Korea: The First War We Lost

by Bevin Alexander

Book Overview

This fast moving study is the first to be written by a professional army historian and capably challenges many of the traditional interpretations. This description may be from another edition of this product.

• Format: Paperback
• Language: English
• ISBN: 0781810191
• ISBN13: 9780781810197
• Release Date: November 2003
• Publisher: Hippocrene Books
• Length: 566 Pages
• Weight: 1.90 lbs.
• Dimensions: 1.1" x 6.4" x 9.0"

Customer Reviews

Korea: The first war our politicians lost for us!!!

This is truly a good read - a bit much detail wise - but,nonetheless a good read. I am sad to note that it was my generation that rushed from our high school graduation down to the recruiting offices to do our patriotic duty only to be denied any chance to win by Truman and his ilk. Of only 25 boys in my class, 17 of us volunteered and 3 of these young men are buried in Korea. What a sad, sad waste. Back to the book - it is well worthwhile. Certainly you will learn a great deal about this"Police Action"

A seminal contribution to American military studies

In a newly revised edition, Bevin Alexander's Korea: The First War We Lost continues to be an exhaustive, scholarly exploration of the causes and effects of American involvement in the Korean War. Alexander, a combat historian during the Korean War and commander of the 5th Historical Detachment, points out the U.S. succeeded in stopping North Korean aggression, but failed in its attempt to destroy the North Korean state and eliminate this strategic shield protecting China's heartland. Alexander's informative and comprehensive text is enhanced with thirteen maps and is a seminal contribution to American military studies in general, and the Korean conflict in particular.

Excellent Meld of Military and Political Aspects of the War

MY GOODNESS, I HAVE JUST read three Korean War books in a row. Completing the hat trick is Alexander's book. Don't judge the book by its title: there is a fair compendium of the facts (and fantasies) of all the Korean War participants: China, Russia, NKPA and ROK forces, the UN, the US and affiliated armies all swung from victory to defeat; wild bouts of optimism and valleys of despair. Perhaps it is fitting that this country of Morning Calm and intense moods; of vertical ridges and sprawling mud flats, should so condemn those who set foot on its rich and fragrant soils. Do not make Alexander's book the first book you read about the Korean War. Read Appleman, Knox and perhaps Acheson first. Then Alexander's mastery of the war and its complex web of intrigue (NY to Seoul; Beijing to Moscow; London to Delhi) in the high courts of the nascent cold war will hit you hardest where it should: right in the heart. When you count the staggering loss of life-especially in the two years the negotiations dragged on, a delay Alexander rightly blames largely on the USA-and realize they were spent to capture worthless ridges, I doubt tears won't come to your eyes. What a pathetic account Truman and Acheson make of themselves, even if many decisions they reached had merit. Alexander's grasp of history here is very insightful. He claims that it is our obsession with 'total victory' over Japan in WWII that allowed the Russians to enter the Asian war and led to the division of the Korean peninsula in the first place. So too is the author's discussion of NKPA actions off the main Seoul/Taejon/Taegu battle axis. If NKPA forces had not dilly dallied in the west (defending ports the UN never attempted to regain) and on the east coast (deploying in the mountains to prevent ambushes, which also never came), they would have crushed the still weak Pusan defenses weeks before a perimeter could be established. Few books mix politics with military analysis. Even fewer do it well, and Alexander's is one of them. He breaks the diplomatic/political initiatives into tangible issues. While intelligent and analytic, he remains youthful in his comments: "One can only imagine the dispatches that transpired between Moscow and Ambassador Jacob Malik!" The photo of the Russian diplomat's vacant chair at the Security Council meeting is a Korean War icon. To right wingers, an appropriate metaphor for what communist state-ism would always be: empty. While other analyses (In'chon, Chosin, the decision to cross the parallel) and conclusions (that the US was an aggressor! for going into North Korea) are more suspect, they do not detract from the book.

An unfortunate subtitle

Bevin Alexander's book on Korea would probably still be in print if it had a subtitle other than "The First War We Lost." One might assume from this subtitle that this book attempts to advance an unconventional theory about this well-documented subject. Such is not the case; the title simply means that the US/ROK forces had defeated North Korea before the Chinese attacked, driving the US back to the South. Alexander's book is a well-written, interesting description of the Korean war. The author skillfully explains the war from a variety of perspectives- from unit actions to the generals to the political leaders. Adequate maps enable the reader to follow the movements over unfamiliar place names. The author's background as a Korean vet and a military historian are evident in his battle descriptions, but his book does not mirror standard military viewpoints. Alexander's frank comments on MacArthur, Truman, Syngman Rhee and others explain the politics of the war, and he also provides clear, though less-detailed, analyses of the views of Chinese and North Korean leaders. This book is more comprehensive than James Stokesbury's fine book on the same subject. Though both books will hold your interest, if you plan to read only one book about the Korean War for the 50th anniversary, Alexander's is well worth the search.

A friendly read for readers who like history and warfare!

This is a terrific book based on content of the material that was researched and presented. However, I am a really big historical and warfare type of reader, and this book I think lacks some depth in the military campaign section such as graphs and maps in describing the different engagements during the entire war. If you are a reader who had never read anything on the Korean War (like me), I think this book provides a well-rounded knowledge in history, military perspectives, relationships between generals and to their supperiors such as General MacArthur and President Truman, and above all, politics within the U.S. and the world. I think the book was factual and unbiased in its views, and is not written from an "American" point of view, but stating what had took place as the way it happened.