The Sword and the Olive: A Critical History of the Israeli Defense Force

by Martin van Creveld

Book Overview

Combining razor-sharp analysis with dramatic narrative, vivid portraits of soldiers and commanders with illuminating discussions of battle tactics and covert actions, The Sword and the Olive traces... This description may be from another edition of this product.

• Format: Hardcover
• Language: English
• ISBN: 1891620053
• ISBN13: 9781891620058
• Release Date: September 1998
• Publisher: PublicAffairs
• Length: 448 Pages
• Weight: 1.75 lbs.
• Dimensions: 1.5" x 6.4" x 9.6"

Customer Reviews

By Jerusalem-based military expert Martin van Creveld

Written by Jerusalem-based military expert Martin van Creveld (the only non-American author on the U.S. Army's required reading list for officers), The Sword And The Olive: A Critical History Of The Israeli Defense Force is a straightforward accounting of the history of Israel's army, beginning with its origins in the early 1900's when Jews fleeing Russian pogroms banded together for defense against hostile Arabs, down to modern day Israeli military clashes in Lebanon and against Intifada uprisings. The Sword And The Olive is confidently recommended as an exhaustively researched, soberly written, and unbiased account that questions whether the Israeli Defense Force has exchanged the role of the underdog David for the role of the powerful, arrogant, yet ultimately vulnerable Goliath.

Excellent

Both an accurate, factual and unbiased analysis of IDF strageties that fires conemdentation against Israel's methods.

An excellent history of the IDF

Martin Van Creveld does an masterful job at writing about the rise and the decline of the IDF. The first part of the is about how the IDF was improvised in the early phases of the First Arabi-Israeli War. According to Van Creveld those who originated from the PALAMCH companies were much more effective in combat compared to their British trained compatriots within the Israeli army. In the middle section Van Creveld criticizes is the IDF's performance in the Suez Canal campaign and the Six Day War. Van Creveld credits the airforces of the British and French in making the Israeli's campaign successful, but the Israelis committed numerous mistakes such the as the paratroop landing at Mitla Pass that was a militarily useless objective. The next chapter Van Creveld questions the IDFs effectiveness during the Six Day War. Van Crevled theorizes that contrary to public opinion the IDF did not practice the much vaunted indircet approach. The IDF mainly attacked the northern and central Egyptian forces in the Sinai. This allowed those Egyptians in the southern sector to escape. The only general to practice the indirect approach was Yoffe, but since Yoffe was an reservist he never received the publicity and the credit that was due to him. The IDF also never made use of combined arms except in the case of Sharon's operations in the Sinai. Van Creveld harshly condems Israeli operations in the opening phases of the Yom Kippur War of 1973. The overcentralized yet disoganized command structure of the IDF led to near disasterous defeats in the early phases of the Yom Kippur War. Van Creveld then evaluates the IDF's performance in Lebanon during the early nineteen eighties. The IDF tried to put too many armored vehicles in a country that had a scarcity of roads. As a result the IDF became bogged down in traffic jams and the PLO was allowed to escape. The IDF proved itself to be incapable of dealing with insurgencys as to seen in their response to the Palestinian uprisings of the late eighties. The IDF would send it's most ill trained sildiers to deal with the uprising. As a result the IDF either used excessive force or prudence, both of which led to defeat. Van Creveld states the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza is slowly stagnating the IDF and that the Israelis must pull back from these territories. Another aspect that is mentioned in the book is the situation of manpower within the IDF. In the first phase of it's history the IDF was a compact, highly trained, and motivated fighting force. But in the seventies and eighties the force became bloated and ineffective. The IDF accepted so many conscripts that all but the elite units were trained effectively.Van Crevled opionizes that the conscription of women has only made the problem worse. Van Creveld tells about how ill educated IDF officers are compared to their foreign counterparts. Unlike most Western nations the IDF has no formal service academy. Instead IDF officers had to prove their leadership abi

Very Good Review of the IDF

This was an excellent overview of the history of one of the greatest military machines ever to exist. Van Creveld, himself a veteran, writes with an engaging style, if not overly technical in some places. The book was originally written in Hebrew, so some words unique to the language will slow down a lot of readers. Van Creveld also translated (and transliterated) the book into English himself, so some spellings may be different that what a reader would normally be used to. The thesis and conclusions may shatter some illusions that you may have about the IDF, but they are completely accurate. A must read for anyone interested in Israeli history, especially recent history.

Most riveting book on the IDF to be published to date

This is an amazing book, recommendable to anyone interested in the history of the IDF. It truely takes a critical standpoint, highlighting both the accomplishments as well as the failures. Something that comes as a surprise is the parallel line the author draws to the German Armed forces prior to 1945, in terms of organization and warfare doctorine. Great book, at a great price!!! :-)