The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities

by Mancur Olson

Book Overview

"A convincing book that could make a big difference in the way we think about modern economic problems."--Peter Passell, New York Times Book Review

"Clearly, this is no ordinary theory. Equally clearly, it sprang from the mind of no ordinary economist."--James Lardner, Washington Post

The years since World War II have seen rapid shifts in the relative positions of different countries and regions. Leading...

• Format: Paperback
• Language: English
• ISBN: 0300030797
• ISBN13: 9780300030792
• Release Date: September 1984
• Publisher: Yale University Press
• Length: 276 Pages
• Weight: 0.73 lbs.
• Dimensions: 0.7" x 5.4" x 8.5"

Customer Reviews

Why isn't this book more famous?

Olson's book is difficult to classify, since on the one hand, it's not for the general reader, but on the other hand not so forbiddingly dense that it should be classified as scholarly. Lemme put it this way: it's for economically literate people. It makes use of, say, the concepts describing steady-state growth, supply factors, and expeduture-approach identities that one learns about in a college econ class. If you don't know what I just said, I imagine much of this book will be opaque to you. But if you can handle such stuff (and don't let me scare you too much: the gist of this book is clear enough even if you can't), man, O man! Olson's thesis is so brilliant it will give you whiplash! In brief, great empires invariably collapse not because of cultural overstretch, internal discord, or military misfortune, but rather because the very process of building an empire gives rise to myriad vested interests that eventually claw their way so deeply into the neck of the government that they eventually choke it. In other words, empires collapse because they are invariably made sclerotic by special-interest groups. An idea that is truly, classically brilliant: not obvious, but once developed at length, undeniable and endlessly applicable.

Taking "The Logic" Cross-National

Olson seeks to explain why some nations achieve high rates of economic growth while others suffer bouts of stagflation. He contends that the number and strength of "distributional coalitions," coupled with the length of economic and political stability will influence a nation's rate of economic growth. As such, Olson's hypothesis is two fold. First, Olson argues that states with lower levels of "distributional coalitions" often have higher rates of economic growth. Second, states which have experienced prolonged periods of disorder or armed conflict will have lower numbers of interest-group, or collusion organizations. Olson's explanation builds upon his early work in The Logic of Collective Action, which holds that "...large groups, at least if they are composed of rational individuals, will not act in their group interest" (18). Rather, the rational actor will seek to further his or her self-interest, and will subsequently free-ride when possible. Olson expands the scope of this logic to encompass not only the rationality of the individual, but the rationality of the firm in explaining The Rise and Decline of Nations. As the power of the firm expands, the firm seeks to maximize its own utility at the expense of a societal common good. In order to simplify a complex argument, we can think of Olson's theory in this way. An organization or firm will not expend its energy to create a benefit to society writ large, as it, and its members, will only receive a fragment of that benefit in relation to the costs incurred. On the other hand, if the same firm seeks to maximize its utility, it will seek to obtain a larger slice of the social "pie." In so doing, it may lower the benefits of society as a whole, but will significantly expand its own gain and that of its members. Meanwhile the firm will only incur a fraction of the costs such action projects on society at large. As such, Olson writes, "The great majority of special-interest organizations redistribute income rather than create it and in the ways that reduce social efficiency and output" (47). Olson argues that a society with long-term stability - free from war, and economic and political turmoil - tend to accrue more special-interest and collusion groups. This occurs because it takes time and reasonable amount of stability for such interest-groups to organize, solidify, and begin to achieve some collective benefits for their members. Once collective benefits are seen as the result of organization, a host of other interests will begin to coalesce and seek to obtain gains for themselves. What emerges is a highly pluralistic society. This leads us to the second part of Olson's hypothesis, those nations with high numbers of special-interest or collusion groups have lower levels of economic growth. Olson writes, "Distributional coalitions slow down a society's capacity to adopt new technologies and reallocate resources in response to changing conditions, and they reduce t

A parsimonious argument.

When I picked up this book to begin reading it, I was quite frankly nervous. I'd heard it recommended in so many places that I wanted to read it, but I am not an economist and so was not sure that I was going to be able to follow the arguments that it laid out. While I'm certainly not going to claim that I understood everything, I think that I did manage to follow the majority of Olson's points. Furthermore, I believe that this owes more to the lucid and well-structured nature of the book than it does to me being blessed with any unusual intelligence. _The Rise and Decline of Nations_ begins with an explanation of the questions that the book will explore and sets the standards for the consideration of a satisfactory answer. It then works out the logic of the offered argument and breaks that argument down into 9 well-described implications. It then goes on to test and explain that logic and those implications. Olson does a wonderful job of providing adequate support the concepts that he introduces, even to the point of pointing out areas where non-economists might have special trouble or require further information. As a result of all his hard work, the book has the feeling of being exactly as long as it needs to be, and no longer. I was certainly convinced by his arguments about how special interest groups affect economic growth. I understood why he was unwilling to take it farther into the area of policy, but couldn't help but wonder what the eventual policy implications would be, assuming that his theory is further tested and developed. I thoroughly enjoyed reading it, and recommend it wholeheartedly.

Elegant Theory Elegantly Presented

Professor Olson describes a wide range of social/economic structures and processes (unions, big government, high and rising taxes, regulation, monopolies, etc.) that characterize most economies but more so the aging economies of Western Europe (This book was written before the unification of eastern and western Europe). He then proceeds to show us what these all have in common: They each, together and with time, contribute in increasingly slowing down and stifling a nation's economy. Reading this book leads one to see that the USA is also involved in a similar progression, albeit at an earlier stage. I first read this book as an Economics student about 15 years ago. I enjoyed it tremendously. I also learned from it. His clear and powerful conveyance of concepts have kept the ideas with me. He explains the economics simply yet completely. One need not have studied Economics to follow him. I highly recommend this book. Even though the author's forescast is gloomy, his book is brilliant. Sherry S.

An excellent study with plenty of applications.

Olson does a stellar job "proving" his theory using accepted scientific standards. His main thesis is that stable societies, over time, will be stifled by a steady growth of groups each committed to obtaining a disproportionate amount of society's goods. This theory, composed of only nine implications, is parsimonious with wide explanatory power. It helps to explain the post-war growth of coutries such as Japan and Germany, while providing a reason why the growth rates of the United States, and especially Great Britain, have been stagnated. Perhaps the most interesting chapter of the book is the last, in which Olson merges both Keynesianism and monetarism to form a new theory of macroeconomics. By using his theory, he is able to better explain involuntary unemployment than either of the more popular schools of macroeconomic theory. I was amazed at how many phenomena, such as slavery and the Indian caste system, can be at least partially explained by Olson's theory. Anyone seriously interested in knowing the way the world works will want to give this theory substantial consideration.