Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science

by Ian Hacking

Book Overview

This 1983 book is a lively and clearly written introduction to the philosophy of natural science, organized around the central theme of scientific realism. It has two parts. 'Representing' deals with the different philosophical accounts of scientific objectivity and the reality of scientific entities. The views of Kuhn, Feyerabend, Lakatos, Putnam, van Fraassen, and others, are all considered. 'Intervening' presents the first sustained treatment of...

• Format: Paperback
• Language: English
• ISBN: 0521282462
• ISBN13: 9780521282468
• Release Date: November 1983
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press
• Length: 304 Pages
• Weight: 0.90 lbs.
• Dimensions: 0.8" x 5.5" x 8.5"

Customer Reviews

One of the best introductions to Philosophy of Science

If you need good introductions to Philosophy of Science, this one should definitely on your list.

Classic treatment: both a pleasure to read and an education

Ian Hacking's books are a model of clear, persuasive writing on difficult topics and this is one of his best books. In this book, he lays bare the central issues in philosophy of science (realism and rationality) in a way that makes them accessible to a non-specialist reader. Almost unique among scholars, Hacking is equally skilled with history, concepts, and traditions, and uses these skills together well to paint a well organized and compelling picture of science; capturing both its beauty and its warts. He also does an admirable job capturing the various ways we have tried to *explain* science over the years. This is not the usual simplistically "balanced" presentation of philosophy of science that treats all perspectives as having equal votes. Hacking makes his own moderate realist view on the issues clear at each point while he always appears to me to do justice to other viewpoints. One of the things I find most useful and special about Ian Hacking's arguments is that he seems to put great effort into successfully finding the real strengths of each viewpoint before evaluating it. He also often finds instructive points of difference between seemingly almost identical viewpoints. Hacking discusses both realism and rationality, to place them both into perpsective in philosophy of science. We need at least a rudimentary idea of the role reasoning plays in scientific work in order to be able to speak productively about the reality of the things we are talking about. His focus is however consistently on realism: the question of the reality of theories and the question of the reality of entities and substances. This book is not yet another jeremiad on the "logic of science," or the lack thereof, it is a careful discussion of specifically the *ways* in which things are considered real in science, and the *significance* of treating things as real. Hacking understands well the complex relationship between theory and experiment, giving us a superbly nuanced but easily understandable summary analysis of important concepts like incommensurability and the "theory boundness" of data. He then applies the results of these analyses back to the larger issues to support his own realist perspective. The result is a view that strongly emphasizes experimentation. Entities and substances become real in science as they become a practical part of engineering and experimentation, rather than as a result of a verified theory or a long-lived theory. Hacking is lukewarm about the reality of scientific theories compared to the reality of experimentally useful entities. He says: "Scientific realism about theories has to adopt the Peircean qualities of faith, hope, and charity. Scientific realism about entities needs no such virtues." This is one example of how Hacking uses the philosophical viewpoints of positivism and pragmatism throughout to illustrate the different ways of thinking about scientific reasoning. It would be hard to find a bet

An Introduction That's Not Just for Neophytes

This book, which is among my all-time favorite philosophy books, is a paradigm of how the subject should be introduced. It succeeds in introducing readers to many of the most important issues and ideas in contemporary philosophy of science; it's informed by a thorough knowledge of the history of both science and philosophy; it advances a unique perspective, one emphasizing the importance of experimentation as opposed to theorizing, on debates about scientific realism; and it is written in a straightforward and engaging style. In other words, this is an excellent book--one that manages to be both entertaining and informative. As I mentioned above, Hacking's emphasis here is on experimentation as opposed to theorizing. Naturally, philosophers of science are drawn to the study of scientific theorizing; theorizing is what they do, and it's what they understand. But Hacking argues that the prospects for scientific realism (i.e. for the view that the sciences are objective and reveal the (approximate) truth about the world) are dim if you focus on theory alone, and he thinks this is something that has been borne out by recent philosophy of science. Rather than focus on theorizing, he claims, we should focus on the ways in which science involves intervention in the world. Through experimentation, scientists can step into the world and manipulate and change it. This is the way that science allows us to discover something about the world around us--not by the relatively passive activity of formulating theories, but by action in the world. Hacking starts his book by giving a brief overview of how the historicism of Kuhn altered the project in the philosophy of science. He argues that earlier philosophies of science, like Carnap's positivism and Popper's falsificationism, had agreed on quite a bit despite their superficial similarities. Kuhn's work came along and upset all of this consensus. He denied that there was any particular method shared by all the sciences across time, that the sciences involved a cumulative process of knowledge acquisition, that observation could be distinguished from theorizing and understood as an independent source of evidence for and against theories, that the sciences could be understood ahistorically, etc. These views also posed some problems for the objectivity of science. The assumptions Kuhn denied were those undergirding the traditional conception of the objectivity of science, of how scientific inquiry arrived at truths about the world. But does this mean that an understanding of the history of science should undermine our confidence in the objectivity of science and the accuracy of its results? In some ways, Hacking's book is an introduction to these worries and the various possible responses to them. For most philosophers, issues concerning the objectivity of science turn on the question of whether we have good reason to believe that our best scientific theories are true (or approximately true) or

A classic in the philosophy of experimentation

I was an avid fan of Feyerabend when I came across a curious little article by a certain Ian Hacking in a Feyerabend reader. This particular article was startling in its down-to-earth approach to the philosophy of science. It's insistent mantra mirrored that of my supervisor's, "always go back to the experiment". That article turned out to be from a pivotal chapter of Representing and Intervening, a lovely little book that I have grown to love. I don't think it's an exaggeration to say that this book revolutionised the philosophy of science by turning on its head the role of theory and experimentation (experimentation is king whereas I am a lowly theoretical biophysicst!).The question that dominates the second half of the book, by far the better half, is when does a entity in science become a real entity. The answer, according to Hacking is "if you can spray it then its real." In one fell swoop, Hacking side-steps thorny and abtruse concepts that have plagued the philosophy of science such as falsification, induction and paradigms. Hacking re-interprets historical episodes and demonstrates how the final acceptance of a theory was its experimental reliability, not just in single instances, but in a diverse range of applications. The power of his examples is that they are drawn from contemporary experiments - something that not many philosophers of science actually do.As a companion to the book, I really recommend Bruno Latour's "Laboratory Life". Latour complements Hacking by showing just exactly how a single scientific entity changes shape as the experimental techniques which intersect it are expanded and improved upon.Another beautiful quality of the book is the lucid prose. Hacking shows how philosophers don't need to write in a profound style to convey profound thoughts.

Very important philosophical argument for experimentaion

This book awakens the interest about practice in natural science. So Hacking stresses the singificance of experimentation and criticizes the bias for theory in philosophy of science. Very insightful and challenging trial for the new direction for philosophy of science.