Thinking about Consciousness

by David Papineau

Book Overview

The relation between subjective consciousness and the physical brain is widely regarded as the last mystery facing science. Papineau argues that consciousness seems mysterious not because of any hidden essence, but only because we think about it in a special way. He exposes the resulting potential for confusion, and shows that much scientific study of consciousness is misconceived.

• Format: Paperback
• Language: English
• ISBN: 0199271151
• ISBN13: 9780199271153
• Release Date: June 2004
• Publisher: OUP Oxford
• Length: 266 Pages
• Weight: 0.75 lbs.
• Dimensions: 0.6" x 5.4" x 8.5"

Customer Reviews

Why Dolphins are Panpsychists...

- I give four stars (out of five) to this book because I think consciousness is a topic that deserves a lot of attention, and reflections on it, when dealt with in a scholarly manner, deserve full support. Also because this book does bring priceless contributions in some topics (especially in Papineau's "history of the completeness of physics," and in his "pessimism" about brain research finding the precise "spot" of consciousness). On the other hand, I cannot help directing (regretfully) acid criticism towards this work, for I think Papineau failed in many different fronts. The Four Cardinal Sins of this work, IMO, are: 1- Papineau denies consciousness property status. He embraces ontological monism (i.e. "everything" is matter), conceptual dualism (material concepts are different from experiential/phenomenal concepts; i.e., not everything is part of the afore mentioned "everything"...), and, above all, no dualism of property! So, water may have the property of being (1) transparent, (2) fluid, (3) electro-conductive, and these properties may have different ontological histories, different structures, and different places in the Universe's causal-effect chain. Similarly, a living human body may have the property of being (1) opaque, (2) "hot" (i.e. somewhat above zero degrees Celsius), and (3) not liquid (I avoided saying "solid"...), but this very same body does not have the property of (4) having its brain-cortical neurons acting in ABC manner and (5) being conscious. Properties 4 and 5 are not different properties. They are the same!... 2- Papineau does not analyze the "turning on" of consciousness, and its "turning off." To me, this is the most mysterious thing about consciousness, and it deserves an in-depth analysis, especially in its bio-physical dynamics (biology, physiology, physics). That is, what happens to a physical system at the very moment it becomes conscious? We have physical accounts for similar transitions: liquid to solid; opaque to transparent; cold rock to hot rock; etc. What about the moment when consciousness sparkles? 3- Papineau does not deal with the issue of why consciousness came to be in this Universe of ours to begin with. That would be essential for trying to understand, from the point of view of evolutionary biology, why Humans are conscious and why Chips are not (yes, I meant chips, and not chimps ;-) ). What is the evolutionary advantage that consciousness bestows upon those who have it? As far as anyone knows, none whatsoever... Add to it that even Papineau himself does not trust the "mouthings" of those claiming to have consciousness (except when they are humans, though I am not sure why he accepts human mouthings in this regard...) and we are just up "rose" creek in our attempt of an evolutionary account of the emergence of consciousness! 4- He does not theorize solidly and compellingly on the main thesis of his book, that is, explaining why the intuition of distinctness (i.e. brain is different from m

Great philosophy

It has been a while, but this book has made the wait worthwhile. Finally, a book on the philosophy of consciousness that makes sense, that is clear, direct, uncomplicated, original, profound, and has the potential to stir and resolve many debates. Papineau argues for materialism. Not many take the time to do that, nowdays. But it is true many people are still dualists, and those who are materialists do not know how to really defend their views. Other materialists are still thinking on dualist ways, and others cannot decide between token or type identities, fuctionalism, representioalist, HOT, materialist theories. Papineau sticks with token identity. This is the simplest and most plausible view. PHENOMENAL PROPERTIES ARE IDENTICAL TO MATERIAL PROPERTIES. end of story. Papineau has here avoided a lot of baggage. The argument? the same anti-epiphenomenalists have been making. All physical causes are caused by physical things. Phenomenal states have causes, and are caused. Therefore, phenomenal states are material things. (This is not exactly how papienau puts it, but its good enough for me).Papineau does go throught the usual job of demolishing the knowledge argument, the zombie argument, and the explanatory gap argument. NOthing very new here. Mary learns something new not because phenomenal states are nonphysical but because you cannot cause a brain state to appear (which is identical to the phenomenal state) by simply knowing things. You have to experience them. Kripke was wrong, because although identities are necesary, this does not mean that by knowing one side of the identity you will know all there is to know about the property in question. Conceivability does not entail possibility, because there exist counter-examples, in the theory of names. You can conceive of impossible things if your concepts are different. And Papienau argues for conceptual dualism. Phenomenal concepts are different from material concepts, even if they refer to a single material property. Phenomenal concepts, however, refer directly to those properties.Another novelty is that the book is actually about how we THINK about consciousness, and not consicousness itself. So, Papineau tells us how exactly to understand phenomenal concepts. Here I have some objections. What is the difference between phenomenal concepts and the states they refer to? Papineau first takes conclusions about one thing to argue about the other, but on other occasions seems to claim arguments do not apply to both the concept and the state. It seems strange to say that because concepts are indeterminate, then the states refered to will also be indeterminate. Papienau needs to be careful to distinguish when he is arguing about the concepts ore the states refered to, but other than that, the way he constructed phenomenal concepts seems to me to be a right way to argue for a theory of phenomenal consciousness.Ppaineau strikes on the central problem in consicousness studies: why does materialism seem to