Theory and Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science (Science and Its Conceptual Foundations series)

by Peter Godfrey-Smith

Book Overview

How does science work? Does it tell us what the world is "really" like? What makes it different from other ways of understanding the universe? In Theory and Reality, Peter Godfrey-Smith addresses... This description may be from another edition of this product.

• Format: Paperback
• Language: English
• ISBN: 0226300633
• Release Date: August 2003
• Publisher: University of Chicago Press
• Length: 272 Pages
• Weight: 0.91 lbs.
• Dimensions: 9.0" x 0.6" x 6.0"

Customer Reviews

Great explanations of Popper and Kuhn!

This book offers a great explanation of many aspects related to theory and philosophy of science. Explains Popper and Kuhn in readable and understandable terms. I agree with a previous reviewer who stated that this book, "... explains Popper better than Popper." I am considering making it required reading in my theory building course. Great book and great price!

Excellant Introduction

I found Godfrey-Smith's 'Reality and Theory' to be an excellant introduction to philosophy of science. It requires a certain basic understanding of science and a familiarity with common notions of philosophy but is nonetheless appropriate for students and those who are simply interested in reading about the philosophy of science. I am developing a curriculum for an introductory course in the history and philosophy of science and plan to use this title as one of the texts for the course.

Both deep and accessible

The book covers the most important debates in philosophy of science with an amazing clarity and simplicity (it's a accessible to anyone) and still retain the deep arguments. The historical background and the multiple examples (including most of the canonic examples) are also of great interest... In my opinion, one of the best book I've read in philosophy of science.

An outstanding introduction to the philosophy of science

This outstanding introduction to the philosophy of science should not only please the undergraduates for which it was designed but also a broader audience of readers who are curious as to what this enterprise is all about. Godfrey-Smith manages to cover the subject even-handedly, even as he advocates a particular view or approach to the subject. The view that he defends is an unlikely combination of naturalism, empiricism and realism. I say "unlikely" because these three attitudes are not usually found bound into one package. The tension between empiricism and realism, in particular, has traditionally been emphasized. Though I am a skeptic about realism, I found Godfrey-Smith's defense of that view to be the best there is. I do wish he had extended this defense beyond van Fraassen's particular form of anti-realism to the form of anti-realism defended by Laudan. But that is a minor quibble.The first seven chapters follow a broadly historical logic. The two chapters on Kuhn are particularly strong and provide a very nice summary of Kuhn's thinking for those who, though curious about the man's ideas, have never managed to read his Structure of Scientific Revolutions. I also found the chapter on logical positivism a very helpful and concise treatment of this movement. Godfrey-Smith manages to make the reader aware of the shortcomings of this program without, as is often the case, being dismissive.Godfrey-Smith is also judicious in his treatment of feminist approaches to the philosophy of science, sociological views of science, and the endeavor known as "science studies". His discussion of the Sokal Hoax strikes the right balance and avoids the triumphalism that you might expect of someone with Godfrey-Smith's views.It is in chapters 10-13 that Godfrey-Smith assembles the pieces of his particular perspective of the philosophy of science, which he then attempts to integrate in the final chapter. In the last chapter he adopts a brilliant strategy for framing the problem, citing an anonymous reviewer's comment that the marriage of empiricism, naturalism and realism will result in a "muddy paste". You may not be entirely convinced that the marriage of these three isms is a happy one, but you will certainly agree that Godfrey-Smith has avoided the mud; in fact he constructs a satisfying and esthetically pleasing composition out of apparently uncomplimentary colors.

A Model of Balance and Clarity

I studied a lot of philosophy of science when I was in college and graduate school, just for fun. But that was many years ago, and I needed a dispassionate overview of the field and a guide to the various philosophical problems confronting scientific explanation. This was the perfect book.Godfrey-Smith saves his own position for the last few chapters of the book, and tries to present a variety of views in the body of the book with great tolerance for imperfections, rough edges, and infelicities. Yet, he has no qualms about proclaiming that a certain view is no longer treated seriously in the field (e.g., logical positivism, covering law theory, analytic/synthetic division).The book covers the whole of the Twentieth Century, from logical positivism, through Quine, Goodman, and Popper, to Kuhn, Lakatos, Feyerabend, Science Studies, feminism, and post-modernism. He is more balanced than I, I must say, since I really hate post-modernism and all of its fellow-travellers, whereas the author tries to find some pearls of wisdom scattered across the dross.Godfrey-Smith comes out for versions of empiricism, naturalism, and scientific realism. I like his mix, but I am a scientist, not a philosopher, so my opinions carry no weight.I would have liked the book to deal with creationism and intelligent design, which are burning issues in the US, though not (yet) in Europe. I would also have like the book to deal with forms of knowledge other scientific (e.g., aesthetic, street smarts, spiritual). Finally, the book doesn't deal with ethics at all. One could defend this by saying that this has nothing to do with science, but I think that is a conclusion and not a premise, and one which is in fact incorrect.