The Last Assault the Bulge Reassessed

by Charles Whiting

Book Overview

An armored reconnaissance veteran of the campaign and prolific World War II author offers a major re-appraisal of the Bulge battle based on the theory that Allied leaders knew about the German attack in advance.

• Format: Hardcover
• Language: English
• ISBN: 1885119003
• ISBN13: 9781885119001
• Release Date: December 1994
• Publisher: Da Capo Press
• Length: 304 Pages
• Weight: 1.25 lbs.
• Dimensions: 1.0" x 6.4" x 9.5"

Customer Reviews

Ike as diabolical plotter

This reader usually finds source-footnotes to be boring and irrelevant, but when grave accusations are made against a major historical figure, their absence lowers the value of the allegations to little more than tabloid level. Whiting, described on the dust-jacket as "a prolific author of war fiction", finds the conventional interpretations of the Ardennes Offensive to be the products of conspiracies and coverups, and the considerable American losses to be the result of Eisenhower's "evil, ill-conceived" strategy to lure the Germans out of their Seigfried Line. How Ike was able to direct the maniacal generalship of Hitler is not explained. The author's account of the battle is interesting when it focuses on the experiences of the ill-fated U.S. 28th and 106th Divisions, but it cannot be accepted as serious military history. (The rating stars are a requirement of the site and are disavowed. This reviewer dos not "rate" books.)

Conspiracy Theories in the Ardennes

Charles Whiting prefaces his work with his prior belief that all the secretes of World War II had been discovered. With the official release of some previously classified documents, including ULTRA decriptions and other sources the very existence of which had been denied until recently, Whiting found what he believes to be a previously undiscovered secret: SHAEF knew about the impending Ardennes Offensive. Not only did Eisenhower do nothing to prevent the assault, he welcomed it as a means of engaging the tattered remains of the Wermacht outside the nearly impenetrable fortifications of the West Wall.As with other conspiracy theories (Area 54, J.F. Kennedy, etc.), once the theory is fashioned, it is easy to find facts supporting it. However, many of Whiting's points are compelling. Although Eisenhower had little or no ULTRA intelligence about the offensive, MAGIC was intercepting and decoding an astounding number of messages from the Japanese ambassador which outlined the location and time of the assault. Furthermore, there is no question that Eisenhower's staff, notably Omar Bradley, had spoken about the advantages to a German assault in Belgium as early as October, 1944.Whiting's theory, naturally, is less than solid. For example, he fails satisfactorily to explain his opinions as to the reasons why Eisenhower's "plan" failed. Was it that Ike never expected the 106th to put up any resistance? Did he not foresee the German assault bottling up at St. Vith? Did he not realize the heroic defense of Bastogne would create headlines? Nevertheless, as any frequent reader of Whiting's writing can attest, his work is a compelling read. If the theory were advanced for critical review, far more detail and supporting documentation would be necessary. As it is, much of the book is devoted to historical narrative about the Ardennes Offensive -- itself interesting.