The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present

by Christopher Layne

Book Overview

In a provocative book about American hegemony, Christopher Layne outlines his belief that U.S. foreign policy has been consistent in its aims for more than sixty years and that the current Bush administration clings to mid-twentieth-century tactics--to no good effect. What should the nation's grand strategy look like for the next several decades? The end of the cold war profoundly and permanently altered the international landscape, yet we have...

• Format: Paperback
• Language: English
• ISBN: 0801474116
• ISBN13: 9780801474118
• Release Date: December 2007
• Publisher: Cornell University Press
• Length: 304 Pages
• Weight: 1.01 lbs.
• Dimensions: 0.7" x 6.3" x 9.2"
• Age Range: 18 years and up
• Grade Range: Postsecondary and higher

Customer Reviews

A Brilliant Analysis

The Peace of Illusions may be the most important book on America's security strategy published in the last decade. Layne accomplishes three difficult feats, when achieving even one would have been impressive. He provides a controversial yet well-documented interpetation of U.S. grand strategy since the end of the 1930s. At the same time, he shows convincingly that Washington's current approach to world affairs does not serve the best interests of the American people and is ultimately doomed to failure. Finally, he articulates an alternative grand strategy--"offshore balancing"--that would reduce America's costs and risks and prove to be far more sustainable. In his historical analysis, Layne argues that the United States has consistently pursued global dominance since the early days of World War II. Probably the most controversial thesis in the Peace of Illusions is the argument that Washington would have embraced such a strategy during the Cold War era even if the Soviet Union had not existed. Layne attributes much of the U.S. drive for global hegemony to the goal of maintaining a liberal world economic order--the "open door." In advancing that thesis, he builds on the work of a number of "revisionist" historians and economists, most notably William Appleman Williams. Critics may contend, with some justification, that Layne overstates the open door thesis and does not give sufficient weight to other factors, including the impact of crusading idealism on U.S. policymakers. Nevertheless, it is hard to rebut his case that the United States, instead of adopting a more sober and restrained foreign policy following the demise of the USSR, has expanded both the definition of its interests and the aggressivness of its pursuit of those interests. Washington's conduct since 1989 tracks perfectly with a strategy of global hegemony. Layne does an even better job of demonstrating how Washington's current security strategy is needlessly costly in blood and treasure. His analysis of the Iraq debacle is especially devastating, but he shows that Iraq is not an aberration. The current imperial overstretch is now, and promises to be in the future, a bipartisan folly. Layne builds a compelling case that a hegemonic strategy has invariably led to the demise of previous great powers, and that a similar fate awaits the United States unless there is a change in course. And Layne has an appealing alternative security strategy--America as offshore balancer. Other scholars have used different terms, such as strategic independence and balancer of last resort, to describe such a strategy, but the principles remain the same. Instead of trying to be the global policeman (or even worse, the global armed social worker), the United States needs to adopt a more selective and restrained foreign policy. Contrary to proponents of the current policy, this alternative is not "isolationism"--a vacuous slur designed to stifle intelligent debate. It is, however, a policy

Creating a Foreign Policy for America

Many of the problems stemming from George W. Bush's grand neoconservative crusade are practical, resulting from the sort of mistakes to be expected from a gaggle of arrogant incompetents. Iraq, of course, is the most obvious example, but by no means the only one. Also fundamentally flawed, however, are the principles behind the Bush program. At these the redoubtable Chris Layne takes aim. Layne is a professor at Texas A & M University. He has long been writing trenchant articles and studies attacking the imperialist temptation, and especially the idea that the end of the Cold War allows--no, mandates--that Washington manage the rest of the globe down to the most insignificant civil war and local disturbance. The culmination of Layne's work is The Peace of Illusions, which focuses on matters of American grand strategy. The book is a serious read, but a necessary one if you want to understand why current policy would still have been a disaster even if Bush & Company hadn't been guided by fantasies when attempting to implement their vision. It is the imperialist vision itself that is flawed. Layne's analysis is thoroughly substantive, a sharp contrast especially with so much of the junk pouring forth from alleged "conservative thinkers." And the work is historical, recognizing that what happened yesterday still matters today. Layne explores the relationship between current controversies, past events, current players, and past strategies. It is a modern cliche to term books a "must read," but The Peace of Illusions surely is a must read for anyone who wants to understand and especially to change U.S. foreign policy.

In this mastepiece Layne says America must change its strategy of expansion

Christopher Layne's work The Peace of Illusions is a book published on the onset of a new millennium. It is a book about hegemony and preponderance and equally a book about grand strategies. More precisely, it is about US hegemony and US grand strategy. Layne argues that in order for the US to preserve its preponderant role in the world affairs a strategy of off-shore balancing is required. America could remain the main player in international affairs without necessarily engaging in costly and dangerous wars of expansion. In order to convince the reader that he is right, Layne wrote a book whose intellectual foundation is three-fold. First, at the theoretical level Layne offers probably the best taxonomy of realist theories. In the present academic world in which notions such as defensive or offensive realism are often open to debate and more often not clearly understood or, by the same token, not clearly defined, Layne's book brings precious theoretical clarifications. The author does not seek to find out what the foundation of a certain theoretical approach is or may have promised to be. Layne already knows all that. He shares his theoretical knowledge with the reader in a clear and direct language which makes his sophisticated analysis of theories of international politics accesible to the intellectual reader, regardless of his background. Layne's theoretical analysis is at the same time a taxonomy and a superb in-depth analysis of realism. Second, for those readers out there, political scientists, as well as, historians who believe that America's grand strategy since 1940s until the present was driven only by the noble purpose of saving the world from all sorts of -isms such as communism, totalitarianism. authoritarianism, or terrorism, Layne's interpretation of historical accounts would seem at the least bizarre. Some of the readers, possible, will be left with a bitter taste in their mouth. Layne's historical accounts are mostly drawn from primary sources. By doing so Layne comes to the conclusion that open door policy considerations ans liberal ideologies have pushed the US on a dangerous way of expansion. Those two factors have become the driving engine behind America's strategy of expansion. Certainly, those who believe that the US joined NATO solely for the noble purpose of defending Western Europe, or got involved in Iraq for the purpose of defending its citizens and the whole "free" world from terrorists who were not there to begin with before the US invasion, Layne's argument may seem outrageous. However, for those readers who are willing to pose and think twice, Layne's argument makes perfect sense. Third, in order to preserve American preponderance in the world for a longer period of time, Layne proposes a strategy of off-shore balancing. Layne's claim is based on the propositions that the US has the best military in the world and, at the same time, a sheltered geographical position. Therefore America can defend itself at any time