Primates and Philosophers: How Morality Evolved

by Frans de Waal

Book Overview

Can virtuous behavior be explained by nature, and not by human rational choice? "It's the animal in us," we often hear when we've been bad. But why not when we're good? Primates and Philosophers tackles this question by exploring the biological foundations of one of humanity's most valued traits: morality. In this provocative book, renowned primatologist Frans de Waal argues that modern-day evolutionary biology takes far too dim a view of the natural...

• Format: Paperback
• Language: English
• ISBN: 0691141290
• ISBN13: 9780691141299
• Release Date: February 2009
• Publisher: Princeton University Press
• Length: 232 Pages
• Weight: 0.60 lbs.
• Dimensions: 0.6" x 5.5" x 8.5"

Customer Reviews

A great (and brief) read into the issue of Morality.

This is a great book if only because it provides views from five different scholars. "In the Tanner Lectures on Human Values that became the lead essay in this book, Frans de Waal brings his decades of work with primates, and his habit of thinking deeply about the meaning of evolution, to bear upon a fundamental question about human morality. Three distinguished philosophers and a prominent student of evolutionary psychology then respond to the way de Waal's question is framed, and to his answer. Their essays are at once appreciative of de Waal's endeavor and critical of certain of his conclusions. De Waal responds to his critics in an afterword." The main thrust of de Waal's essay is what he calls "Veneer Theory," which is the argument that morality is only a thin veneer overlaid on an amoral or immoral core. The first to respond is Robert Wright (The Moral Animal: Evolutionary Psychology and Everyday Life), who states that he is in fact not an adherent to de Waal's Veneer Theory. Second is Christine M. Korsgaard (Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity), who denies that Veneer Theory is even real. Third is Philip Kitcher (Living with Darwin: Evolution, Design, and the Future of Faith (Philosophy in Action)), who generally attacks Veneer Theory as not being relevant to bridging the divide between primates and humans. The fourth, last, and my personal favorite, comes from Peter Singer (The Life You Can Save: Acting Now to End World Poverty). Singer, I believe, does the greatest justice to the entire argument and I happen to agree with almost everything he says. Singer states, "The issue, then, is not so much whether we accept the Veneer Theory of morality, but rather how much of morality is veneer, and how much is underlying structure. Those who claim that all of morality is a veneer laid over a basically individualistic, selfish human nature, are mistaken. Yet a morality that goes beyond our own group and shows impartial concern for all human beings might well be seen as a veneer over the nature we share with other social mammals." In conclusion, I think this is a valuable book and do recommend it. I would also recommend getting Michael Tomasello's Why We Cooperate (Boston Review Books) as it is similar in nature and style. Lastly, I would also mention that Frans de Waal mentions a research experiment in which he "demonstrates" primate empathy, but as Tomasello points out, "But studies [contra de Waal] from three different laboratories in the case of the capuchins, and from our laboratory in the case of the chimpanzees, have all found that this is a spurious result in that it does not depend on a social comparison at all. One of the studies found that simply seeing and expecting to receive the grape makes the cucumber look less attractive to chimpanzees. No other individuals need to be around. There is no social comparison going on, only food comparison. So nothing related to norms of fairness are at work either (pg. 32)." Hope that

Deriving a human "ought" from a monkey "is"

"Primates and Philosophers" is precisely what it looks like: a scientific and philosophical exploration of the origins and meaning of human morality. The main contributor to the book is Frans de Waal, the well-known primatologist. (In case you don't know what a "primatologist" is: de Waal studies apes and monkeys for a living!) His ideas about morality are then scrutinized and critiqued by science writer Robert Wright and philosophers Peter Singer, Philip Kitcher, and Christine Korsgaard. (Yes, *the* Peter Singer and *the* Philip Kitcher.) In the final chapter, de Waal responds. The entire debate is excellently and even-handedly introduced by Stephen Macedo and Josiah Ober. In other words, the book is a real meeting of the minds! De Waal believes that large parts of what we call human morality can be found already in apes, and sometimes even in monkeys. He admits that rational thinking is (probably) present only in humans, but argues that such thinking cannot exist without prior building blocks that do exist among other primates, for instance empathy, reciprocity, a sense of fairness, and at least some steps towards community concern. Thus, human behavior doesn't represent a fundamental break with animal behavior. There isn't a radical discontinuity between animal and human nature. Rather, humans have erected their rational thinking on top of a "tower of morality", most of which we share with apes and some monkeys. De Waal further believes that our rational thinking is somewhat overestimated. We don't really make moral decisions based on abstract rational reasoning around maxims and imperatives. Rather, emotions play a large part in our decisions. This shows that rational thinking is based on emotions such as empathy, present already in apes. De Waal's main adversary, at least as he sees it, is something he dubs "Veneer Theory" (VT). According to VT, humans are at bottom selfish, bad and brutish. Morality is a thin veneer, a purely pragmatic response to the fact that the egoist needs other people to get along. "Scratch an altruist, and watch a hypocrite bleed" is the slogan of VT. Thomas Huxley and Thomas Hobbes are prime representatives of this perspective. In reality, de Waal argues, humans are social, empathic and altruistic by nature. Our morality is hard-wired into our genes. Naturally, the author considers apes to be moral in the same manner, and gives many examples of empathy, cooperation and peaceful conflict solution among chimpanzees and bonobos. At the same time, de Waal also admits that our morality has a darker side. It's only valid within our own group, while very different rules apply to outsiders. At one point, he even exclaims that morality and warfare goes together, and that this too is derived from the apes. Apparently, chimpanzee flocks sometimes attack each other, with deadly consequences. De Waal's critics share his conviction that morality is something real and objective, and also that humans evolved from apes through

Wonderful read; very well written.

This book was lent to me by a friend, and after reading I felt it necessary to purchase my own copy. I would have never made this choice, this text is completely outside my normal reading genres, but I'm very glad I did. Frans de Waal provides and extremely well written thesis on his views of morality in humans, his views are then analyzed by others, and closes with his response. I haven't read his other text Good Natured, but intend to do so. It is important to note that I am in no way highly educated in the fields of primatology, anthropology, or philosophy; my background is in math and computer science; so I came to this book with a certain ignorance.

Critically Important Research

Teleologically oriented theologians and pompous philosophers need to read this book. New empirical research offers dramatic insights as to the how's and why's of the bilogoical origins of human values and morality. The more this book is read and digested, the faster the phony televangelists will disappear from popular and uninformed culture.

Actions speak louder than words

When Charles Darwin published "The Origin of Species", it was greeted equally by widespread acceptance and outrage. The acceptance was due to the realisation that here, at last, was a mechanism explaining the workings of life. The outrage was expressed over what this meant about human beings. Could we be relegated to the status of "mere animals"? Frans de Waal has merged the two views to show that we indeed are closely related to other animals. As a social species we share behaviour traits with other creatures who live in groups. While most of today's objections to "Darwinism" centre on the loss of "morality", the author notes that instead we should rejoice in sharing something so fundamental. In these exquisitely written essays - the Tanner Lectures - de Waal shows how behaviour in various species, particularly our closest cousins the great apes, exhibits moral issues daily confronted and resolved. His research has led him to challenge one of Western society's most commonly held shibboleths - that morality is limited to human beings and that it lies as a thin layer over our animal instincts. Labelled by de Waal as the Veneer Theory, he attributes its source to Thomas Henry Huxley, also known as "Darwin's Bulldog" for his defence of natural selection. Huxley, along with Alfred Russel Wallace, thought that human reasoning was to ?? mechanism lifting us above the remainder of the animals. The author notes the irony of Darwin's most vocal defender countering the naturalist's own stance that morality in humans is reflected in ape behaviour. De Waal forcibly contests Huxley's view, arguing that moral decisions result from our being a social species. Survival meant cooperation from our earliest evolutionary state, and was strengthened by selection pressures over time. De Waal cites numerous examples of how chimpanzees reconcile after fights, intercede to stop or prevent conflicts, share resources and console those in pain or stress. Young chimps are guarded away from zoo moats because even adult chimpanzees cannot swim. Individuals with no stake in particular events may intercede because a situation may lead to a threat to the entire troop. One example, the ape rescuing a human child in the Chicago Zoo, is well known. A less celebrated but far more significant event is the rescue and release of an injured bird by a bonobo. Not only is this a striking example of cross-species empathy, but the bonobo went to the effort of climbing a tree as high as she could to provide the bird with the optimum means of escape. In the recent past when such circumstances led to the equating of human and animal behaviour, it was derided as "anthropomorphising" zoology. De Waal notes that the terms many object to equating behaviour not only lack substitutes, but merely reflect the evolutionary realities. Our behaviour equates ape behaviour because our species have a common ancestor. There are other complaints about de Waal's findings and conclusion