going to do ourselves, instead of what Lee is going to do." Lee lacked direct experience with Grant but there is no indication that he questioned Grant's ability. Lee's problem was he didn't know how Grant thinks, reacts, etc. In many respects this book is an account of how Grant and Lee got to know each others abilities.Chapter II details Sheridan' raid threatening Richmond . Grant and Sheridan took great pleasure in the defeat of J.E.B. Stuart. Sheridan had defeated his cavalry and killed Stuart. However, the Confederate Cavalry Sheridan defeated in May 1864 was not the same splendid cavalry that J.E.B. Stuart had led on his June 12-15, 1862 ride around McClellan.. By May 1864 Stuart's mounts were tired, worn out and hungry with no replacements. His cavalrymen were also tired, hungry and replacements were at best limited. Perhaps stung by Lincoln's remark "Who ever saw a dead cavalryman?" Sheridan seems to have had a personal vendetta against Stuart. As Rhea notes serious criticism can be leveled against Sheridan's campaign as it deprived Grant of badly needed scouting thus "severely handicapped Grant in his battles against Lee." Grant should have learned this lesson in the Wilderness when critical union cavalry scouting was also absent.The major battles/engagements from Spotsylvania Court House to the North Anna River are narrated. However, this book is primarily a discussion of commands with emphasis on Grant and his subordinates. Failure to react to promising situations are documented for both Lee and Grant with both failing to capitalize on significant opportunities. Referring to Lee the author noted that "His performance was a masterpiece of defensive fighting . ."; however Rhea notes several cases where Lee missed a significant opportunity and/or incorrectly judged Grants intended course of action.The author notes an interesting situation regarding the frequent remoteness of Grant and his commanders from the field commanders at critical times. Referring to Lee's army moving down Telegraph Road virtually unmolested the author wrote regarding Grant and Meade "After nightfall they made no attempt to coordinate the movements of their corps and seemed content to leave decisions in the hands of local commanders. The union army floundered like a force without a head for several critical hours." Finally, Rhea stated that th

Lee and Grant at their best

This third book in Rhea's following of the 1864 Virginia campaign is a gem. I like it even better than his previous two books, which are classics. Grant and Lee are developed in depth, and a complex series of maneuvers is made understandable. The research is impressive, and the writing is gripping. This is how campaign studies should be written. I compeletely disagree with the reviewer who thought there were too many first person accounts. I thought those accounts brought the book to life. For my money, this is the most compelling civil war narrative of the year. I can't wait for the next installment.

Solid military history of a little-studied campaign

Gordon Rhea's "To the North Anna River: Grant and Lee, May 13-25, 1864" is his latest installment in his on-going series of military histories about the great Overland Campaign, following his earlier volumes on the Wilderness and Spotsylvania battles. "To the North Anna River" differs from the previous two books in that the focus here is not upon full-scale fighting between massed armies, but instead examines an extended interval of maneuvers and probes which always fell short of the assaults planned. Mistakes and misperceptions by both armies abounded, balanced by unfaltering determination and moments of genuine brilliance. This period has in the past attracted relatively little attention from military historians, probably due in large part to its lack of "big battle" drama. Yet, the story told by Rhea is one full of suspense and tension, as Grant vigorously sought a weak point where he could finally overwhelm his foe, while Lee scrambled to block each move. Ultimately, it is a story with neither clear-cut winner or loser. Certainly Lee managed to preserve his army, yet the North Anna portion of the Overland Campaign ended with an undeterred Grant sending his army even deeper into Virginia to ultimately pin the Army of Northern Virginia in place, defending Richmond and slowly bleeding to death. Rhea's concentration is upon Grant and Lee and their chief deputies, the corps commanders, and he provides incisive analyses of the leaders for each step of the campaign. He thoroughly demolishes the tired old myth that Lee foresaw each of Grant's moves, but bestows strong acclaim upon the Confederate commanding general for his ability to find a way out of every scrape. Grant receives high marks from Rhea for his unwavering resolve in carrying out his strategic aims, but is sharply faulted for repeated failure in tactical preparation. Both Lee and Grant, Rhea amply demonstrates, were guilty of errors and oversights. In the end, the two generals seem to have been unusually well matched. Corps commanders on both sides receive little praise, with only Hancock in the Army of the Potomac evidencing sufficient judgment and initiative to be trusted off a short leash.Although each maneuver and clash is described in sufficient detail to understand what happened, "To the North Anna River" is not primarily concerned with recounting the experiences of individual soldiers. Edwin Coddington's classic study of Gettysburg was subtitled "A Study in Command" and that is a label which could be appropriately applied to Rhea's books. The question of "why" (or "why not") is always central, not just "what" and "how"."To the North Anna River" is a strong continuation of an admirable work in progress and I already look forward to the next volume in the series which should bring the armies of Grant and Lee to the fields of Cold Harbor.