Inside Hitler's High Command

by Geoffrey P. Megargee

Book Overview

Challenging previous accounts, Geoffrey Megargee shatters the myth that German generals would have prevailed in World War II if only Hitler had not meddled in their affairs. Indeed, Megargee argues, the German high command was much more flawed than many have suspected or acknowledged. Inside Hitler's High Command reveals that while Hitler was the central figure in many military decisions, his generals were equal partners in Germany's catastrophic...

• Format: Hardcover
• Language: English
• ISBN: 0700610154
• ISBN13: 9780700610150
• Release Date: April 2000
• Publisher: University Press of Kansas
• Length: 352 Pages
• Weight: 1.40 lbs.
• Dimensions: 1.1" x 6.3" x 9.3"

Customer Reviews

An Expertly Crafted Look At Germany's Highest Command Leadership

"Inside Hitler's High Command" is a brilliant look at how Hitler and his generals operated in World War II. Hitler's overriding desire not just to command, but to personally dominate his generals is evident as the German command function is amazingly recreated by author Geoffrey P. Megargee. Megargee offers us a typical week in the command life of Hitler and his generals (as much as any week in those days could be considered typical). These sections make for some of the book's most fascinating and readable pages. One goes back and forth between grudging admiration for German military technical abilities, and a sense that everything was just hanging by a thread and waiting to fall apart. Hitler's meddling, his generals sniveling subservience, the vastness and barbarity of the Russian operation, and the dogged determination and intelligence of the Allies all spelled the Third Reich's doom. Megargee's work is a fine piece of historical scholarship that expresses these wartime realities skillfully.

Shatters some old myths

This book is an attempt to re-write what has been the conventional view of the relation between Adolph Hilter and the German General Staff. After the war, Hitler was conveniently dead and that allowed the German Generals to put out a version of history that was accepted for some years but was at odds with the truth. The German Generals had towed the line that they were politically neutral prior to the 1930?s and that they had not been supporters of Nazi aims. Further that they opposed some aspects of Nazi war aims and acted in a professional way. Lastly they were highly competent and might have won the war if it had not had been for Hitler continually interfering with their operational plans. Megargee argues convincingly that the German Generals had a political agenda similar to the Nazis. That is they supported the abrogation of the Treaty of Versailles, they wanted an end to democracy and they wanted Germany to rearm and to become a great power again. A large number of Generals such as Rommel, Guderian, Zeitzler and Reichenau were if not committed Nazis, enthusiastic barrackers yelling support from the sidelines. One interesting point is Megaree?s estimation of the ability of the German Generals. After the war a large number wrote memoirs in which they modestly estimated themselves as pretty good. Megaree concedes that from an operational point of view the German army did well. However it was vulnerable in a number of respects. The key mistake made by Germany in the war was the attack on the Soviet Union. It would seem clear that the planning for operation Barbarossa was deeply flawed. For instance the Germans knew nothing of the actual strength of the forces against them. (The Soviets had 5 million men, 20,000 tanks and 20,000 aircraft to the German?s 3million 3,200 and 3000 respectively) In addition the Germans had no clear plan of defeating the Soviets. Barbarossa was based on the hope that the bulk of Soviet forces could be destroyed near the Polish border. It was then hoped that the Soviets might give in or the government would collapse. However if this did not eventuate the Germans had massive supply problems. They had limited fuel, and they could not use the Soviet railway system until they changed the gauge. In fact when the Soviets failed to collapse the Germans suffered massive supply problems, not being able to supply their troops with winter clothing and struggling to maintain ammunition levels and fuel and spares for their vehicles and planes. Thus throughout the war the German Army acted as if intelligence was not really worth worrying about and that supply was a problem which could be overcome by an act of will. This deficiency was not a problem in initial war in the west, as the distances were so small and the French and British acted incompetently when faced by the German advance. However against the Soviets it was fatal. Megargee summarises the weakness of the German generals as one of a strategic weakness. It was one that th

Excellent Academic Look At Hitler's General Staff!

Conventional wisdom regarding the fate of the Wehrmacht in World War Two has always been that it was Adolph Hitler's maniacal meddling in the day to day affairs of the armed forces that created the catastrophic defeats along the eastern front that lost the war. Indeed, many of the first hand post-war memoirs of those German generals and other staff officials supported this point of view, giving one the idea that if only the generals had had their way, Germany would have been victorious. There is much to commend such a view; certainly Hitler's decisions were often counter-intuitive and counter-productive, and he often seemed to change his mind and the tactics associated with a campaign in mid-stream. The results of these actions were indeed often disastrous. Yet, as the author of this scholarly investigation into the machinations of the General Staff and its decision making process brilliantly argues in this fascinating and informative book, the evidence supporting such a theory that Hitler single-handedly lost the war through his incompetence simply does not exist.In fact, this book is quite well written; it is authoritative, informative, and extremely well documented. The author has managed to turn what could have been a historical curiosity for the amusement of other academic historians into a terrific reading experience for a more general audience. He approaches the subject with verve and a plethora of telling examples of how the general staff were involved and complicit in the day to day decisions that were so disastrous for the Wehrmacht; far from being helpless factotums who merely carried out Hitler's demands, they initiated debates and discussions in which Hitler often played the provocateur, attempting to gain a better idea of what each of the participants in the discussions really thought regarding a particular course of action. Also, in employing the kinds of primary evidence used here, he illustrates how involved and enthusiastic many of the generals were in making fateful decisions. As the author maintains, there is no credible evidence that they did in fact take any serious issue with Operation Barbarossa or with its conduct until things began to go awry. The simple truth of the matter seems to be that they shared Hitler's myopic faith in the invincibility of the Wehrmacht, and seriously underestimated the capabilities, endurance, and determination of the Soviet forces. The fateful decision was the first one, the effort to invade the Soviet Union without recognizing the serious logistical and tactical problems that were ensue when prosecuting a fight over such a vast distance and with a front that was thousands of miles long. Likewise, the decision by Hitler and General Staff to declare war against the Americans seemed more the result of an arrogant disregard for facts in favor of self-serving ideology. Of course, to argue that the general staff itself was complicit is not to deny the degree of sloth and banality associated with Hi

Not all Hitler's fault after all.

The author's intention to analyse a complex subject, whilst at the same time entertaining the general reader, has succeeded in this excellent book. His view that the generals and OKW shared willingly in Hitler's military blunders - post war memoirs tend to be disingenious - is not in itself new. However, Megargee has assembled the primary evidence in a convincing and comprehensive form. As he argues, there is no significant evidence that the High Command seriously opposed the Fuhrer's declaration of war on Russia or America in 1941. Indeed, they took a most simplistic view of Russia's strength and America's likely impact over time. Detailed here too are Hitler's poor attention to strategic planning and military intelligence. In the Gotterdammerung phase of the war, the author has an excellent chapter on Hitler's insistence on promoting men wildly above their ability just because they were loyal. Himmler's dismal showing as a military commander is the best example of this. The book is a most readable insight into the mind set of those who led Germany to defeat in a flawed system.

Hitler's Willing Executives: General Disarray and Decline

Within months of Germany's unconditional surrender in May 1945, his former military "advisors" tried to distance themselves from his over-reaching grand strategy. Beginning with Halder's self-exculpatory _Hitler as Warlord_ in 1949 and continuing through the highly popular memoirs of Guderian, Manstein, Warlimont, Mellenthin and Bock, the dead Hitler was put in the docket and found guilty of strategical naivite. Post-war propaganda depicted a German High Command which "knew better" than Hitler but were intimidated and brutalized into submitting, or being replaced and disgraced.This myth has been unravelling piecemeal of late with respect to certain "fatal decisions" (Invasion of Russia, Battle of Britain, Declaration of War on the US, the North African Campaign). However, until Megargee's well-written study, none have presented a dissection of how the High Command collectively shared responsibility with the Little Corporal for confusing phase lines on a planning map with logistical, mechanical and manpower realities.This is most likely because "organizational history" tends to be boring. It's much more interesting to read about behind-the-scenes feuds among monocled martinets than the precise way in which orders and intelligence were processed and disseminated. Megargee manages to envigorate his descriptions of the "system", such as it was, with the constant reminder of the clash of egos that diffused what little "opposition" there was to Hitler's conceptions. Throughout it all, Megargee shows how the once powerful vaunted "General Staff" became a mere cog in the awkward_Army High Command_(OKH)structure working alongside, but hardly in synch with Hitler's personal war cabinet, the _Armed Forces High Command_ (OKW). The High Command at work is the heart of this illuminating expose. The most detailed case study is that of _Operation Barbarossa_, often described as Hitler's leap into the dark. Megargee shows how, in spite of the reservations that many of the senior commanders expressed at the time, they were brought along by the seeming precision and foresight of detailed operational staff studies. Megargee illuminates the Wehrmacht's poor use of and regard for intelligence staffs and their work.Paricularly illuminating is Chapter 8 "The System at Work: A Week in the Life of the High Command". The week for display was well chosen: December 15-22, 1941, when the first signs of Operation Barbarossa's failure SHOULD HAVE become apparent. The clear exposition of decision-making and breaking demonstrates exactly how and why Hitler's "professionals" came to share his delusions. Throughout, the illusion of controlling the situation hundreds of miles away by dint of modern instantaneous communications was reinforced by the misuse of raw information filtering back from the beleaguered field commands.Megargee's clear exposition and lively prose should dump the final shovel of dirt on the grave of the lame lament:" I