The Yom Kippur War,

by Insight Team of the London Sunday Time and Insight Team of the London Sunday Times

Book Overview

The extraordinary and definitive story of Israels desperate battle for survival in a lightning war that began on 6 October 1973 -- Yom Kippur, The holiest day in the Jewish calendar. This is the... This description may be from another edition of this product.

• Format: Hardcover
• Language: English
• ISBN: 0385067380
• ISBN13: 9780385067386
• Release Date: January 1974
• Publisher: Doubleday Books
• Length: 514 Pages
• Weight: 1.56 lbs.

Customer Reviews

Insight into a war that led to peace

Former Egyptian President Anwar Sadat made two major gambles during his tenure as the leader of Egypt. The first was in 1973, when he risked defeat and a superpower confrontation by joining with Syria to launch a two-front attack against Israel. The second was in 1978, when he signed the Camp David accords, making peace with Israel. Ironically, the second could not have happened without the war, and his signing of the peace treaty with Israel cost him his life. Sadat had very limited war aims in 1973; his goal was to make a reasonable stand against the Israelis, erasing the stigma of the crushing defeat of 1967. He was quite correct in his belief that Israel would never negotiate with her Arab neighbors as long as they thought that they possessed overwhelming military superiority over the Arab states. This book is an excellent description of the prelude to the war, explaining the (correct) Egyptian reasoning that concluded that war was necessary to peace. It also goes into great detail in explaining the air of complacency that existed in Israel. Since the Israelis firmly believed that they couldn't be beaten, then there was no chance of an Arab attack. The idea that the Arabs would fight simply to gain respect was something that they did not think of. The Israelis had also constructed a line of fortifications along the Suez canal called the Bar-Lev line. Since they considered this line impregnable, it was lightly manned and short of weapons. In other words, it was the Maginot Line syndrome all over again. The descriptions of the cynical effectiveness of Henry Kissinger as U. S. secretary of state astounded me, showing a master of political reality at work. His beliefs were the same as that of Sadat, thinking that peace was not possible until Israel suffered some kind of defeat at the hands of the Arab armies. After the war broke out, his hope was that Israel would prevail, but would be bloodied enough to realize that an overwhelming military victory over the Arabs was no longer a certainty. Therefore, his ideal outcome was that the Arabs would pressure Israel, but that they would ultimately prevail, and Israel would stop before the Egyptian army was completely destroyed. This would cause the Israeli leadership to finally understand the need for negotiation with the Arabs and leave a strong, pragmatic leader in Egypt that they could negotiate with. The Soviets held the same view and joined with the United States to force a cease-fire before the Israelis could destroy the Egyptian forces. Neither the American or Soviet side would abandon their client states, but neither wanted the other's clients to be severely damaged or destroyed. The leadership of both superpowers valued détente far more than the feelings of their client states, something that the leaderships of Egypt and Israel learned the hard way. The Yom Kippur war was one of the few that actually had a positive outcome. The Arab armies showed that they were no longer a pushover and t

biased, interesting

This book tries to be all things to all people. It provides an excellent introduction that has real transcripts from the Israeli fortification the Suez and the radio contacts with HQ as they were overun and sourounded. This gives the reader the feeling of uter collapse that the Israeli army found itsefl in when Egyptian and Syrian units rolled over them in the first day of the war. Yet the book goes on to detail the ensuing U.N machination, the historical buildup, the palistinian problem, the intentions of the 10 nations at war(this includes the arab contingents sent to fight in the war). The book details the 'brink' of nuclear war between the super powers and the subesquent airlifts.In the end the Israeli army routed the Syrian and Egyptian armies and came within miles of Damascus and Cairo, encircling an entie egyptian army on the east side of the canal. The book has many drawbacks. It does not credit Mr. Sharon witht he credit he is clearly due for his hard hatted efforts to breakthrough and take the initiative while other isreali counteroffensives were crushed. THis book also is typically biased as the english press always is, towards the palistinians, who had nothing whatsoever to do with this war. In fact the war was fought by Sadat so that he could later sign a peace with israel and get rid of the russians so he could ally him self witht he americans(liek King Hussien had done). Sadat allowed his Syrian ally to be crushed while his soldier sstopped only miles from the canal, waiting under thier SAM missle shield. Other books on the subject might be helpful in filling the gaps. Notably Sharons 'Warrior', Harzogs 'War of atonement' and Boynes 'Two O' Clock war'. For details fot he israeli counterattack on the Sinai one can read Aden(Bren)'s account of the war.

THE definitive book on the subject

Comprehensive, insightful, balanced, and more. I only wish there were more maps and some better fact-checking or proofreading, especially since the book is advertised as "the revised and definitive edition": p. 271 says the carrier Independence can carry "eight hundred" aircraft; apparently "eighty" was intended. p. 277 refers to "giant" Antonov-12s, although they're C-130 equivalents. the Antonov-22's are the real giants. p. 356 says Watergate began in March of 1972 (June, of course, is correct) p. 368 has Soviet recon satellites being launched from Archangel; it's Pletsetsk