Redefining Russian Society and Polity

by Mary Buckley

With the advent of Gorbachev's glasnost era, Russians have been forced to redefine their society and polity. Journalists, academics and politicians all needed a new language in which to articulate... This description may be from another edition of this product.

• Format: Paperback
• Language: English
• ISBN: 0813315794
• ISBN13: 9780813315799
• Release Date: October 1993
• Publisher: Routledge
• Length: 346 Pages
• Weight: 1.10 lbs.
• Dimensions: 0.8" x 5.9" x 9.0"

Customer Reviews

Buckley's book illuminates the Gorbachev paradox.

Reviewed by Johanna Granville, Clemson University, Clemson, SC USAOn October 16, 1997 at a forum at Baker Institute for Public Policy, Rice University in Houston, Mikhail Gorbachev received the Enron Prize for Public Service. Former secretary of State James Baker credited Gorbachev for "setting the USSR on the irreversible path to freedom." Because of Gorbachev's "tremendous political courage," Baker claimed, millions of people enjoyed freer, more prosperous lives. But millions of Russians do not approve of what Gorbachev did, would deny him the Enron and Nobel Prizes, and mark him a villain because he caused the unravelling of the USSR and Warsaw Pact and because their lives are less prosperous in today's Russia. Mary Buckley's Redefining Russian Society and Polity helps the Western reader to understand the Gorbachev paradox by showing the Russian people's mixed reactions to glasnost. Her study is a key contribution to the growing body of literature about social changes in the USSR in the late 1980s and early 1992. She examines the manner in which Russian journalists, academics, and political actors approached social and political issues from the Gorbachev era to the chaotic post-Soviet period. Utilizing Russian newspapers, journals, radio and television programs, interviews, and other sources, Buckley persuasively argues that the images and ideas that blossomed during the Gorbachev years led to social and political visions that were incongruent with the prevailing system. These images eventually led to systemic disintegration. Buckley states, furthermore, that Soviet citizens initially welcomed the expanded coverage of material that had long been taboo, but as they suffered from the "failed economic reforms," they began to fear "deviance and social collapse." In other words, glasnost's candor about the various social "ills" (drug abuse, prostitution, AIDS epidemic, etc.), coupled with economic uncertainty, increased the citizens' fear about Russia's future. Later, in early 1991 and 1992 under Yeltsin's leadership, soaring inflation and unemployment rates caused panic over economic security and dread of imminent civil war or revolution. The Commonwealth of Independent States, Buckley further claims, has inherited the sociopolitical diversity and the deeply rooted problems so long buried by the communist regime. Her book employs a refreshing methodology. Rather than focusing exclusively on objective events, laws, parties, and movements, as do many, if not most, monographs on the former Soviet Union, Buckley also incorporates the "emotions, myths, analogies, and jokes" prevalent in the USSR from 1985 to 1991 to better grasp Russian social and political thought in the initial years of transition. Her book is enjoyable, in part because it is full of amusing jokes that capture the mood of the Russian people. Buckley helps the reader to understand the ironies of glasnost and perestroika. First, she remi