The Korean War

by Matthew B. Ridgway

Book Overview

In December 1950 General Matthew B. Ridgway replaced General Walton Walker as commander of the Eighth Army, and in April 1951 he succeeded Douglas MacArthur as supreme commander of the United Nations... This description may be from another edition of this product.

• Format: Paperback
• Language: English
• ISBN: 0306802678
• ISBN13: 9780306802676
• Release Date: March 1986
• Publisher: Da Capo Press
• Length: 362 Pages
• Weight: 0.97 lbs.
• Dimensions: 0.9" x 5.5" x 8.5"

Customer Reviews

Ridgeway has his say on Korea

One of the finest books written on The Korean Conflict by a man who ought to know as much as anyone about combat and Korea. As a personal hero of mine in WWII he took over an army totally unfit to fight and win against the new enemy, the Chinese. How he turned this sorry situation around is spelled out in many other books. The General simply tells his story about how he helped to make the 8th Army combat effective again. As far as I'm concerned South Korea is the nation it is today partially because of him. This book pulls few punches and the truth rings clear to anyone who has worn our nation's uniform in battle.

Ridgway and Limited War

Matthew Ridgway is a fairly unknown general in US military history. This is unfortunate because he was incredibly insightful and capable. In fact, he was probably the United States' best general of the Cold War. _The Korean War_ is an account of his experiences commanding first the Eighth US Army and then the entire United Nations Command against the Communists. He entered the war at a time of catastrophic defeat. The Chinese Communists had forced the Eighth Army into a disastrous retreat, the longest in US military history. Ridgway took command of the Eighth Army and forged it into a more capable weapon. By doing so, he was able to halt the Communist advance and retake much lost ground._The Korean War_ explains how Ridgway did this. Moreover, though, the book demonstrates his ability to grasp how the Cold War meant that the US needed to fight different kinds of wars. Total war was now very dangerous because it could result in a Third World War with the Soviet Union or a much larger war with China. Ridgway, therefore, endorsed the necessity of fighting limited wars. He developed this stategy as well as an operational approach of attrition. He wanted to wear down the Communists and force them to concede in negotiations. He focused on reducing the risk of escalation and minimizing his own losses in order to form a sustainable strategic and operational approach. As such, Ridgway played a formative role in the development of US strategy in the Cold War. This book explains how and why he did so. It is essential reading for anyone who wants to understand conventional military strategy during the Cold War.

Excellent book for a military perspective of the Korean War

General Matthew Ridgway commanded the U.S. Eight Army in Korea from December 1950 until April 1951 when he succeeded General Douglas MacArthur as Supreme Commander of the United Nations forces in Korea and Supreme Commander of the U.S. Far East Command. The Korean War is his personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and his view of the implications the Korean conflict would have on future U.S. foreign policy. Ridgway does a fine job of explaining the impetus for U.S. involvement in a war on the Korean peninsula, a war in which America was incredibly unprepared and downright disinterested. Ridgway's analysis of the U.S. failure to anticipate the invasion is insightful. The U.S. believed the next war would be another global conflict similar to World War II in which Korea would play very little importance. Ridgway states that the U.S. was not concerned with Korea mainly because it was beyond the traditional U.S. defensive perimeter that would be protected against the next global conflagration. Furthermore, Ridgway points out that the U.S. had faith in the United Nations to forestall any serious aggression and, in the event of a failure, the U.S. felt confident in the power of its nuclear deterrence. Ridgway claims confidence in these factors left America believing in a psychological Maginot line in Korea. Little fault can be found with Ridgway's analysis of the North Korea's invasion of South Korea and subsequent unprepared U.S. entry into the Korean War. Ridgway states "diplomacy is only as strong as the military muscle willing to be put forth." The amount of military muscle put forth is driven by the resolve of the American populace and with Korea there was little. Had the U.S. demonstrated or even indicated a resolve to protect the South Korea, the invasion probably could have been averted. Ridgway dedicates much time to the civil-military dispute between General MacArthur and President Truman during which MacArthur was eventually relieved and replaced by Ridgway. Ridgway claims that the outcome of this dispute settled once and for all the debate over military versus civilian supremacy when determining the course of U.S. policy. From the beginning of the Korean War, MacArthur had his sights set on a victory that was not the limited to South Korean liberation but included to global destruction of Communism. President Truman on the other hand was mindful of the politics at home and abroad and did not support MacArthur's calls for the isolation and destruction of China and all of Communism. Truman knew what MacArthur refused to recognize -- that America would not rise to fight World War III as it did to fight World War II. Additionally, Truman was very aware that the new dynamics of the Cold War and of nuclear proliferation were changing the face of warfare and bringing to light a new concept of conflict, limited war. Ridgway does a superb job of analyzing the conflict betwee

The commander tells how he saw the war in Korea

Matthew Ridgway was arguably the finest general officer to serve in United States forces in the 20th Century. Whether one agrees with this ranking or not, no one can dispute that he performed a feat of leadership unmatched by any senior general in American military history - he took an American army that had suffered the greatest defeat in its history and rebuilt it through the force of his personality and gifts of leadership and turned it around and had it successfully on the offensive in only one month. Had he done nothing else, his fame would be unmatched, yet he additionally kept the United States out of the Indochina morass that ten years later would be Vietnam - when there were no Ridgways to warn of the dangers of commitment there.