Monongahela 1754-55: Washington's Defeat, Braddock's Disaster

by René Chartrand and Patrice Courcelle

Osprey's examination of one of the key campaigns of the French and Indian War (1754-1763). On 9 July 1755 amid the wilderness of North America, Britain suffered one of the most humiliating defeats in her history. General Braddock's army, a mixture of British regulars and American militia, was shattered, losing over 900 men from a force of 1,300. Braddock was killed and the remnants of his army rescued by his aide, Colonel George Washington. The origins...

• Format: Paperback
• Language: English
• ISBN: 1841766836
• ISBN13: 9781841766836
• Release Date: September 2004
• Publisher: Osprey Publishing (UK)
• Length: 96 Pages
• Weight: 0.65 lbs.
• Dimensions: 0.3" x 7.3" x 9.8"

Customer Reviews

Balanced, Good Account of Battle

Written by a Canadian, this is a balanced look at the opening events of the French and Indian War, which sparked a world war. Starting with the French move into western Pennsylvania, Chartrand explains the French-Canadian defense strategy and the British-Colonial response. Washington is sent to take and fortify the forks of the Ohio River, but is pushed out of the forks. He fires on a French diplomatic mission, the Jumonville affair, and the French and Indians then force him to surrender at Ft. Necessity. The British respond in part by sending two regiments to America under Braddock. Braddock's force does no long range scouting and stumbles into an ambush. On the day of the battle, the French and Indian force lacks good recon and nearly crumbled when it first met Braddock's advance guard, but they rally and move along either side of the enemy column, picking off the enemy from behind trees. Trying to fight in lines, and with most of its officers hit, the British-Colonial column panics and flees back across the river, with Washington leading the rear guard. Chartrand gives a good detailed account of the fight, with analysis of the battle and campaign. One of the many interesting sections is the discussion of the British army wagons, and how they were unsuited to conditions in America. Battlefield photos are a regular feature of the Osprey Campaign Series, and this one is no different, even showing interesting views of the forks, and the battlefield, which is now a steel factory!

Defeat is a greater teacher than victory

Monongahela must go down in history as one of the continent's history's worst military blunders, though not unusual, as General S. Clair was to prove less than half a century later. And British ineptness must be deemd the primary cause. Gearge Washington and the British learned from their mistakes and went on to win the war. The French failed to learn from their victory and lost, even though to the North, under one oftheir own Generals, they too committed a similar blunder and suffered defeat, which would make another nice book. Rene Chartrand gives a good build up to the conflict and describes the action quite well. Especially in regards to the blundering of the British in battle. He also describes the forces and their relative strengths and weaknesses well. However, though he mentions the Indians, he fails to name the tribes, which mars otherwise excellant work.

Wilderness Power

René Chartrand's Monongahela 1754-1755, #140 in Osprey's Campaign series, is another excellent volume on the Seven Years War in North America from the French perspective. Chartrand brings his extensive knowledge on the subject, combined with an insightful writing style, to produce a fresh look on how the war started. American readers will find this volume particularly interesting due to the critical role played by young Colonel George Washington. Furthermore, readers will find that the standard succinct descriptions of Braddock's defeat have left out many important details, which Chartrand assiduously fills in. The initial sections on background to the war, opposing leaders and opposing armies are good, and cover about 20 pages. In the section on opposing plans, Chartrand notes how the French relied on a defensive strategy based on "Wilderness Power" to deny the Ohio River valley to the British. Essentially, the French center of gravity - in modern military parlance - was based upon their close relationship with the local Indian tribes. The limited French military capabilities in the region were enhanced by adoption of local tactics and fast-moving river-borne communications; taken together, the Indian connections and willingness to adapt to local conditions gave the French military "Wilderness Power" that the conventional-minded British lacked. On the other hand, Chartrand points out that the British relied on the doctrine of overwhelming force and the commitment of Braddock's army to western Pennsylvania represented an unprecedented act that was intended to overawe both the French and Indians. Chartrand includes five 2-D maps (Situation in North America 1753-4; French forts in Ohio; Route of Braddock's army; the Monongahela, 9 July 1755; Situation in North America, Fall 1755) and three 3-D maps (Jumonville Glen and Fort Necessity; Monongahela ambush; Monongahela - the rout). The three battle scenes are excellent: Fort Necessity, Braddock's defeat and Washington's rearguard. The 3-D maps utilize the new format, with grid lines and all text sequenced on one side of the page. Chartrand also includes an excellent order of battle, as well as interesting notes and photographs on the sites today. Chartrand begins his campaign narrative by describing the Jumonville incident and the surrender of Fort Necessity in 1754, both incidents in which Washington was in command and failed. Although the defeat at Fort Necessity was probably inevitable, the Jumonville incident is highly controversial and Chartrand treats this incident carefully (some other authors use this incident to denigrate Washington's integrity). Chartrand covers Braddock's march westward in great detail and it is clear that despite the disastrous tactical outcome, Braddock and his staff were to be commended for the impressive logistic in moving an army with artillery over such terrain. It is also clear that the French had little tactical plan to deal wi