India's China War

by Neville Maxwell

Book Overview

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• Format: Paperback
• ISBN: 0140216049
• ISBN13: 9780140216042
• Release Date: January 1972
• Publisher: Anchor Books
• Length: 568 Pages
• Weight: 0.70 lbs.

Customer Reviews

Unpopular but honest account of the Sino-Indo Conflict

Since the book tells the truth of Nehru's government's foolishness, arogance, adventurism and opportunist mentality, this otherwise excellent book however was not very popular in India, even to this date.The disputed McMahon Line was a unilateral imaginary line drawn by the British colony authorities without the awareness of the Chinese and without consulting to the Chinese government. Therefore it was not challenged by the Chinese government before British withdraw from India in 1947. During Nehru's rein, he foolishly pursue the so called "Forward Policy" to take effective control the territory and border that the British imagined and wished to establish. But China in 1962 is no longer the China 1897 under Ching Imerial dynasty who was unable to exercise a strong protection of her own territory. Now Nehru faced with was a formidable Chinese Red Army (PLA) who was battle hardened and had just defeated Chiang Kai-Sheik in 1949 and have fought a war at par with the US army in Korea (1950-1953). Nehru foolishly believed China has no will to defend her territory by force. Therefore Nehru advanced to McMahon Line and tresspassed it. The "Forward Policy" inevitably provoked the Chinese garrison force and the war was erupted inevitably. Although the Chinese has tried to settle this by negotiations, but it was flatly refused bny Nehru's government. The result is the illprepared Indian force suffered humiliating defeat on both west and east fronts. The war however was stopped by a surprising Chinese unilateral withdraw back to the north of McMahon Line. The rest, is history.Neville Maxwell's book was the result of his extensive research of the Indian Defense Department's archive. It sould be noted that Maxwell was unable to access the records from the Chinese side. So how could it be biased against India? For the reason along, how could it be said he was a Indophobe and a Sinophile? For a loser who does not learn from his mistakes and admit his own failure and shortcomings, a bigger disaster is waiting to happen.

Without a doubt, a master piece

This book is definitely one of the best book I've ever read about a limited war between two countries. While I don't think the author has any bias against India, as one of my fellow reviewers suggests, I believe other reviewers have already discussed the merits of this book. I would only like to add three points in this discussion:1. It is really sad that the UK's imperalism/colonailism haunts these two countires even after withdrawing from India. The MaMahon line is not a written agreement between UK & Chinese (Ching dynasty) governments but a product of some irresponsible officials in India & Tibet. The UK government should have the ultimate blame for the whole debacle.2. It reminds us that how media can affect our point of view so easily. We must beware of our inherent assumption about the righteousness of a democratic government.3. In view of Nehru's statement about "driving out the enemy", recent Indian leaders' decalration that China is still the biggest threat for India, I think these Indian leaders should concentrate on improving the life their people instead of fabricating an emeny from these agressive statements.

The most authoritative account that I know of on the subject

Research based mostly on Indian and British sources, well-written, important account of the historical events that led to the war, easy to readThis book is based almost exclusively on information available from Indian sources. Yet, the book faults Prime Minister Nehru of India primarily for provoking and then mis-managing the war. The book is a damning account of the ineptitude of top Indian political leadership in strategic matters. India, facing all the disadvantages of terrain, chose to pursue a 'Forward Policy' of establishing indefensible flag posts that could only be supplied by air, against a world-class PLA land army that held the advantage of a well-connected road network throughout some of the most inhospitable terrain in the world. After refusing to enter into meaningful negotiations on defining the border, Nehru pursued this myopic policy because he foolishly deluded himself into believing that the Chinese would be unwilling to enforce their territorial claims by force of arms. In the end, the war broke out at in a narrow Himalayan valley that could not possibly have been any more disadvantageous for Indians -- the Chinese positions overlooked a denuded, unready Indian infantry brigade which lacked ANY ARTILLERY SUPPORT WHATSOEVER, that was THREE WEEKS away from the nearest Indian roadhead by foot across high mountain passes and thick tropical forests, and supplied exclusively by erratic air drops. The Chinese, by contrast, had a 7-ton roadhead barely a few hours walk away. The book also severely castigates the Indian political leadership for interfering with the functioning of the military in matters of promotions of senior officers. The end result was that by 1962 the Indian General Staff had become mere supplicants of their political masters, and unable to counter impossible strategic/tactical demands with an objective, professional military analysis. Thus, senior military officers at the general staff level (who had never held major combat commands before) were often making decisions for individual battalions or companies -- all the while not protesting against the impossible demands being made of them. Another excellent account of the military aspect of the battle at Thag La is 'Himalayan Blunder' by Brigadier JP Dalvi -- the beleagured brigade commander who was given impossible orders to assault well-defended Chinese positions at an altitde ranging from 14,000 feet to 18,000 feet with no air/artillery support, roughly 3 battalions spread over 12 miles, and only 50 rounds of pouch ammunition per man! Thus, did David take on Goliath.

This book shows how much we can be mislead by the media.

London TIMES reporter Nevile Maxwell wrote this book solely based on the declassified documents from India's Defense Department. It shows how India's prime minister Mr. Nehru launched the "northern advance" policy disregard the historical evidence were all against India's claim. The war started by Indian army firing upon the Chinese border garrison force and ended up with India's humiliating total defeat. But ironically, we in the West always believed that Chinese, instead of India, was the aggressor.

An insight examination of the 1962 China-India border war.

Nevile Maxwell's detail account of the 1962 China - India border clashes in the Himalayas. The book was based on the declassified documents from India's Defense Department. Contrary to the common believe that China was the aggressor, the war actually happened because of Nehru's agressive but foolish Northern-advance policy in the believe that China, while politically isolated from the world community, will never resist India's advancement. The loss of war by india was assured by an incompetent and ill prepared Indian army. Although China has won the war, but she nevertheless has suffered tremendous propaganda defeat and was portrait as an agressor trying to take advantage of the "peace-loving Democratic India" by the world news media. Solely based on information from India, there was absolutely no material was obtained from Chinese sources.