The Limits of Air Power: The American Bombing of North Vietnam

by Mark Clodfelter

Book Overview

Tracing the use of air power in World War II and the Korean War, Mark Clodfelter explains how U. S. Air Force doctrine evolved through the American experience in these conventional wars only to be... This description may be from another edition of this product.

• Format: Hardcover
• Language: English
• ISBN: 0029059909
• ISBN13: 9780029059906
• Release Date: May 1989
• Publisher: Free Press
• Length: 297 Pages
• Weight: 1.47 lbs.
• Dimensions: 1.2" x 6.5" x 9.6"

Customer Reviews

The Limits of Air Power: The American Bombing of North Vietnam

Great book....its a shame I got it via mail long after I needed it for my report. I had to use on=line resources to complete my report because there was no way to get the book faster. Also the seller was no help..they responded to none of my e-mails.

Sledgehammer at a Knife Fight

It is an article of faith to many airpower advocates that the "politicians" kept the military from winning, put too many restrictions on operations in Vietnam, kept them from hitting targets, and meddled in operational and tactical actions. Mark Clodfelter, who is a military historian at the National War College, shows that this view is wrong in a big way. He explains why the U.S. Air Force failed and then later succeeded is its strategic bombing campaigns in the skies over Vietnam. He focuses his account on Operations: ROLLING THUNDER, LINEBACKER and LINEBACKER II. ROLLING THUNDER failed for a number of military, strategic, and political reasons. The civilians in the Johnson administration failed to set clear strategic goals. Air Force generals designed their operations as if they were trying to destroy the industrialized economy of Germany fielding hostile conventional ground forces instead of what they were facing: a lightly supplied, indigenous insurgency in a third world country with an agrarian economy. In short, the U.S. Air Force brought a sledgehammer to a knife fight. President Lyndon Johnson did interfere with operational decisions, picking targets at his famous or infamous (depending on your perspective) Tuesday Luncheon meetings. For months there was no military representative at these meetings, and no minutes were taken. National Security Advisor Walt Rostow once told me that these gatherings were a lot like academic seminars in their tone, and with that in mind, it is hardly surprising that Clodfelter finds that participants often left the meetings with entirely different ideas on what had happened in them. Yet, he argues that better strategic direction would have made no difference, since the Americans brought the wrong tools to Southeast Asia. During Nixon's time in office, the nature of the war changed. Coldfelter's recognition that the war shifted with events is a major strength of this book and shows sophisticated analysis. After the Tet Offensive destroyed the Viet Cong, the Communists turned to conventional operations. The 1972 Easter invasion was an attempt to finish off the southern regime once and for all. This time the targeting criteria that Air Force and Navy planners used made sense, as conventional operations were far more susceptible to the type of air campaign the Americans wanted to wage. Weapons technology had changed significantly between the mid-1960s and the early 1970s. "Smart bombs" allowed the United States to do more with less. The Nixon administration, also had more limited goals in 1972 when it ordered LINEBACKER II compared to those of the Johnson White House during ROLLING THUNDER. Bombing to blunt the other guy is different from bombing to win. This is an important and broadly focused book. Clodfelter gives not only gives a good account of military developments, but he also shows how and why the diplomatic and strategic goals of the United States changed between the two pres

Not just about Air Power in Vietnam

On one level, Mark Clodfelter's "The Limits of Air Power" is a learned assault on the myopia of Air Force commanders and the canonical vision that political constraints doomed the military to defeat in Vietnam. On another, more important level, it is a thoughtful analysis of the classic Clausewitzean dictum that "war is politics by other means," which has implications far beyond the air campaigns against North Vietnam.Clodfelter uses a simple, but effective framework to examine political efficacy of three major air campaigns against North Vietnam: Rolling Thunder (March '65 to October '68), Linebacker I (April '72 to October '72), and Linebacker II (December '72). For each campaign, he assesses to what extent the bombing helped achieve the civilian leadership's "positive political objective" (i.e. what political purpose the US was trying to achieve by the use of force). At the same time, he identifies and assesses the various "negative political objectives" that put constraints on the use of force (i.e. what political purposes were endangered or aggravated by the use of force). Finally, he considers other factors that could constrain the use and effectiveness of air power, such as doctrine, weather, technology, personnel, etc. The author's conclusions are persuasive, although not exactly groundbreaking in their originality. In short, Clodfelter argues that Linebacker II (aka "Christmas Bombings"or "Eleven Day War") was a more effective political tool not because air power was finally unleashed with a fury against Hanoi as Air Force planners had been calling for all along, but rather because the positive and negative political objectives of December 1972 were so less ambitious and less constraining from those of pre-1968. Nixon's primary positive objective was to secure the continued withdrawal of US combat troops while not abandoning South Vietnam to an imminent communist take-over. Détente and Kissinger's diplomacy ensured that China and the Soviet Union would not intervene, and Nixon's landslide re-election the month before removed major domestic issues from the equation. Moreover, the conventional nature of the March '72 Easter Offensive exposed the North to punishing air attacks on their major combat units that seriously endangered their ability to defend themselves. Thus, the pain Linebacker II inflicted led Hanoi to agree to terms that gave the US "peace with honor" but left them able to fight another day. President Johnson's more sweeping positive objective (i.e. "a stable, independent, non-communist South Vietnam"), along with his many negative objectives (a legitimate concern of superpower escalation, a desire to protect his domestic Great Society Program and win support for the US abroad), and fundamental disagreement among his advisors on the chief objective on the air campaign, all combined to undermine Rolling Thunder's utility as a political tool.Is Clodfelter's work - and particularly his framework - relevant to the inte

A FAR better book than the unkind review below suggests

This book isn't perfect. Several times I found myself thinking 'hmm, I don't think that's a fair conclusion', mainly because of the author's occasional unsustained assertion, hyperbole or sweeping generalisation. But heck, this book deals with a very contentious topic, so the author isn't going to please everyone anyway. The research is good, the argument compelling (even if not always agreeable) and the prose clear and engaging. In short, this is a good book. It's certainly much better than the anonymous reviewer from Montgomery, AL, suggests.I teach airpower, and I encourage my students to read this book. They shouldn't swallow it all hook, line and sinker, but they SHOULD read it.

The limits of doctrine in face of reality

An associate professor of history at the US Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs, Colorado, Mark Clodfelter displays a huge knowledge of facts and figures as concerns the American bombing of North Vietnam. He masterly shows the connection between political and military factors conducive first to the failure in saving South Vietnam as an independent country, and later to helping the United States save their face when getting out of the trap. What is no less interesting from an up-to-date standpoint, the book also helps understand why the war of Kosovo was won by air power, and why not just so according to the three-day schedule envisaged by the NATO's high command.