Secret History, Second Edition: The Cia's Classified Account of Its Operations in Guatemala, 1952-1954

by Nick Cullather

Book Overview

The first edition of this book, published in 1999, was well-received, but interest in it has surged in recent years. It chronicles an early example of "regime change" that was based on a flawed interpretation of intelligence and proclaimed a success even as its mistakes were becoming clear. Since 1999, a number of documents relating to the CIA's activities in Guatemala have been declassified, and a truth and reconciliation process has unearthed other...

• Format: Paperback
• Language: English
• ISBN: 0804754683
• ISBN13: 9780804754682
• Release Date: November 2006
• Publisher: Stanford University Press
• Length: 221 Pages
• Weight: 0.60 lbs.
• Dimensions: 0.6" x 5.9" x 8.0"

Customer Reviews

When competence is acceptable, honesty is suspect; social justice and democracy are subservise

The author, the young historian Nick Cullather, wrote this case-study report on Guatemala for new recruits during his one year stint at the CIA. He soon left for academia. Cullaher had full access to all the allegedly existing files concerning CIA operations in Guatemala from 1952 to 1954. This report has been published during the short "glasnost" at the CIA. The text shows many deletions (often idiosyncratic) from CIA censors, even if they reemerge in other parts of the text. The story is well known by conspiracy theorists and historians of Guatemala. They now have the insider proof they needed. The ousting of the democratically elected president Jacobo Arbenz by the would be caudillo Carlos Castillo Armas with the enthusiastic support from the CIA will be the general rehearsal for future operations in other parts of the World during the Cold War. The operation in Guatemala will turn into a success despite the many mistakes in the planning and implementation phase. Castill Armas was a disaster and his successor will prove themselves even worse. Guatemala is still paying for that successful operation. This story (not so secret after all) outlines the modus operandi of CIA and will be the blueprint for future covert operations, whether or not successful. A recommended reading to all contemporary historians.

Regime Change the Old-Fashioned Way

This is a great book about one of the great follies of the Cold War: the CIA's overthrow of a leftist government in Guatemala in 1954. The author, Nick Cullather, wrote the book while employed as a CIA historian. He had full access to surviving files on the Guatemala operation, and intended his monograph to serve as a case-study for CIA staff. It was ultimately released as part of a brief "openness" campaign at the CIA. Parts were heavily (and clumsily) redacted by CIA censors before declassification, but the remaining text still fascinates and appalls. Cullather is wise in the ways of government, and understands the role of hubris and error in human affairs. His book is very smart. Today the story is well known. In the early 1950s, the CIA plotted to rub out a reformist Guatemalan government that had redistributed land to peasants and curbed the influence of the United Fruit company. The agency funded anti-regime activists, blocked arms shipments, established a clandestine radio station, and assembled a rag-tag army of rebels based in Nicaragua and Honduras. Notwithstanding the David-and-Goliath nature of the contest, the covert action almost failed. Intelligence was bad, the operation was poorly planned and riddled with security lapses, and most CIA assets within Guatemala were rolled up before the invasion began. Worst of all, the invaders were laughably incompetent and on the verge of collapse after a few days of border fighting. Fortunately for the bunglers at the CIA, the Guatemalan Army became gripped by fear that Eisenhower might send in the Marines: to avoid a showdown with the U.S., the generals removed the reformers from power. Under the ensuing dictatorship, land reform was cancelled, two-thirds of the population was disenfranchised, political parties were banned, and Guatemala became dependent on massive U.S. aid. The operation entered CIA lore as a big success, and led to the fiasco at the Bay of Pigs. Although Americans didn't learn this secret history for decades, no one in Europe or Latin America was deceived. The world knew that we had raped a small country, and the damage to our reputation was immense. Ironically, the "Sovet threat" that prompted the covert action turned out to be a figment of the Dulles brothers' imaginations: after the coup, captured documents revealed that the handful of communists in Guatemala's government never had significant links to Moscow. The whole sordid mess was much ado about nothing -- just like Iraq's WMDs. Cullather's "Secret History" should be required reading in classes on 20th century American history, for it is a timely reminder of how badly America can stumble when it meddles in the internal affairs of other countries. George Bush may not understand it, but there's a reason why people all over the world distrust the United States. Whether Iranian, Guatemalan, Cuban, Brazilian, Vietnamese, Laotian, Chilean, Congolese, Angolan, Nicaraguan, or Iraqi, they know o

One of the best books I have ever read

SECRET HISTORY details the U.S. government's plot to rid Guatemala of Jacobo Arbenz and continue American interests in the region. The thing that makes Cullather's book so riveting is that he is not writing for an audience. Yes, he is hired by the CIA to write this account but he has no obligations to them. Because of this the truth shines through in an extraordinary fashion. Cullather details the CIAs involvement in overthrowing the democratically elected government of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala. The book explores why the U.S. government found it necessary to overthrow a legitimate government in favor of a U.S. friendly military regime. Perhaps the most compelling part of the account is how Guatemala played as a precursor to the the Cuba situation and the Bay of Pigs. The U.S. government is thoroughly intrigued by the effectiveness of the covert operation (financially and politically) - read: the government could deny any responisibility because it never even had to land a single troop of its own on foreign soil. A beautiful piece of history that is thankfully no longer secret. If only they released more of this stuff before buckling back up a short period after letting Cullather write this.

An illuminating inside account of a CIA covert operation

This is a frank account of the CIA's operations in Guatemala to overthrow the democratically elected centre-left government of Jacobo Arbenz. It was written in 1994 by an historian of the CIA's History Staff, classified as "secret", and disclosed to the general public in 1997 with some minor deletions. Although dealing only cursorily with the Guatemala history and politics of the period, it is rather detailed with respect to the CIA's role in them, and it is a very useful book if one wants to get a clear view of the political climate of the era and of the role of the US in Latin American politics. With the tragic example of the CIA's sucess in the overthrown of the Arbenz government as a vivid and recent event, is it all that strange that, four years later, cuban reformists and revolutionaries would move with a much tougher determination in the path of social and economic reforms, just before the US government could try to repeat the operation? which incidentally they did at the Bay of Pigs... The Afterword to the book, written by Piero Gleijeses, on the consequences of the CIA's coup to Guatemala up to the present day, is chilling and revolting

illuminating look into the secretive world of the CIA

Nick Cullather's account of the CIA operation PBSuccess is quite interesting in that it relies primarily on CIA documents. These documents were unavailable to those previously writing about the overthrow of Jacobo Arbenz in 1954. He provides insight into the processes rather than into the personalities involved. The only negative about this account, pointed out by Cullather himself, is that the CIA uses retired agents to screen material before publication. The screeners' deletions can be quite extensive in certain areas despite the CIA promise to be more open. As one reads this book it becomes annoying when many names, sentences and paragraphs are sanitized by the retired CIA agents. Nonetheless the book is informative, well written and a very enjoyable read. This book is a must for anyone interested in the covert world of the CIA. The book also would be of interest to anyone studying the nature of U.S. involvement in the national affairs of our Latin American neighbors.