Intention

by G.E.M. Anscombe

Book Overview

Intention is one of the masterworks of twentieth-century philosophy in English. First published in 1957, it has acquired the status of a modern philosophical classic. The book attempts to show in detail that the natural and widely accepted picture of what we mean by an intention gives rise to insoluble problems and must be abandoned. This is a welcome reprint of a book that continues to grow in importance.

• Format: Paperback
• Language: English
• ISBN: 0674003993
• ISBN13: 9780674003996
• Release Date: October 2000
• Publisher: Harvard University Press
• Length: 106 Pages
• Weight: 0.43 lbs.
• Dimensions: 0.3" x 6.0" x 9.0"

Customer Reviews

succinct work of concentrated genius

A political philosopher friend of mine who dotes on Richard Rorty, John Dewey, and- least impressive of all- Daniel Dennett, calls Intention, "Anscombes crummy little book.". That may rank as one of the most wrongheaded reviews of all time. On a quick, superficial reading, Intention IS easy to dismiss with a shrug. However, a closer, slower reading reveals the extraordinary riches of this brief, brilliant, book. Anscombe was almost unique among twentieth century philosophers, in that she was a Plato and Aristotle scholar( First Class honors in "Greats" at Oxford.), who was also a student and disciple of wWittgenstein. In this remarkable book, Anscombe uses a Wittgensteinian mode and manner to approach Aristotelian (and Thomistic) themes in action theory. Intention is extraordinarily succinct and siffused with a remarkably dry, understated, wit. J.M Cameron once wrote that Anscombe wrote in a "dorian mode", without ruffles or flourishes. That is true. It is also true that she was a brilliant minaturist. Like the stories of her fellow Catholic Flannery O'Connor, Anscombe philosophical texts are akin to exqusitely crafted and detailed medieval ivories.

WONDERFUL FUN

I was a student of Anscombe's when she was a visiting professor at the University of Pennsylvania, along with her spouse Peter Geach, circa 1980. I took a class on Wittgenstein from Anscombe and a class on Frege from Geach. Anscombe was a wonderfully friendly raconteur with dry wit and lofty memories of Wittgenstein, who apparently "blessed" her. For the class we used her book Intention, a great read and even better when read aloud by her. Geach's class was a frightening exercise in intimidation, as few of us were brave enough to even be in the room with him, much less have him lecture to us on Frege. I remember being the sole person in the class, and saying nothing for 12 weeks. Meanwhile Geach lectured at the board, completely ignoring me. From what I understand when they headed back to England they boarded the wrong plane and wound up in Mexico City. I did spend some time discussing McTaggart with Geach, and almost went abroad to write my dissertation with him on said, but was warned that he probably wouldn't remember me when I showed up.

Essential reading

It's a must for everyone who are living in the world which is dominated by the modern scientific worldview. Especially anyone who has a special interest in the nature of action and intention and ethics shouid read it. The essential theme is "practical knowledge". We are doers in a real world. We are neither mere spectators in the world nor immaterial ghosts wrapped in an inner world always willing but never action. One of the the five best books that I've read in philosophy. Highly recommended. Caveat: This book is extremly difficult to understand at one reading so you shoul read it over and over again.

A masterful monograph on human action

Elizabeth Anscombe's brief, difficult book sets out to discredit the idea that an intention to do something is a state of mind, however fleeting and subliminal, which precedes the agent's doing it. In a series of short dense essays without titles, Anscombe discusses a whole set of issues that surround her central claim - how the agent knows what she wants to do, for instance; or whether an action can be described as intentional quite apart from what the agent wants to achieve by performing it; or whether intention can only be expressed conventionally; how reasons for action differ from its causes. With admirable brevity, Anscombe manages to open up several lines of enquiry into human action in general, and their interest may in fact be independent of how they illuminate the idea of intention.Anscombe's treatment of these issues often resembles an effective demolition job, but it would be hasty to conclude that she knocks down various existing theories to replace them with others of her own devising. Rather, she seeks to display the poverty and unfruitfulness of spinning sophisticated philosophical theories out of certain features of our talk about intentions. In Anscombe's view, the fact that we can sensibly ask what someone's intentions were when she was getting married, for instance, should not be taken to imply that the question has a determinate answer only if she did indeed have a distinct thought about her intentions at the time - if there was a conscious episode in her mental life that could be described as intending something. If you are ready to have your theoretical wings clipped, this is the book for you.Reading 'Intention' induces a strange kind of instability. On the one hand, you wonder if it isn't just a controversy over how to define words, or how to carve out a region of human action that lends itself to description in terms of the concepts of intention, voluntariness or freedom. If you happen to be at home in a language other than English, and one that does not have a family of words corresponding exactly to the English 'intention' and 'intentional' (with all their syntactic complements), you might be inclined to see Anscombe's results as profoundly contingent - as laying out how some speakers of a particular language supposedly make sense of their actions. On the other hand, you also find yourself realising that what she is after is not merely local: that it has to hold of human action in general - and that her distinctions capture something that must be acknowledged, even if her analyses do not always conform to 'intentional' as the word is used in ordinary English. This sense of instability comes out very clearly in her example of St Peter's denial of Jesus: somehow I wish it didn't have to be described as an intentional act, and yet I find it terrifying that to describe it otherwise - as a sheer reflex of fear, for example, or a mindless, automatic response - would be to falsify it completely.

Reflections on an oft-neglected subject

G.E.M. Anscombe, a student of Wittgenstein, uses an approach that is reminsicent of her old teacher by dividing her book into individual reflections on aspects of what it means to intend to do something. This method invites the reader to meditate on this topic and does a powerful job to help one realize what a mystery intention is, and shows just how much depth there is to human action and interpersonal relations. Anscombe, who just died earlier in 2001, is rightfully considered one of the greatest English speaking philosophers of the 20th century, and this work is a magnificent example of her genius.