The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans Von Seeckt and German Military Reform

by James S. Corum

Book Overview

Following Germany's defeat in World War I, the Germans signed the Versailles Treaty, superficially agreeing to limit their war powers. The Allies envisioned the future German army as a lightly armed border guard and international security force. The Germans had other plans.

As early as 1919, James Corum contends, the tactical foundations were being laid for the Nazi Blitzkrieg. Between 1919 and 1933, German military leaders created and nurtured...

• Format: Paperback
• Language: English
• ISBN: 0700606289
• ISBN13: 9780700606283
• Release Date: October 1992
• Publisher: University Press of Kansas
• Length: 294 Pages
• Weight: 0.95 lbs.
• Dimensions: 0.7" x 6.0" x 9.1"

Customer Reviews

Great work

Full of common sense. A must-have for anyone interested in the history of the German Army tactics. It is incredible how so many things were left to be put in written on a so-much studied subject.

A Solid Scholarly Analysis

The German Reichswehr - the military of the Weimar Republic from 1919 to 1933 - is far less well known than the Imperial German Army of the First World War or the Wehrmacht of the Second World War, but James S Corum's The Roots of Blitzkrieg goes a long way toward correcting that deficiency. This is not a popular history but rather, a scholarly analysis of how Germany rebuilt its army after defeat in the First World War and laid the groundwork for combat success in 1939-41. At the center of this account is General Hans von Seeckt, commander of the army from 1919-1926 and Corum focuses much of the book on the period of von Seeckt's reforms. After reading this book, readers may wake away with the impression that the harsh restrictions imposed upon Germany by the Allies in the Treaty of Versailles may actually have helped von Seeckt to build a better army than he might have if unrestricted. Not being allowed to keep a huge stock of outdated arms from the First World War forced von Seeckt to seek development of new and better weapons, including those developed in secret collaboration with the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the reduction of the German regular army officer corps from 60,000 to only 4,000 enabled von Seeckt to keep only the very best leaders. The author concludes: "this process of rebuilding the German Army is one of the most impressive and significant military accomplishments of the twentieth century." The Roots of Blitzkrieg consists of eight chapters and an epilogue. Corum begins with von Seeckt's emphasis to study and learn from the mistakes of the First World War to build a new doctrine for the Reichswehr. As the author notes, the victorious Allies paid little attention to learning from the First World War while the defeated Germans assiduously scooped up all the essential lessons for their new war-fighting doctrine. Interestingly, von Seeckt attached great importance to both tanks and gas warfare, both of which he saw as war-winning tools. The second chapter covers von Seeckt's re-evaluation of German military doctrine. Von Seeckt saw "the key to future victory was mobility" and the answer to the enemy's superior numbers. Despite the demonstrated strength of the defense witnessed in trench warfare, he emphasized an offensive orientation for the Reichswehr. The result of von Seeckt's re-evaluation was the `Leadership in Battle' regulations, written in 1921, that had a strong influence on the development of German tactics up to 1940. The third chapter deals with debate within the Reichswehr. To his credit, von Seeckt did not enforce orthodoxy but allowed serious professional debate within the Reichswehr about doctrinal development. There were three opposing schools of thought: the defensive school, the psychological school and the `People's War' school. The fourth chapter deals with training the Reichswehr. Since the Allies had limited the Reichswehr to only 4,000 officers but set no limit on NCOs, von Seeckt re-structured the Reic

An Enjoyable Introduction

This book is a good starting point for understanding German military developments in mechanized warfare during the interwar years. Alternately, if you only wanted to read one book on the subject, this would be a good choice. Easy to read, makes clear points, and covers a fair amount of territory.

The Reichswehr: A very sticky topic

Professor Corum has produced a very concise (c. 200 pages) history of how the German Army spent its inter-war years. Including chapters on doctrinal development (air and ground), training, and weapons design and implementation, Dr. Corum has done his best to avoid political/strategic questions that are inherent in a text covering the rebirth of the German military.Dr. Corum also makes a statement in focusing on General Hans Von Seeckt as the driving force behind many of the reforms the Reichswehr undertook during his years as chief of the general staff. By taking the spotlight away from Heinz Guderian, Corum has placed the emphasis on the man who fostered the kind of general staff where sweeping tactical and organizational changes were possible. Professor Corum also makes it very clear that those changes were in large part due to a serious assessment of the lessons of the First World War.A reader from an allied country may have difficulties in trying to separate the great advances in warfare made during the period of the Reichswehr, and how these principles were misused only a few years later. However, one can not avoid marveling at the professionalism and flexibility of the tradition of the Prussian General Staff, and it is those qualities that Professor Corum has focused on in his text.

Concise analysis of German rearmament in the Interwar years.

Corum, a historian, German linguist, and former military intelligence officer has written a fine study of how Germany was able to absorb the lessons of its defeat in WWI, overcome the restrictions placed on the size and composition of its armed forces, and develop the revolutionary military doctrine that swept it to astonishing victories against every European country it engaged. Corum focuses on General Hans von Seeckt, enigmatic Chief of the German General Staff -- twice awarded the Pour le Merit, Germany's highest decoration for valor -- as the architecht of this remarkable feat. Seeckt set the stage for reform of the Army by fostering a climate of open discussion on all matters regarding doctrine development in which the ideas of the best thinkers -- regardless of rank -- were given a full hearing. A tremendous number of experimental programs were conducted to try out various tactical doctrine. Many of these, secretly carried out in the USSR. Corum cites numerous training manuals, military correspondence and other primary resource documents to illustrate the revolutionary nature of Seeckt's impact on the German military. The book appeared about the same time as a book on American preparation for WWII -- There's a War to be Won -- that is very instructive when read together with Roots of Blitzkrieg. Current military leaders and their civilian overseers should read both books and bear in mind that the constrained resourses available to our armed forces today make the German model the more relevant of the two. Americans, fifty years ago could count on the full mobilization of our industrial and population base to prepare for war. Today's headlines continually reflect lack of preparedness in training exercises, inability to recruit and retain quality personnel (especially pilots), and inadequate funding for research and development programs -- a formula for disaster. Our political focus on humanitarian missions conducted by our armed forces has diverted training and R & D funds and that other scarce resource -- time -- from their intended purposes and prevented implementation of new information age technology. Corum's book demonstrates that, with even minimal support from the political establishment, the U.S. could revive its rapidly deteriorating military capability.