Military Incompetence: Why the American Military Doesn't Win

by Richard A. Gabriel

Book Overview

The history of American military operations in the post-Vietnam era has been marked by failure and near-disaster. Since 1970, American forces have been committed in five operations--in Sontay to... This description may be from another edition of this product.

• Format: Hardcover
• Language: English
• ISBN: 0809069288
• ISBN13: 9780809069286
• Release Date: January 1985
• Publisher: Hill & Wang
• Length: 1 Pages
• Weight: 0.75 lbs.
• Dimensions: 0.9" x 6.3" x 9.3"

Customer Reviews

Call to arms

The first thing to say about Army Reserve Maj. Richard Gabriel's 1985 book is that it had no influence. Since then, the American military has displayed incompetence in Libya, Somalia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Panama, Saudi Arabia, the Persian Gulf, Haiti and Yugoslavia. Gabriel was on to something. In "Military Incompetence," Gabriel submits after-action reports on the five military adventures -- I use the word carefully -- the country had embarked upon since cutting and running from Vietnam: raids to rescue prisoners at Sontay, North Vietnam, Cambodia and Iran; "peacekeeping" in Beirut; and the conquest of Grenada. Using primarily the findings of congressional investigations and Department of Defense commissions empaneled to review these disasters, but also some interviews of participants and bystanders and some very valuable reporting by newspaper and television reporters, Gabriel lays out a history of unbelievable incompetence. Grenada, the biggest of these pipsqueak operations, was in many ways the worst as well, even though the Joint Chiefs of Staff by then had had the benefit of four straight disasters to learn from (not counting Vietnam) and had even established a new division to fix things, the Joint Special Operations Center. Gabriel concludes, correctly, that the problem is at the top, although also systemic. He was not the only man saying so. The late David Hackworth was railing against the "no-fault Army" in those days. Both men complained that the military had changed from a band of warriors into a managerial bureaucracy. This in itself did not require much perspicuity. Military leaders and their civilian superiors bragged about it. The valuable insight of both men was that armies, navies and air forces do not need to be managed, they need to be led. Gabriel, a professor of politics, presents a more profound understanding than the better-selling Hackworth. His core criticism deserves to be quoted at length: "The military must relearn what it once knew, namely, that is is a true profession, and not just one more enterprise awash in the sea of a free society. For the last 25 years and most certainly during the last 15 years, since the advent of the All Volunteer Force, members of the military have come to perceive what they do as just one more occupation, a career in which benefits to the individual have come to outweigh the need for selfless service to the Republic. The process began in 1960 with Robert McNamara's attempts to make the military more `modern' by incorporating a number of business practices and techniques designed to make the Pentagon bureaucracy more efficient. Such techniques in themselves are no danger. However, with them came the habits, values and practices of civilian business enterprises, especially the belief that motivation within the military is no different from motivation in the larger business community. That motivation, as in the larger society, is rooted in self-interest rather than self-sacrifice. . . .

Excellent military history

If you love the American military, don't read this review; just get a copy of the book. Used copies are easily found online. It reads like Tom Clancy, i.e., you won't be able to put it down. I've heard a lot of people complain about bureaucracy, but this book does an excellent job of painting an exacting picture of the problem. Gabriel argues that 3 issues produce American military failures:1. Size of the officer corps (it is too big).2. Rapid reassignment of officers (no one learns their job).3. Self-promotion ( and self-serving bureaucracies).4. Amateurism of political leadership.The result is a lack of force preparedness and competent mission design.Gabriel quotes a lot of numbers, so it is easy to check them. I was surprised to discover the ratio of enlisted to officers had gotten worse since the books publication in 1985. At publication, the ratio of enlisted to officers was about 7 to 1, it is now a little above 5 to 1.Chapters on post-Viet Nam military operations make up the bulk of the book. Each chapter represents a detailed look at the planning and execution of the operation. Each operation is described as a failure in fact, if not political representation. The operations are:1. Sontay Prison rescue attempt2. The Mayaguez rescue attempt3. The Iran rescue attempt4. Peace keeping in Beirut5. Grenada (rescue of students)I am not comfortable with the concluding recommendations. I find them little more than tilting at wind-mills. Gabriel recommends fewer officers, fewer promotions, fewer reassignments, and end to the Joint Chiefs of Staff bureaucracy. Enjoy.

Prescient Analysis of Military Failures...Req'd Reading!!!

Don't be fooled by the titled...this is not a tired tale from a dove. Gabriel's analysis of military failures from the Vietnam era through the early 80's is insightful and full of wisdom that all military planners - hawks and doves - should consider. Yes, Gabriel's work holds value to military planners and scholars, but the text is also vibrant and exciting. The author looks at five different operations. Gives an overview of their objectives and describes what went wrong. Then pulls the layers back and exposes the lessons learned from each encounter. Its part historical narrative and part analysis. Powerful stuff. Just as relevant today as it was prior to the Gulf War. Read up on our successes in that theater, then read this and see how we applied the lessons Gabriel taught us (and others, to be sure). Your understanding of military planning will grow significantly. As will your appreciation for our men and women in uniform.Highly recommended.

the military is still totally incompetent

The best book written about the post-Vietnam military. Although Mr. Gabriel was an officer, he seems especially in tune with what really happens to the soldiers on the ground who have to carry out stupid orders from above. Ths is one of the most honest and objective looks at the U.S. military. I wish he would write a sequel, beginning with Panama, Iraq, Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia. A litany of failure.

Required reading for any military professional.

Excellent analysis of the repeated failures of US military operations from the end of the Vietnam war through the assault on Grenada. Many of the lessons learned that are examined in detail were directly applied by the commanders in Operation Desert Storm. I was presented with a copy in 1987 at my commissioning ceremony by a Special Forces LTC. After sharing it with several peers in Army Aviation, I passed my highlighted, dog-eared copy to a friend at Pensacola where several Naval Air professionals got a chance to take a peek. I now require that my junior officers and NCOs read this book as part of their professional development.