The War Against Rommel's Supply: 1942-43

by Alan J. Levine

Book Overview

Examines a critical but often overlooked aspect of the campaign for North Africa Reevaluates the development of Allied airpower

This is an exciting account of a little known, yet vital part of World War II: the Allied effort to blockade Axis forces in North Africa with a relatively small number of planes and submarines. Erwin Rommel's desert campaign relied on sea and air supply lines across the Mediterranean, and the Afrika Korps would be crippled...

• Format: Paperback
• Language: English
• ISBN: 0811734587
• ISBN13: 9780811734585
• Release Date: February 2008
• Publisher: Stackpole Books
• Length: 240 Pages
• Weight: 0.96 lbs.
• Dimensions: 0.7" x 6.0" x 9.0"

Customer Reviews

The War against Rommel's Supply Lines

I bought this book for two reasons. First, I've read Mr Levine before. His book "D-Day to Berlin" is excellent. Though I've read a number of books on the North Africa campaign before, this is the first book that deals with the logistic issue as the main theme. In 1940, the British started a small campaign to disrupt the Axis supply line to North Africa, believing that it would be the best way to assist the 8th Army in defeating the Axis. In 1941 and 42, the campaign was stepped up and included the assistance of US fighters. The effort and the action increased to the degree in 1943 that the author spends a little more than a third of the book on the five months on 1943. Much of the Allied effort to stop convoys from reaching Tunisia was with air power but British surface fleet and submarines were also used. Though the surface fleet didn't fare too well against German planes and Italian warships, British subs were able to sink merchant ships and some Italian escorts. The Germans tried to retaliate against this increased resistance by attacking the planes and ships stationed at Malta but weren't very successful. Though much of the book covers the destruction of German communications, the author also covers to a smaller degree land battles that were assisted by air strikes. This Allied campaign was so successful that it quicken the surrender of the Axis forces in May 1943 by months, maybe many months. This early surrender speeded up the Allied timetable for attacking Sicily and Italy which resulted in Italy suing for peace and forcing the Germans to send troops to Italy and away from France and Russia. It seems obvious this campaign worked for von Arnim still had 250,000 men and operational panzers and guns but didn't have fuel, ammo or food to prosecute the war. Surprisingly, the author author also includes coverage of the strengths and weaknesses of planes and other equipment used. The weaknesses of the US P-38s were new to me and welcomed information. There are two maps and some interesting photos. The author also provides an impressive Notes section as well as a extensive Bibliography and Index. Even if you have read about the land campaigns in North Africa with Rommel, Montgomery and Operation Torch, there is a good chance you will learn sometihing new and interesting in this book; it was well researched and would be an excellent supplement and reference to your existing library.

The failure of Axis logistics in the N. African campaign

Very well detailed, yet keeps the big picture throughout, as to the difficulties of the British, and the Axis in keeping supplies flowing to the Med. and N. African campaigns. Even more respect for the Afrika Corps, seeing the difficulties they faced getting supplies, especially fuel, and in losing air cover.

Attacking Supplies Wins War

Alan Levine's "The War Against Rommel's Supply Lines" (2008 reprint 230-page paperback) is a quick paced history for the Allies' defeat of the Nazi Afrika Korp. With six impressive chapters Levine recounts the Axis and Allied armies conflict for the entry to southern Europe. Beginning with explanation for Malta's strategic importance (as an island for British submarine and air force bases amid Italian and German sea lanes for supplying N. Africa) the book meticulously describes Axis and Allied units compositions and strengths. Eisenhower's and Rommel's campaign strategies and unit battle tactics are presented along with analysis of their successes and failures. The author posits the occasional "if only" scenarios to broaden reader comprehension. As the title suggests the battle for North Africa was as much about ending Nazi supply as it was fighting in the desert. As soldiers, tanks, canons, bombers, and air fighters warred across Tunisia and Libya, sailors, merchant marines, submarines, dive-bombers, and ships of all sizes battled in the Mediterranean. Keeping Rommel ill supplied helped towards Allied victory. Levine shows that attacking supplies wins wars! Amid the many beneficial and interesting aspect of this history is Levine's ability to show the Allies' maturing and growing edges through the conflict. The US military did not arrive to N. Africa (November 1942) ready to fight. The British military quickly and carefully trained the Americans as they fought side-by-side. Also, the author correctly documents Vichy France's reluctance to fight the Nazis and its marginal help to the Allies once it defected, in stages, from Hitler. This helpful history is well documented with 17 pages of endnotes, more than 25 period black and white photos illuminating Rommel's Afrika Korp, and five pages of bibliography. Unfortunately, only one map (of Tunisia on page vi) is provided. The downside of this book is the author's ability to race from one portion of the campaign, and war, to another with little warning. Transitions are rarely used here. Such syntactical evasion presumes reader identification with the subject. Levine is written for those with some World War 2 North African campaign knowledge. (This might be detractive for the novice WW2 reader.) This book is recommended to everyone with an interested in World War 2's North African campaign.

Outstanding Research Effort With Minor Presentation Issues

This is a very good book providing an in-depth analysis into the battle raging against the umbilical cord tying the Axis forces in North Africa to their base in Italy. In my opinion, no student of the war in the Mediterranean will be able to ignore it. The book covers the whole of the supply struggle waged in the Mediterranean, but focuses on the period following the Alamein battles and the invasion of North Africa by US and British forces, when it became imperative for Allied planners to prevent a permanent lodging of Axis forces in Tunisia, to the surrender of Axis forces in May 1943. Five out of six chapters are devoted to this effort, while the first chapter provides a concise, yet highly informative and well-researched summary of what went on during 1940-42. The focus chapters deal with the planning of the invasion of French North Africa, and in particular the role and establishment of 12th Air Force. The author describes well the troubles this formation went through when it was first established, and the very difficult command arrangements at the start of the campaign in Tunisia. The following chapters discuss the invasion, the attack against the build-up of Axis forces in Tunisia, which is rightly described in a very critical manner, the re-organisation of the forces engaged in the logistical battle from January 1943 onwards, and their contribution to the eventual victory. The book gives time to both US and British forces engaged in the battle, and is quite (and justly) complimentary to the Italian effort in keeping the Axis forces in Tunisia supplied. The author manages well to weave a narrative integrating theatre strategy and individual actions, although at times the information packed into single sentences or paragraphs can become overwhelming. I am also not convinced about the need for as much detail as is sometimes provided and editing could maybe have parsed the text a bit more of unnecessary detail. The book is very well-researched, going through archival material such as unit records of air formations engaged in the battle, or patrol reports of submarines, and it makes very good use of official histories, of both sides. This is a particularly outstanding feature of the book - where possible, the author made the effort of trying to verify claims made by Allied forces against air and sea targets, by checking the Axis records. While this is no doubt a thankless task, and often a wild goose chase, it is one that cannot be lauded enough. The author has also gone to good length in providing a background on the technical capabilities of the Allied weapons available for the task, highlighting the planes and submarines in particular. The book sports an index, an extensive literature list, and a good set of endnotes - in other words, it is a serious research work. What is missing is a list of maps, although since there are only two, so maybe that was not considered necessary. Which leads me to: sufficient in number and detail map

Well Written Narrative of a Largely Ignored Campaign

Was the solid battlefield performance of General George Patton and General Bernard Montegomery the greatest factor in defeating the Axis in North Africa? Alan J. Levine, also author of Stalin's Last War: Korea And The Approach To World War III, reveals for us a more likely reason for Allied victory in North Africa -- winning the war of logistics. We should welcome fresh analysis of "the efforts of Allied air and naval forces in the Mediterranean to cut off the supplies of the Axis forces in Northwest Africa during 1942 and 1943." Mr. Levine has made himself intimately familiar with the subject and has skillfully captured the war against Rommel's supply lines in six chapters: The War in the Mediterranean, 1940-42, Planning the Invasion of North Africa and the Twelfth Air Force, The Invasion of North Africa and the Race for Tunis, Attacking the Tunisian Buildup Nov-Dec 1942, Reorganization, Sea Sweeps, Land Defeats: Jan-Feb 1943, Victory: March-May 1943. "The War Against Rommel's Supply Lines" is not light reading or a page-turner, but a densely written narrative of the North African campaign. Mr. Levine has made an exhaustive study of Allied and Axis records to correctly justify claims of air kills and sunk ships. The author reveals how a captured ENIGMA machine and ULTRA gave the Allies an intelligence boost. To be sure, Mr. Levine has respect for the Italian Navy -- they were not the clowns portrayed in other works -- but were skilled in decoding Allied transmissions as well as expertly carrying out underwater demolitions. The author skillfully weaves in a series of well-written snapshots such as Malta's Beaufighters scouring the moonlit seas and mauling heavily escorted Italian shipping -- P-38 Lightnings bedeviling formations of heavily-loaded German Ju-52 transports inbound from Sicily -- and Italian sailors unselfishly rescuing British submariners they had just sunk. Later, far-ranging American B-17, B-24, B-25 and B-26 bombers attacked ports and airfields across Sicily, Italy, and Tunisia, with spotty success. Not surprisingly, aircraft struggled with desert conditions -- dry sand contaminating equipment, and the deep mud wrecking aircraft trying to land. Despite the notorious reputation the Mediterranean Sea has for undersea operations, Mr. Levine points out that this was only one of two successful submarine campaigns ever fought. Surprisingly, Allied surface ships did not fair well overall. Both sides suffered greatly from the unseen menace of underwater mines. Slowly, the Allies were able to overwhelm the Axis with superior numbers on the sea, land, and in the air. The author argues the successful campaign to cut the Axis's lines of support "led to a relatively cheap triumph over a large enemy force on land, with a major impact on the subsequent campaigns in Europe." No other book, with the exception of Mediterranean and Middle East 2004: v. IV: The Destruction of the Axis Forces in Africa: History of the Second