The Desert Generals

by Correlli Barnett

Book Overview

An outstanding contribution to the history of the Second World War, this complete account of the Desert Campaign of 1940-43 is now better than ever, with new commentary and fresh documentary evidence... This description may be from another edition of this product.

• Format: Mass Market Paperback
• Language: English
• ISBN: 0345024710
• ISBN13: 9780345024718
• Release Date: January 1972
• Publisher: Ballantine Books
• Length: 370 Pages
• Weight: 0.50 lbs.

Customer Reviews

Churchill prolonged the war in N Africa

The book is 300 hundred pages long with 22 pages of commentary on the chapters and about 30 pages of listed references and reprints of actual documents. There are 29 photos of the generals discussed in the book which are actually a very nice touch as you read about these individuals. There are 25 hand drawn maps that show the action being written about. I don't know who drew them (Maybe Barnett himself) - they are clear but almost quickly scribbled out. At first it is a curiosity, but then you accept them 2nd ratedness since the book is so well written. John Keegan used this book as a reference when he wrote that fantastic book "The Second World War". He said about this book "The fighting in the Western Desert, for the Germans an appendix to their advance to the Mediterranean, has been much written of, but nowhere better than in Cornell Barnett's 'The desert Generals." The book covers the British general in great, fascinating detail from Major-general R.N. O'Connors first campaigns against the Italians, to Montgomeries pushing Rommel back to Tripoli. I have never heard of Major General O'Connor, but he must be the greatest British General of WWII. He is in the league of Rommel. This book illustrates clearly how O'Connor understood and used mobile forces (mechanized) to out manouvre an enemy the OUTNUMBERED HIM BY 10 TO 1. The book also covers the meddling Churchill undertook, and how his overall strategy stopped O'Connor from completely eliminating the Italians before the Germans even had a chance to get to N Africa to save their allies. After O'Connor is sent off to another area by Churchill, the new British commnaders are not trained in the concepts of mechanized warfare etc. The author very clearly explains the British shortcomings as far as how they organize their units, what are the overall strategies that ignore using mobile forces. (O'Connor was a revolutionary commander in the British way of conducting warfare) The commander in Chief of the middle East during this time was General Sir Claude Auchinleck. Never heard of him, but another man brought to life by the author, and a very able general. His one fault was not relieving a couple commanders soon enough, after poor performance. The only German general covered in this book is Rommel. The author does an excellent job in describing Rommels actions and how they compared to the British actions/reactions. Typically Rommel would be able to plan, organize and execute a counter attack in less than one day. The British (because of their outdated views, and unit organization) would take several days at minimum. This book however covers almost NOTHING concerning the condition of the troops. Other than constant fuel shortage for the Germans. Nothing about the heat, food, casualties etc. Just about the General (as the book title indicates) Some quotes from the book: "...most regular officers of the British Army were amateurs as well as gentlemen. Born into the gentry or

Fabulous Use of Sources

Barnett's "warts and all" bios of so many of the British officers involved in the African campaign stirred up the Montgomery worshippers, despite the length of the rest of the work when compared with the section on Montgomery's command. The author succeeded with the original edition because of his reliance on facts already of record; the later editions beginning in the 1980s included the revelations from the declassified Ultra program. At the end of each section Barnett has new commentary based on the new information available, but apart from one or perhaps two instances, finds even more support for his conclusions, and often enough, more reason to criticize the Montgomery deification. The original edition remains intact within the new edition, which is an excellent approach. Winston Churchill is criticized for his incoherent meddling. A great war leader like Churchill is bound to have made really monumental blunders, and did. By forcing one of his African commanders to launch an unwinnable and (at best) ill-advised to save Greece, he prolonged the war in Africa by two years. Auchinleck and Dorman-Smith produced the plan which defeated Rommel, beat Rommel, and were then relieved by Churchill. Montgomery's victory at Second el Alamein cost him more than half of his tanks and ended with Monty's failure to chase and catch Rommel before he could slip back to Europe. And the "victory" was entirely due to Hitler's failure to resupply Rommel; its timing was determined by the landing of US troops far behind Rommel, which was the cause of Rommel's retreat. Barnett's use of sources is splendid. He relies on British sources, but also uses German and Italian sources thoroughly and appropriately to illuminate the back and forth struggle in North Africa. Regarding "What If" scenarios -- Despite some claims to the contrary, the threat to Allied war efforts posed by the loss of the Middle East was real and serious. Loss of the Middle Eastern oilfields would have crippled, even eliminated, the British fleet, opening the road to a German invasion of Britain, thereby ending any possibility of a western, second front such as the one opened on D-Day. At best, it would have required even more US convoys; the few dozen miles of English Channel was a terrible logistical obstacle to the use of Allied armed forces after D-Day (although that can in large part be attributed to Montgomery). Loss of the Suez Canal would have cut the British Empire in two, leaving the Far East the exclusive domain of the Japanese. Luckily, Germany was led by a military bungler and meddler worse than any other produced in the 20th century. Omar Bradley's "A Soldier's Story" has some more truthfully negative remarks about Montgomery, and is also worth reading to find those.

Barnett displays his keen ability to dissect high command

In this book, Barnett again demonstrates a unique ability to dissect high command. Barnett was ahead of his time with his critical analysis of Montgomery. The latest edition includes a section which details the extent to which the allies in North Africa knew in advance what Rommel's moves would be, thanks to ULTRA intercepts. With this additional information, Montgomery's cautious conduct of the campaign in North Africa comes into even greater question. Barnett also details how the British, under O'Connor, were on the verge of driving the Italians from North Africa in 1940, but instead chose to send an expeditionary force to Greece on what was basically a poltical mission masterminded by Winston Churchill. That mission, like Churchill's foray into Gallipoli during the First World War, collapsed and Axis forces were not cleared from North Africa until early 1943. This book is highly recommended for anyone who enjoyed *Hitler's Generals* or *Swordbearers*, both also by Barnett, or anyone interested in the history of the Second World War, North African theater.

Bashing the Montgomery Myth

This work is a study of military leadership under stress, not a detailed blow-by-blow campaign history. The setting is the Libyan and Egyptian deserts, between June 1940 and January 1943. The perspective is thoroughly British and the fluctuating tide of British military fortunes is depicted by a detailed examination of the five key commanders in this period. Originally written in 1960, this work was revised in 1981 to incorporate the later information on the role of Enigma. Although Barnett's main contention - that General Montgomery's accomplishments were more mythical than factual - is not addressed until the last chapters, it is the primary intent of the author to debunk this myth. The first chapters deal with the opening of the desert war and the initial victories of Field Marshal Wavell and General O'Connor over the Italians. Beda Fomm was O'Connor's brilliant victory, but today it is overshadowed by Rommel's battles. Despite the extent of these victories, the victors were soon forgotten: O'Connor was captured in the initial attack of the German Afrika Korps and Wavell was relieved by Churchill. Although this was an interesting phase of the war for the British, these chapters lack the dynamic quality that the rest of the book has. General Sir Alan Cunningham, a hero of the campaign in Ethiopia, was sent to replace O'Connor. He was the first British general to face Rommel on even terms, but he lasted in command for only three months. When Cunningham took command, the British were still reeling from Rommel's first offensive and desperately attempting to raise the siege of Tobruk. Cunningham presided over the premature Operation "Crusader" to relieve Tobruk, constantly goaded by Churchill to strike at once. Barnett's portrait of Cunningham is interesting in two respects. First, as a successful colonial soldier suddenly thrust into command of a large mechanized army, Cunningham fumbled Operation Crusader (although more for non-technical reasons, like failure to achieve mass at the decisive point or maintain unity of effort). Cunningham was able to recover and muddle through to a victory of sorts, but suffered a loss of confidence that was fatal to his continued command. This is Barnett's second interesting point, on the strain of battle command upon the commander. Ostensibly, Cunningham was relieved due to "battle fatigue" but the erosion of his command authority and confidence was closer to the truth. General Auchinleck, the British Commander-in-Chief in the Mideast, then made a disastrous choice in selecting General Ritchie to temporarily command the 8th Army. Although Operation Crusader had forced Rommel to abandon the siege of Tobruk and pull back, Ritchie took over command as the Germans swept back up to the Gazala line outside Tobruk. Ritchie was well-connected politically and he possessed a soldierly image but unfortunately, his professional abilities were modest. Ritchie was unimaginative and indecisive

Fills a gap and pays a well deserved tribute.

This book examines the role played by some of the lesser known yet great commanders of the North African campaign. The arrival of Field Marshall Montgomery in North Africa and his subsequent victory at El Alamein in 1942 made him a overnight hero. Unfortunately, the commanders who had come before him were not given their dues, even though they had done a great job managing the situation in the North African theater during the intial difficult times. Undoubtedly, Montgomery had done a great job in winning the war in the North African theater, yet one must not forget that other great commanders such as O'Connor, Auchinleck, Ritchie, Wavell, Cunningham had set up the stage for him. In order to have a balanced view of the commanders in the North African campaign, this book is a must read.