Knowledge and the Flow of Information

by Fred I. Dretske and DRETSKE

Book Overview

What distinguishes clever computers from stupid people (besides their components)? The author of Seeing and Knowing presents in his new book a beautifully and persuasively written interdisciplinary approach to traditional problems--a clearsighted interpretation of information theory. Psychologists, biologists, computer scientists, and those seeking a general unified picture of perceptual-cognitive activity will find this provocative reading. The problems Dretske addresses in Knowledge and the Flow of Information --What is knowledge? How are the sensory and cognitive processes related? What makes mental activities mental?--appeal to a wide audience. The conceptual tools used to deal with these questions (information, noise, analog versus digital coding, etc.) are designed to make contact with, and exploit the findings of, empirical work in the cognitive sciences. A concept of information is developed, one deriving from (but not identical with) the Shannon idea familiar to communication theorists, in terms of which the analyses of knowledge, perception, learning, and meaning are expressed. The book is materialistic in spirit--that is, spiritedly materialistic--devoted to the view that mental states and processes are merely special ways physical systems have of processing, coding, and using information.

• Format: Paperback
• Language: English
• ISBN: 026254038X
• ISBN13: 9780262540384
• Release Date: March 1983
• Publisher: MIT Press
• Length: 292 Pages
• Weight: 0.95 lbs.
• Dimensions: 0.7" x 5.9" x 8.9"
• Age Range: 18 years and up
• Grade Range: Postsecondary and higher

Customer Reviews

a classic

~It's kinda nonsense to call a thought nonsense without any argument against it. It is in fact a totally sensible position (actually many great philosophers hold it) to consider meaning as quantifiable.This book is a classic of both epistemology and philosophy of mind. I don't agree with Dretske that our cognition is only concerned with digitalization, so that perception is mainly out of conceptualization. But the application of digital/analog distiction is really helpful to understand our~~ cognition in terms of information flowing. As one reader said, I really like this part of the book.Also, his contribution to the definition of knowledge should not be neglected. There are a few philosophers who think of knowledge in terms of information, rather than in terms of justification. Although few people are interested with knowledge now, this line of thought is very intuitive and elegant.It's been more than 20 years, since this book was published. But still, many parts of this~~ book help to understand more contemporary discussions of epistemology and philosophy of mind.~

An excellent book

This book is a classic, well worth reading for those with any kind of interest in contemporary epistemology or the philosophy of mind. Dretske develops an ingenious and elegant theory of informational content, and then puts it to work giving information-theoretic analyses of knowledge, perception, beliefs and concepts. Not surprisingly, since he's tackling hard problems, there are difficulties with these, and Dretske himself has changed his position quite a bit since 1981. But in each case his attack on the problem at hand is of at least as much interest as where he ends up. Dretske begins his account of perception, for instance, by reworking the analogue/digital distinction, using the modified version to give a clear and plausible account of the distinction between perceptual and cognitive processes. Whatever the fate of his theory of perception itself, this a good idea, and has been deservedly influential. The book is filled with good ideas of this kind.Finally, a comment on the preceding review. The claim that meaning can be quantified is neither the main nor any other thesis of Dretske's book, and foisting it on him is wildly unfair. Drestke clearly and often distinguishes between the meaning of a sign and the information it carries. Moreover, his account of informational content certainly isn't just communication theory in disguise, as he hammers home time and again. As if this wasn't enough, early in chapter 2 Dretske explicitly rejects as absurd the claim that the amount of meaning in a message can be measured. Since warning lights of these kinds appear in the preface and regularly in every chapter thereafter, the preceding reviewer must indeed have found Dretske's (perfectly lucid) prose indigestible. There's every sign that he just hasn't bothered to digest it.