The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy

by James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock

Book Overview

The Calculus of Consent was co-authored by Buchanan with Gordon Tullock, with whom Buchanan collaborated on many books and academic enterprises throughout their careers. As Robert D. Tollison states in the foreword, " this book] is a radical departure from the way democracies conduct their business. The Calculus is already a book for the ages."

This classic work analyzes the political organization of a free society through...

• Format: Paperback
• Language: English
• ISBN: 0865972184
• ISBN13: 9780865972186
• Release Date: August 1999
• Publisher: Liberty Fund
• Length: 376 Pages
• Weight: 1.35 lbs.
• Dimensions: 1.1" x 6.0" x 9.0"
• Age Range: 18 to 10 years
• Grade Range: Postsecondary to Grade 5

Customer Reviews

High praise with a grain of salt

The main contribution of this pathbreaking book is by providing a rationale for the "counter-majoritarian difficulty": Why does society tolerate the "dead hand" of the constitutional framers to limit the freedom of choice of living individuals who wish to undo the constitution? The authors muse that in some previous stage, where individuals cannot identify their future preferences, each individual is threatened by two kinds of risk: The first is that others will attempt to take something that belongs to her and achieve their purpose by popular vote. From this prespective each individual desires that such a popular vote will not be made effectual unless supported by the largest number of participants. The second concern is that individuals might wish, in the future, to appropriate something that belongs to others, and may be thwarted by a popular vote, inimical to their cause. From this second perspective they wish to institute a rule that allows the appropriation to take place with only a minimal number of supportets. Each one of these two perils can be represented by a cost function, where the cost is a function of the number of voters necessary to carry the proposed measure; adding up the two functions generates an aggregate cost schedule for all rational players. The minimum of the aggregate function indicates the optimal number of individuals, as a portion of the voting population, necessary for carrying the proposed measure. If this number is greater than 50% of the population, this fact justifies the entrenchment of entitlements in a constitution. The grain of salt that must be added to this analysis is that the authors do not provide an explanation why that number might be greater than 50% of the population, or what might be the conditions that must be satisfied for the generation of that number.

Classic work in economics and political organization

The Calculus of Consent, written by James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, is one of the founding publications of what has since become known as the subdiscipline of public choice, which is the application of tools of economic analysis to the domain of political decision making. In theory, political decisions are made by elected officials in their pursuit of the "general interest" or the "common good", however defined. In reality, however, political decisions reflect the outcome of the workings of a number of interested parties, which includes voters, politicians, career government officials (bureaucrats), special-interest groups, lobbyists, etc., each of whom have their own agendas and interests. When someone appeals to the public interest while making a political argument, more often than not the underlying motive is a matter of self-interest (e.g. teachers' unions angling for larger teacher salaries under the pretext of improving public education). Public choice theory does not mean to be critical or cynical about this. Instead, it is merely intended to be descriptive: that's simply the way the political decision-making process works, and we need to understand this first before we try and improve the world through politics. For his central role in the development of public choice theory, professor Buchanan would go on to earn the 1986 Nobel prize in economics. The book's main contribution lies in its development of the analysis of political behavior, particularly so-called logrolling (i.e. vote-trading, or political exchange). The Founding Fathers set up our political system in order for the general interest to be served rather than interests that only benefit specific groups at the expense of the rest of the population. But elected officials have learned to circumvent that intent by happily trading their vote on issues on which they don't care one way or the other in exchange for votes on issues about which they do care. All members of the legislature end up voting for each other's pet projects, which all get enacted at taxpayers' expense. The authors propose that one solution would be to distinguish between legislative rules and constitutional rules. Legislative (statutory) rules may be adopted by simple majority coalitions pursuing their own interests. Constitutional rules, on the other hand, are supposed to be decided on without regard for short-term individual consequences ("what is right in the long run?" instead of "what's good for me today?"). Legislative rules are substantive, constitutional rules are procedural. Constitutional rules are meant to restrict abuse of the legislative process by majority coalitions. The difference between legislative and constitutional rules is perhaps somewhat idealistic. After all, what's to prevent people from voting for or against constitutional rules based on their short-term interest. In theory, people are thought to realize that "what's right" will also benefit them, as everyone els

Politics through an economist's lens

In this landmark work, Buchanan and Tullock work through the basic principles of public choice theory. They reject the political scientists' conception of the political process in which policy decisions are viewed as a private interest vs. public interest struggle. They replace that with a theory that the public interest is simply the aggregation of private decision makers. They further point out that in the political science view, the "public interest" is always the correct choice with the same appeal to all voters, which may or may not be thwarted by "special interests", when in fact most choices appeal to many different "law consumers" with different strengths. That is to say, given a choice to fund road improvements or not, some voters will have very strong feelings for, some strong feelings against, but many voters may not have strong feelings either way. In a market transaction, the voters strongly desiring the road could purchase the acceptance of the opposition and uninterested voters with concessions, resulting in an efficient allocation of resources (everyone is happy). The analog to this in the political realm is that politicians buy the votes of other politicians by promising to vote for their issues. Thus, in the Buchanan/Tullock view, such log-rolling is to be expected, while in the traditional political science view, it is anomalous. Their model explains things that the standard view of politics previously could not.They also make distinctions between constitutional rules and voting made in the context of existing constitutional rules. As part of the constitution making process, they point out that the traditional political science approach views simple majority voting as the standard, and question why unanimity is not. There is a tradeoff to be considered: a unanimity-based system results in no external costs, but considerable decision-making costs, whereas a simple majority-based system imposes some of both. They conclude that many more decisions should be made on at least a super-majority system, especially those decisions that potentially impose significant external costs.The biggest problem I had with this book is that the prose is somewhat dense, though not as bad as Ricardo. They tend to write almost exclusively in the passive tense. One description I have seen of this work is that it essentially applies the science of economics to the ideas described in Federalist X. It would be nice to see an update of the contents in a more user-friendly style; their ideas would find a much broader audience and a better understanding of Madison's thesis on majority rule and the "violence of faction".

A genuine, celebrated classic

Some reviewers comment that this book has "a conservative bias." Nothing could be further from the truth. This book is written in the great classical-liberal tradition that motivated the American revolution and the drafting of America's 1787 Constitution. Buchanan and Tullock saw themselves as putting into modern economic language the insights and wisdom of James Madison and Co. The book does indeed counsel skepticism of big government, and it is no great fan of unlimited democracy. But the authors come to this position because they understand that even democratic governments can be tyrannical and that a depoliticized society -- governed largely by private property rights -- promises peace, prosperity, and cultural flourishing. Few books on economics are as original and insightful as is The Calculus of Consent -- and it remains as fresh in 1999 as it was when first published in 1962.

A landmark in analysis of government and its problems

This is probably one of the most rewarding books anyone can read. If you care about government and what it does (or doesn't) do to (or for) you, read this book. It requires patience and concentration, but it's well worth the effort. The authors succeed in showing how it is wrong to assume that government has always the best of intentions. They put a human face on politics and explain with impressive reasoning why government and politics produce unreasonable outcomes. The explanatory power of this book is unmatched. Anyone who cares about what this country is and what it could be should read it. Despite what you may have heard, their agenda is not conservative, it is individualistic, treating each person with dignity. The outcomes may surprise you, but you can't help but be moved by the force of their logic.