Inside the Iron Works: How Grumman's Glory Days Faded

by William H. Gregory and George M. Skurla

Skurla, former president and chairman of Grumman Aerospace, and Gregory, the former editor of an aviation and space magazine, trace the triumphs and disappointments of America's onetime top aerospace contractor, from its rise in the 1930s to the company's takeover by one of its biggest competitors. The company's rise and fall is seen through the ey

• Format: Hardcover
• Language: English
• ISBN: 155750329X
• ISBN13: 9781557503299
• Release Date: January 2004
• Publisher: US Naval Institute Press
• Length: 225 Pages
• Weight: 1.10 lbs.
• Dimensions: 0.9" x 6.4" x 9.2"

Customer Reviews

Brought Me back

I used to work for Grumman during the F-14 "glory days". In fact before I became a Budget Planner, I used to work in the Clean Room attaching "honeycomb" for the F-14 wings. Grumman did it right back in those days regarding employee morale. Every once in awhile, employees were encouraged to watch "fly bys" of the Tomcat over the runway by Plant 4. It was a great period of my life. The book brought back memories as well as info that the lower level workers had no idea was going on. We need more books about that great "family friendly" company before it became Northrup-Grumman.

An aerospace giant that lost focus and lost independence

"Unfulfilled destiny" is how George Skurla sums up the fortunes of the company he spent his entire professional career with. He begins the book in a somber mood, thus trying to convey his depression at seeing the aftermath of what had been a mighty company reduced to the junior partner in one of today's big-name aerospace firms. Skurla follows the highs and lows of a company that had built thousands of airplanes for the U.S. Navy during World War II, had built the lunar module which the Apollo 13 crew had used as a lifeboat, and had diversified into truck bodies, buses, hydrofoils and even maritime container refrigeration. Yet the company's "bachelor life" ended abruptly when it merged with one of its biggest rivals in 1994. Skurla calls the F-14 "the crux of the Grumman story". The essence is that of an airplane with a troubled history. Basically, Congress was dictating what the Navy should have, and the Navy's fighter and attack pilots, both active and retired, had different ideas about what the airplane should do. Inevitably, as time dragged on and Grumman spent pots of money in defending the F-14 before a plethora of Congressional committees, the cost per unit soared, and no lower-cost alternative seemed to be available at the time. Emphasis on the lightweight attack airplane concept did not help Grumman's cause, either, because many believed that this would mean a low-capability machine. Grumman wanted to supply the F-14 because of its ruggedness in keeping with the founders' mantra for what an airplane should be designed to do, namely survive in battle conditions, and because of its ability to challenge long-range Soviet Navy bombers from hundreds of miles out from the carrier group. Yet some admirals considered the F-14 too complex and wanted the lighter, more maneuverable F/A-18 as an alternative. The F-14 program, in taking the company toward near bankruptcy, produced the most headaches for Grumman. Lew Evans, the top man until his death in 1972, said that "the [engineers] design things, but then the manufacturing group has a hard time building them". Skurla was running the lunar module program at the time, yet such was Evans' desperation that he cajoled him into sorting out the F-14 mess. Yet the horrible D-word, downsizing, was hanging over Grumman's head even in the early 1970s, and many believed - even within the company - that Grumman was not doing enough in this regard, allowing overheads to rise alarmingly. Iran's Shah then threw the company a lifeline by ordering 80 F-14s - "a marketing and finance coup," notes Skurla. All but one had been delivered by the time of the Iranian revolution. Grumman attempted to diversify into the civilian market with the Gulfstream series of bizjets. What was lacking was service support for worldwide customers, yet the top man said that Grumman would not involve itself in that. Hence, the nub of the problem: Grumman was good at building, but not at marketing - a significant flaw in any strategy

The Inside Scoop

This is a wonderful inside look into a uniquely American Company. This history of the Grumman Corp. will be of great interest to both aerospace and business professionals.