Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace,

by Edward N. Luttwak

Book Overview

Luttwak's become the unthinkable. And here he has succeeded magnificently. For peacemakers and warmakers alike". -- Harry G. Summers, Jr., New York Times Book Review.

• Format: Paperback
• Language: English
• ISBN: 067483996X
• ISBN13: 9780674839960
• Release Date: February 1990
• Publisher: Belknap Press
• Length: 320 Pages
• Weight: 2.65 lbs.
• Dimensions: 0.8" x 6.2" x 9.3"

Customer Reviews

Ignore the Detractors, This Book is Brilliant

Edit of 21 Dec 07 to add links. My own discovery of how the threat changes depending on the levels of analysis would not have occurred without this brilliant book by Edward Luttwak. It was his careful and reasoned discussion of how specific capabilities and policies might not make sense at one level of analysis, but do when combined with others, that helped me understand why US (and other) intelligence communities continue to get so much wrong. First to credit Luttwak: anti-tank weapons make no sense in isolation (tactical level), but if they slow the tank down enough to allow artillery and close air support to have an impact (operational level), they might close gaps and win victories (strategic level). Bottom line: nothing in war can be considered in isolation (including, one might add, the post-war needs that enable an exit strategy). It was from Luttwak's work that the Marine Corps Intelligence Center (today the Marine Corps Intelligence Command) developed the new model for analysis that distinguished between the four levels of analysis (strategic, operational, tactical, and technical), combined that with the three major domains (military, geographic, and civil), and then cross-walked that against every single mission area (infantry, artillery, tanks, aviation, etcetera). One simple example of the importance of Luttwak's work to intelligence: at the time (1990) the Libyan T-72 tank was considered by the US Intelligence Community to be a very high threat because it was the best tank that money could then buy--but on reflection, we found this was true only at the technical level of optimal lethality. At the tactical level the tank was being stored in the open, poorly maintained by poorly trained crews, parts cannibalization occurring regularly, this dropped the threat to low. At the operational level there were a significant number of the tanks scattered around and available, this raised it to a medium threat at that level. At the strategic level, the tanks could not be sustained in battle for more than two weeks, and dropped again to low. Edward Luttwak, in company with Colin Gray, Martin van Creveld, Ralph Peters, and Steve Metz, is one of the most brilliant and clear-spoken of the strategists writing in English, and this book will remain--for years to come--a fundamental building block in the learning and maturation of national security strategy. Other recommended books at this level: Modern Strategy Transformation of War The Changing Face of War: Lessons of Combat, from the Marne to Iraq Wars of Blood and Faith: The Conflicts That Will Shape the 21st Century Security Studies for the 21st Century Strategy: Process, Content, Context--An International Perspective The Search for Security: A U.S. Grand Strategy for the Twenty-First Century The Sword and The Pen - Selections From The World's Greatest Military Writings War and Peace and War: The Rise and Fall of Empires

One of the best books on strategy

This book is not for the greenest of novices, and it contains no recipes or easy plans that will make your military or business plans unassailable. Instead, Luttwak presents as a central thesis that all war (and peace) is paradoxical. Paradox arises because the enemy is a living, thinking, acting person, dedicated to fouling your plans and making your goals and tactics irrelevant. For example, Luttwak states that the Maginot line was one of the most brilliant defenses in history. It truly was impenetrable. So impenetrable, that the Wermacht just went around it! The mistake of the French, therefore, was not constructing the line (as many have argued), but assuming that it would ever be attacked. The book is now a bit dated, as it uses anti-tank defense in Western Europe as an exercise in the different levels of understanding war, but it remains an excellent treatise on how to think about war. In this way, it is quite similar to Clausewitz's _On War_, a manual for thinking about war, not winning one. Luttwak also pushes Clausewitz's dictum that all levels of war are subject to and determined by the political, or grand strategic level. Contradictions are always resolved in favor of the higher level. Thus, the rifle fits the tactics, which are determined by the operation, which is suited to the theater, which is selected and fought in because of national policy. Peace begets war, and war begets peace. This book is rather like the yin-yang of combat.

A Penetrating Analysis on Strategy

This book discusses the dynamic and sometimes contradictory uses of 'strategy' in five different levels: Grand Strategic level, Theater Strategic level, Operational level, Tactical level, and Technical Level. Because of the dynamic nature of strategy, conflicts of interests often arise between different levels - so that what one sees as logical at one level may not be acceptable in another. Indeed, this book sets out to address the confusing nature of the problem and puts the entire issue into perspective with the concept of 'paradox'. Historical examples are used to expound his arguments. As always, Luttwak's work is incisive and provocative. Enjoy it!

A superb analysis of strategy

Luttwak makes an excellent argument that strategy is different from other plans of action, in that a strategist must contend with active, intelligent opposition. Consequently, a plan can be good simply because it is bad, or vice versa, which Luttwak calls "paradoxical logic". He takes as a primary example the use of infantry anti-tank weapons in the defense of West Germany from the Warsaw Pact (the example is still clear, even if dated), and examines the effects of such weapons on a technical, tactical, operational, theater, and political level, each building on the last. Luttwak carefully examines the advantages and disadvantages of doing the unexpected, of maneuver versus attrition and why World War II was fought the way it was, and of the consequences of fighting in a way that does not support the ultimate goals of the theater of war. He takes the examination of strategy to a level I haven't seen since Clausewitz, and is much more readable.