Pragmatism

by Hilary Putnam

Book Overview

Hilary Putnam has been at the center of contemporary debates about the nature of the mind and of its access to the world, about language and its relation to reality, and many other metaphysical and epistemological issues. In this book he turns to pragmatism - and confronts the teachings of James, Peirce, Dewey, and Wittgenstein - not solely out of an interest in theoretical questions, but above all to respond to the questions of whether it is possible...

• Format: Paperback
• Language: English
• ISBN: 063119343X
• ISBN13: 9780631193432
• Release Date: February 1995
• Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell
• Length: 128 Pages
• Weight: 0.45 lbs.
• Dimensions: 0.4" x 5.5" x 8.5"

Customer Reviews

Outside looking in

Everyone knows the basic thing about truth, that if x is true about x, then y cannot be true of x in so far as the truth of x is concerned. That statement can be discerned easily in most scientific and verifiable truths but not all truths are subject to verification - such as God exists. Pragmatism is a philosophy that extends into many fields of inquiry. Putnam in this book, which is a collection of a series of his lectures deals with the truth as pragmatists have approached it. Putnam, himself, not a pragmatist philosopher, expresses a clear understanding of what the pragmatist approach to truth is. His lectures were exemplary in their clarity but were not meant for the uninitiated. It is a short book and the uninitiated reader may find it helpful to read "Pragmatism - A Guide for the Perplexed" by Robert Talisse first. The advanced reader will enjoy Putnam's dissection and analysis of the differences and errors made by some pragmatist philosophers. He covers a wide range of such philosophers from Kant to Wittgenstein (although some do not regard Wittgenstein as a pragmatist philosopher), and the acknowledged pragmatists like Dewy, Peirce, and Rorty. He explains why pragmatism has taken a leap forward when it transcends the old philosophy in which truth is seen in the dualistic forms, eg, fact and value; and sees the truth as a comingling all them.