Structure of Behavior

by Maurice Merleau-Ponty

Book Overview

Keine ausf hrliche Beschreibung f r "Die Struktur des Verhaltens" verf gbar. This description may be from another edition of this product.

• Format: Paperback
• Language: English
• ISBN: 0807029874
• ISBN13: 9780807029879
• Release Date: January 2000
• Publisher: Beacon Press (MA)
• Length: 256 Pages
• Weight: 0.65 lbs.

Customer Reviews

Merleau-Ponty's argument for phenomenology

I would like to begin by saying I agree with Idiosyncrat in regard to the importance of this work for understanding Merleau-Ponty's philosophy as a whole. I would like to add some reasons why I consider this particular work important especially for those who are interested in phenomenology. Merleau-Ponty was a phenomenologist in the tradition of Husserl and Heidegger. The path Merleau-Ponty follows to phenomenology, especially in The Structure of Behavior, is, however, unique. I. Phenomenology as a general approach to philosophical questions begins with the work of Husserl. Merleau-Ponty belongs to this tradition to the degree that he uses the methods of phenomenology and phenomenological analysis in approaching philosophical problems. But there are some differences in approach between Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. Unlike Husserl, Merleau-Ponty does not begin his analysis in The Structure of Behavior with a `phenomenological reduction' and he does not attempt to offer, at first, any philosophical arguments for the adoption of the transcendental (or phenomenological) attitude. Merleau-Ponty also does not choose to begin his analysis with "consciousness" as Husserl does, but with behavior which Merleau-Ponty believes is neutral in regard to the classical distinctions between 'mental' and 'physical' (pg. 4). This means that Merleau-Ponty, like Heidegger, will ultimately ground his phenomenology at a deeper (existential) level, as opposed to merely analyzing explicit, or theoretical, acts of consciousness. Merleau-Ponty summarizes the uniqueness of his method best in his Phenomenology of Perception. He writes, "we shall take objective thought on its own terms and not ask it any questions which it does not ask itself. If we are led to rediscover experience behind it, this shift of ground will be attributable only to the difficulties which objective thought itself raises" (pg. 83). This is the method that I think is unique to Merleau-Ponty. Husserl is looking for an apodictic ground for philosophy, and Heidegger is interested in the question of the meaning of Being. Neither of these questions are questions which objective thought asks itself but require a more radical form of reflection (which may be motivated for its own reasons). Merleau-Ponty will only adopt the transcendental, or phenomenological, standpoint after objective thought has led itself into a number of aporias which it is unable to solve on its own. He will begin by simply taking objective thought on its own terms. In order to take objective thought on its own terms Merleau-Ponty chooses to begin The Structure of Behavior with an analysis of the scientific theories of behavior themselves, rather than with some version of the phenomenological reduction. The Structure of Behavior analyzes these theories in some detail as well as the reasons for their failures. There are a number of reasons that the scientific theories Merleau-Ponty examines fail to make behavior and perception intel

Essential for understanding his second book

Merleau-Ponty is far better known for his second book, the monumental Phenomenology of Perception. The Structure of Behavior is an earlier stab at the same themes, and its philosophical views are less developed than on the latter work.Does this make it optional reading for those seeking to understand Merleau-Ponty? Not at all. In the first two chapters of Structure of Behavior, Merleau-Ponty discusses and critiques the major currents of theoretical psychology in his time (Behaviorism and Gestalttheorie), at a level of detail far beyond that which he does in the Phenomenology of Perception. In fact, in the initial chapters of the latter work, he repeatedly refers the reader to the earlier one's discussion of psychology. While the Phenomenology of Perception is justly celebrated for its engagement with the facts and findings of empirical psychology, it surprisingly does not reveal Merleau-Ponty's knowledge of the discipline like the present book does.In short, students of his latter work will do very well to read at least the first chapter of this book, probably the first two. One will find it much easier to understand his psychological background after reading them.

A psychologist's philosopher

Merleau-Ponty's background in psychology is evident in this wonderful yet dense volume. Merleau-Ponty begins a critique of psychology that starts by questioning the assumption of the reflex in psychophysiology, continues, by questioning Pavlovian reflexology, and culminates with a view of behavior as comprised of transummative orders. In reaching this conclusion, Merleau-Ponty recapitulates the Gestalt psychology notion of a whole being greater than its parts. Readers and scholars should find a great deal in Merleau-Ponty that can be related to John Dewey, G.H. Mead, and J.J. Gibson. The scholar willing to undertake the project of tracing the lines of thinking emanating from Gestalt Psychology's turn-of-the-century influence will find Merleau-Ponty a towering figure whose work cannot be ignored.