The Somme

by Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson

Book Overview

Published in a new edition on the centenary of the seismic battle, this book provides the definitive account of the Somme and assigns responsibility to military and political leaders for its catastrophic outcome.

"A magisterial piece of scholarship. . . . It is a model of historical research and should do much to further our understanding of the Great War and how it was fought."--Contemporary Review

"Revisionist history at...

• Format: Paperback
• Language: English
• ISBN: 0300220286
• ISBN13: 9780300220285
• Release Date: April 2016
• Publisher: Yale University Press
• Length: 384 Pages
• Weight: 1.00 lbs.
• Dimensions: 1.2" x 5.1" x 7.7"

Customer Reviews

The complete truth about the British command

In recent years I have seen articles and film documentaries which tend to rehabilitate the image of the British military leadership, and of Haig in particular, during the Great War. The propositions are that the conditions of the war produced new and difficult challenges that it took the leadership time to adapt to, that whatever they did they could not avoid taking heavy casualties and that, in the end, they did learn and developed the most effective tactics by the end of the war. Reading this book reveals that the leadership really were donkeys. The last two propositions above may be true, but the top-level commanders are shown to be dreadfully slow learners given the amount of experience they already had by the time the Somme campaign began. Furthermore, they seem to have been devoid of any capacity for self-criticism. The book is a chronicle of incredible incompetence and Haig's aspirations had me, by the end, wondering if he might have actually been a bit deranged. The authors' conclusions, however, are measured and clear: Haig was simply the wrong man for the job; in fact too romantic rather than the dull plodder as he is usually characterized. The authors' thoroughness in investigating a broad range of original material, and their well-supported arguments, leave no doubt that this is the definitive study of the British performance at the Battle of the Somme, and not just of the military leadership but also the political, and of the lower-level command and the ordinary soldier as well. But it is not just a dry history text. The book reads well, lightened by the occasional flashes of dry humour, and the drama and tragedy of the battle is always apparent.

surgical description not a "soldiers' story" type

The book is another British interpretation of the battle.using almost solely British sources.The author faults the British commanders for not understanding the "changing face" of 20th century industrialized warfare where artillery and machine guns were the major consideration.Haig,the British commander is characterized as a "romantic",pretty much stuck in the 1850's "charge of the Light Brigade" type mentality.According to the author,the new technologies of the tank and the airplane are still too new to make a pronounced tactical difference one way or another at the battle of the Somme.These 2 new technologies while having instances of success were minor compared to the advances in artillery and the author states that about 70% of battlefield casualties during WW1 were caused by artillery alone. The author spends alot of time explaining the fine points of different calibers of heavy guns and mortars and their capabilities and effectiveness.The major theme of the book seems to revolve around the failure of the British High Command to understand how to properly use the "creeping barrage."Before you get to the end of this book you will definitely have the concept of a "creeping barrage" as part of your vocabulary.The German part in this book revolve around setting up good killing zones and waiting for the British Tommies to "come on." The book would be contemporary because it stresses the resposibilities of governments to be at the top of their military game in regard to preparation,equipment,hospital sevices,etc. when indulging in a war." The oft used quote by unsuccessful politicians and general,"WE did our best"!!,doesn't cut it in regard to a war,although the quote can be successfully used when doing the dishes.

The Second Circle of Hell in Detail

"The Somme" covers the events surrounding 1916's Battle of the Somme with a renewed look at the evidence, in some cases reviewing previously held beliefs and claims about events. In doing so, the book presents a very large amount of detail. The book is divided into chapters that focus on different phases of the battle, with the 1st July being dealt with over a few chapters, each focusing on particular sections of the front. With operations beyond that first period, the book shifts more to a chronology-based division of discussion. Although there were lots of things happening, the authors sometimes condense them and turn their attentions to representative operations in that phase of the battle. Coupled with extensive quotes from unit War Dairies, letters, communiques and other primary sources, the presentation of the information builds up a very solid overview the battle and its ebb and flow. While the authors are very critical of the commanders and their failures, (a case fairly well supported, as far as I could see), they also emphasise the fact that the civilian leadership was no more enlightened, contrary to commonly held opinions. Of particular interest to the critical eyes of the authors are Haig and Rawlinson, for varying reasons. One thing that was of particular note for myself was the inclusion of lots of maps, at least one per chapter. These maps give a good view of the section of the front for the chapter, making tracking the movements of units all that much easier. Prior and Wilson have given a great account of the Battle of the Somme, and certainly has my recommendation for anyone wanting a starting point for the battle itself. One will end this book with a very detailed understanding of the Battle of Somme, and some of the lessons that were eventually learnt from it.

A study in military incompetence

The authors provide a highly analytical study of one of the more famous campaigns of WWI. Their conclusions seem unassailable. The British soldier performed well but senior command performance was deficient. Haig had dreams of one great Murat-like cavalry charge ending the entire war. Communication between the various senior levels of leadership was lacking or dysfunctional. Even the civilian leadership refused to take a meaningful involvement. At times the writing style is a bit dry and the text can read a bit like a spreadsheet. Yet, the authors make their point and make it well. This will probably stand as the definitive study of the Somme for years to come.

Very critical of Haig

Prior and Wilson are very critical of Douglas Haig and contend that he never understood the complexity of modern warfare. During the intial planning of the Somme offensive Haig did not develop an effective bombardment plan that would neutralize the German defenses. As a result thousands of British soldiers were killed in the opening phases of the campaign by German defenses that managed to survive the massive British bomdardment. But this bomdbardment was very ineffective because the artillery failed to cooperate with the infantry and this led to gunners missing their target but a large margin. Haig continued his errors by believing that the battle could be a Napoleonic type of decisive victory and this made him to commit thousands of troops to a stalemated camapign. The only weakness of the book is that the authors leave out the French and German perspectives of the camapaign, but otherwise this is an excellent account of the battle.