Normal Accidents: Living with High Risk Technologies - Updated Edition

by Charles Perrow

Book Overview

Normal Accidents analyzes the social side of technological risk. Charles Perrow argues that the conventional engineering approach to ensuring safety--building in more warnings and safeguards--fails because systems complexity makes failures inevitable. He asserts that typical precautions, by adding to complexity, may help create new categories of accidents. (At Chernobyl, tests of a new safety system helped produce the meltdown and subsequent...

• Format: Paperback
• Language: English
• ISBN: 0691004129
• ISBN13: 9780691004129
• Release Date: September 1999
• Publisher: Princeton University Press
• Length: 464 Pages
• Weight: 1.46 lbs.
• Dimensions: 1.2" x 6.1" x 9.2"

Customer Reviews

Altogether a fascinating and informative book

Wow. This is an incredible book. I have to admit, though, that I had some difficulty getting into Normal Accidents. There seemed an overabundance of detail, particularly on the nuclear industry's case history of calamity. This lost me, since I'm not familiar with the particulars of equipment function and malfunction. The book was mentioned, however, by two others of a similar nature and mentioned with such reverence, that after I had finished both, I returned to Perrow's book, this time with more success. Professor Perrow is a PhD in sociology (1960) who has taught at Yale University Department of Sociology since 1981 and whose research focus has been human/technology interactions and the effects of complexity in organizations. (His most recent publication is the The AIDS disaster : the Failure of Organizations in New York and the Nation, 1990.) In Normal Accidents, he describes the failures that can arise "normally" in systems, ie. those problems that are expected to arise and can be planned for by engineers, but which by virtue of those planned fail-safe devices, immeasurably complicate and endanger the system they are designed to protect. He describes a variety of these interactions, clarifying his definitions by means of a table (p. 88), and a matrix illustration (p. 97). Examples include systems that are linear vs complex, and loosely vs tightly controlled. These generally arise through the interactive nature of the various components the system itself. According to the matrix, an illustration of a highly linear, tightly controlled system would be a dam. A complex, tightly controlled system would be a nuclear plant, etc. The degree to which failures may occur varies with each type of organization, as does the degree to which a recovery from such a failure is possible. As illustrations, the author describes failures which have, or could have, arisen in a variety of settings: the nuclear industry, maritime activities, the petrochemical industry, space exploration, DNA research and so on. The exciting character of the stories themselves are worth the reading; my favorite, and one I had heard before, is the loss of an entire lake into a salt mine. More important still is the knowledge that each imparts. Perrow makes abundantly apparent by his illustrations the ease with which complex systems involving humans can fail catastrophically. (And if Per Bak and others are correct, almost inevitably). Probably the most significant part of the work is the last chapter. After discussing the fallibility of systems that have grown increasingly complex, he discusses living with high risk systems, particularly why we are and why it should change. In a significant statement he writes, "Above all, I will argue, sensible living with risky systems means keeping the controversies alive, listening to the public, and recognizing the essentially political nature of risk assessment. Unfortunately, the issue is not risk, but power; the power to

Of Lasting Value, Relevant to Today's Technical Maze

Edit of 2 April 2007 to add link and better summary. I read this book when it was assigned in the 1980's as a mainstream text for graduate courses in public policy and public administration, and I still use it. It is relevant, for example, to the matter of whether we should try to use nuclear bombs on Iraq--most Americans do not realize that there has never (ever) been an operational test of a US nuclear missile from a working missle silo. Everything has been tested by the vendors or by operational test authorities that have a proven track record of falsifying test results or making the tests so unrealistic as to be meaningless. Edit: my long-standing summary of the author's key point: Simple systems have single points of failure that are easy to diagnose and fix. Complex systems have multiple points of failure that interact in unpredictable and often undetectable ways, and are very difficult to diagnose and fix. We live in a constellation of complex systems (and do not practice the precationary principle!). This book is also relevant to the world of software. As the Y2K panic suggested, the "maze" of software upon which vital national life support systems depend--including financial, power, communications, and transportation software--has become very obscure as well as vulnerable. Had those creating these softwares been more conscious of the warnings and suggestions that the author provides in this book, America as well as other nations would be much less vulnerable to terrorism and other "acts of man" for which our insurance industry has not planned. I agree with another review who notes that this book is long overdue for a reprint--it should be updated. I recommended it "as is," but believe an updated version would be 20% more valuable. Edit: this book is still valuable, but the author has given us the following in 2007: The Next Catastrophe: Reducing Our Vulnerabilities to Natural, Industrial, and Terrorist Disasters

Insightful perspective on serious industrial accidents.

Normal Accidents is the best summary of major industrial accidents in the USA that I have encountered. It is written in a factual and technically complete style that is particularly attractive to anyone with a technical background or interest. I was able to read a borrowed copy from a colleague a few years ago when I was appointed as chairman of the safety committee at a manufacturing facility where workers had potential for exposure to toxic gasses, high voltage, x-radiation, and other more everyday industrial hazards. The author's insight is right on target for achieving a workable understanding of the cause and prevention of disaster events. I wanted to buy copies for all our engineering managers and safety committee members, but the book is out of print. It is my fond hope that the author will write an updated version with analysis of more recent events as well as the well-chosen accidents in the previous edition. For any safety related product or process de! ! signer, this book is a must read! For any technically cognizant reader, this book is a delight to read, even if it is a little scary in its implications. For everyone else, it has some really interesting historical stories.

Reprint needed

I specified this book as one of (the better of) two choices for supplementary reading in a university-level engineering course, and I'm dismayed that it's currently in this precarious print status. The book is an excellent--compelling and comprehensible-- explanation of the inherent risk of failure of tightly-coupled complex systems, in other words, the world we have created around ourselves. Engineers particularly need this insight before being unleashed on the world, because engineering as a profession (if not vocation) has taken the obligation to protect humankind from science and technology. If not a reprint or new edition, perhaps a new publisher is in order.