The Generals' War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf

by Bernard E. Trainor and Michael R. Gordon

Book Overview

An account of the war in the Persian Gulf takes readers behind the scenes at the Pentagon and the White House to provide portraits of the top military commanders and to discuss what worked and what... This description may be from another edition of this product.

• Format: Hardcover
• Language: English
• ISBN: 0316321729
• ISBN13: 9780316321723
• Release Date: January 1995
• Publisher: Little Brown and Company
• Length: 551 Pages
• Weight: 1.95 lbs.
• Dimensions: 1.5" x 6.4" x 9.6"

Customer Reviews

A detailed and hard-hitting account of the Gulf War

In "The Generals' War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf," Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor have crafted a fascinating work of military history. As the title indicates, the book places a heavy emphasis on the actions of the senior military officers involved in the planning and execution of the U.S.-led coalition's 1991 war against Iraq. In the preface, the authors note that this conflict "is without precedent in the annals of warfare. It was the dawn of a new era" (page x). In their acknowledgements section, the authors discuss in detail the research that went into the writing of this book. They note that they interviewed administration officials, diplomats, allied military officers, and intelligence experts; they observe further that some "talked on the record; others on a not-for-attribution basis." They also drew on written responses that former president George Bush provided to their questions. Their research is meticulously documented in a lengthy set of endnotes (pages 479-520), thus enhancing the book's credibility. The text is further enhanced by thirteen detailed and clearly drawn maps that illuminate many aspects of the war: the Iraqi air defense system, coalition force deployment and movement, locations of oil fields, and more. Also included are photographs of many of the senior leaders involved in the war. The book is full of fascinating details about many aspects of the war. The authors discuss the participation of various coalition forces in the campaign, as well as the diplomatic activities involving the USSR, Egypt, and other nations. Also discussed are friendly fire incidents and Iraqi POWs. I was particularly interested in the many details about the military hardware used by both coalition and Iraqi forces; the authors cover aircraft, naval vessels, sea and land mines, mine-clearing gear, tanks, and more. There are some really noteworthy battle scenes; particularly vivid is a description of a tank battle between U.S. and Iraqi forces--"an impressive tableau of destruction." Gordon and Trainor are pointedly critical of many aspects of the conduct of the war. They discuss examples of rivalry and poor coordination between the different branches of the U.S. military, and also criticize the French and the Saudis. But the strongest and most sustained criticism is directed at General Norman Schwarzkopf. The authors assess both his command style and planning of the war and ultimately fault him for failing to achieve true joint warfare. The book places a heavy emphasis on the battle of Khafji; the authors discuss this engagement in detail and criticize both Schwarzkopf and General Colin Powell for failing to grasp its lessons. Gordon and Trainor note that the Persian Gulf War was "a laboratory for the American military's new weapons and fighting doctrines." This well-written book vividly shows how hardware, tactics, diplomatic concerns, and personalities came together in the fighting of this war.

Not the same Gen Franks

To those reviewers who have pointed out that the Gen Franks who comes off as incompetent in "The Generals' War" is ironically the same Gen Franks who led the recent war against Iraq, please read the book again. The Gen Franks in "The Generals' War" is Gen Frederick Franks, while the CENTCOM Commander who led the military forces in the most recent war with Iraq is Gen Tommy Franks. They are NOT the same person.

objective account

This is an objective account of the planning and execution of military force during the gulf war. It brushes aside many of the claims made by the USA, and our military brass(details ineffectiveness of patriots, lack of SCUD hunts, overestimation of enemy, etc). It is well written and entertaining, however I wish it had more maps with greater detail of the region and military advances and attacks. I would give this book my highest recommedation.

MUST READ for GULF WAR HISTORIANS

The General's War is an excellent account of the planning and implementation of the Gulf War. In short, it shows why the United States is a great nation. One of the main reasons we were so successful was because we DID argue on how to fight this war. Both the Military and Washington worked together to come up w/ the best possible plan. No war is ever conducted perfectly, but the Gulf War comes pretty close. Don't forget...it is the men and women who fought the war that won it, but the planning phases were crucial to putting our soldiers in the position to win. A little luck in some area never hurts as well. The best part of tis book is that it questions specific decisions from the war. This critcal analysis not only brings awareness, but helps our military and polititians plan future military operations. Don't forget to read "Bravo Two Zero" about the British SAS in the Gulf. Great book!

An outstanding critical assessment of the Gulf War.

Bernard Trainor presents two key arguments in this book that are worthy of consideration. One is that the USMC learned early on in the battle for Kafji that the Iraqi army was a house of cards, but Gen. Swartzkopf either ignored or missed that message and in any event never got the word to VII Corp commander Gen. Franks to position his troops for a battle of pursuit. As a result a large portion of the Republican guard were able to escape the VII Corp left hook. The second key argument in this book is that Colin Powell the author of the so-called "Weinburger Doctrine" which argued for the use of US forces only when victory is assured and when backed by the will of the American people, urged George Bush to call a premature end to the war which allowed the Republican Guard to participate in crushing the Shi'ite rebellion occuring within earshot of US troops. Trainor is sometimes a little too critical of decisions made in the heat of battle and far too USMC-centric but he is an outstanding student of war. I highly reccommend this book.