The Logic of Congressional Action

by R. Douglas Arnold

Book Overview

Congress regularly enacts laws that benefit particular groups or localities while imposing costs on everyone else. Sometimes, however, Congress breaks free of such parochial concerns and enacts bills... This description may be from another edition of this product.

• Format: Paperback
• Language: English
• ISBN: 0300056591
• ISBN13: 9780300056594
• Release Date: July 1992
• Publisher: Yale University Press
• Length: 293 Pages
• Weight: 1.30 lbs.
• Dimensions: 0.9" x 6.1" x 9.2"

Customer Reviews

a book which questions democratic accountability in congress

According to John G. Geer, a textbook account of a representative democracy is that representatives attempt to translate the public's view into governmental action. Legislators are supposed to represent and act on the interests of the electorate. Gere cites Edmund Burke's distinction between `trustee' democracy, in which politicians lead public opinion, and `delegate' democracy, in which politicians follow the public's will. Jean-Jacaques Rousseau believed that, ''the deputies of the people are not representatives; they are merely its agents". He expressed extreme cynicism regarding the British system of representation: "The English people believes itself to be free. It is greatly mistaken; it is free only during the election of the members of parliament, Once they are elected, the populace is enslaved; it is nothing." To the extent that Arnold's theory of Congressional behavior suggests that it is more necessary for legislators to identify issues that could make them vulnerable to challengers and to find the safe margin of decision making than for them to strictly adhere to the constituency opinion in roll-call voting, the US representative system seems to fall under `trustee' democracy, and is antidemocratic in the Rousseauian sense.