The Specter of Communism: The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1917-1953

by Melvyn P. Leffler

Book Overview

The Hill and Wang Critical Issues Series: concise, affordable works on pivotal topics in American history, society, and politics.

The Specter of Communism is a concise history of the origins of the Cold War and the evolution of U.S.-Soviet relations, from the Bolshevik revolution to the death of Stalin. Using not only American documents but also those from newly opened archives in Russia, China, and Eastern Europe, Leffler shows how...

• Format: Paperback
• Language: English
• ISBN: 0809015749
• ISBN13: 9780809015740
• Release Date: October 1994
• Publisher: Farrar, Strauss & Giroux-3pl
• Length: 160 Pages
• Weight: 0.39 lbs.
• Dimensions: 0.5" x 5.4" x 8.2"

Customer Reviews

As Good As It Gets

Melvyn Leffler's "The Specter of Communism" is a superb, short, and nuanced history of the origins of the Cold War. It should be assigned reading in any college course on 20th century American foreign policy. In Leffler's telling, Stalin felt vulnerable after World War II and wanted to preserve good relations with the U.S. The Soviet dictator insisted, however, on moving his borders westward, installing a puppet regime in Poland, and playing a leading role in the occupation of Germany and Japan. These goals didn't necessarily clash with core U.S. interests and might not have resulted in a Cold War if Europe and East Asia hadn't been on the verge of collapse after 1945. Since World War I, Washington had been haunted by the fear that the resources of Europe and Asia might fall under the control of one hostile power -- either Germany or Russia -- that could then threaten the security and political economy of the U.S. Washington policymakers didn't think that Stalin planned to start a new war, but they panicked when communist parties surged in France, Italy and elsewhere. Assuming that communist governments would link their economies to the USSR's, Washington responded by moving to rebuild the German economy and integrating Germany into a U.S.-led European bloc. Stalin, fearing a revival of German power, clamped down on Eastern Europe and blockaded Berlin. The Cold War was soon going at full steam. One of the high points of Leffler's book is the discussion of the domestic politics of anti-communism. American conservatives didn't give a hoot about Europe or foreign policy; however, they did want to exploit anti-Red feeling in order to discredit New Dealers and crack down on labor unions and civil rights groups. But having stirred up a lot of paranoia, conservatives were outflanked when the Truman Administration tapped these same sentiments to win support for expensive plans to rearm the U.S. and rebuild Europe! Thus the Great Bipartisan Compromise of the 1950s and '60s was born: an anti-Soviet foreign policy was married to crude Red Baiting at home. Leffler writes clearly, understands the policy environment of Washington, and doesn't accept the prevailing (and idiotic) myth that U.S. foreign policy is generally well-informed or motivated by moral considerations. On the contrary, the U.S. policymakers of the late 1940s were more-or-less amoral and sometimes poorly informed about foreign countries. (American foreign policy can be Machiavellian and inept at the same time.) "The Specter of Communism" is history at its best.

Readable and insightful survey of the genesis of the Cold War

I was assigned to read this short book for a course on United States foreign policy in the 20th century. Unlike a great many texts on the subject, I found it absolutely enjoyable to read. Things to watch in particular are how Leffler handles the shift of how the United States officially and popularly felt about Communism and the Soviet Union before and after World War II, the formulation of the doctrine of containment, and most especially the interplay between the leadership not only in the United States, but the Soviet Union and Europe as well. This final point, the exploration of the nature of particular leaders and national psyches, is the greatest strength of Leffler's account. FDR, Truman, and Stalin especially come alive in the narrative. Through the course of the narrative, the reader is given a very interesting and now unconventional thesis that to some extent, the Cold War was indeed inevitable in the post-war world as a result of the positions of the United States, the Soviet Union, and the ruin of Europe. Especially pivotal to the coalescence of the Cold War was the United States' declaration of the Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe. Leffler says: "The American intent was not to threaten the Soviets or divide Europe, but this was the price the Truman administration was willing to pay in order to revitalize Western Europe and harness the resources of western Germany" (pg 67). Overall, this is an intelligent and accessible account of the origins of the Cold War that anybody interested in the World Wars, the Soviet Union, Communism, and/or contemporary foreign policy would do well to read.

Good survey of US bias against communism

This book is good for what it tried to accomplish. Its a introductory survey of the origins of an American mindset against communism. Leffler points out that communism wasn't a concern of the USA population or politicians until after WWII- when the communist began to rival democratic capitalism. Leffler uses historical documents to support the assertion that the sum of world-wide communism never really came close to rivialing the US in terms of economic or military power. However, the fear that maybe communism could gain equal status one day in the future led the US to undertake decisive actions toward securing Hegemony.