How the South Could Have Won the Civil War: The Fatal Errors That Led to Confederate Defeat

by Bevin Alexander

Book Overview

Destroying conventional historical wisdom, acclaimed military historian Bevin Alexander reveals how the South most definitely could have defeated the North-and how close a Confederate victory came to... This description may be from another edition of this product.

• Format: Hardcover
• Language: English
• ISBN: 0307345998
• ISBN13: 9780307345998
• Release Date: December 2007
• Publisher: Crown Publishing Group (NY)
• Length: 337 Pages
• Weight: 1.40 lbs.
• Dimensions: 1.2" x 6.5" x 9.5"

Customer Reviews

Great Read and a Civic Service

For my money, this is history explored in the most engaging way possible - i.e. identifying and exploring the big "what if's." What if a given condition would have been recognized; what if a particular individual would have made a different decision at a pivotal moment; etc. And, in the pursuit of identifying and exploring those `what if's', Bevin Alexander makes a compelling case while delivering a thoroughly engaging and entertaining read! However, early on in reading this book, something else fairly leapt off the pages - how easily the North could have won the war sooner! Given their overwhelming superiority in numbers and material, had the strategy and tactics Mr. Alexander so convincingly advocates for the South been only *tepidly* applied by the North, the war could have been brought to a swift and decisive end well before the four bloody years that ensued. The only Northern leader that embraced the strategy of taking the war to the people and tactics of maneuver over frontal attacks was Sherman (and possibly Sheridan who was not appreciably covered in the book) and very late in the war. By so doing, Sherman produced spectacular results that, after turning north and closing with Richmond, finally provided the conditions necessary to bring the war to an end. That being said, Mr. Alexander's proposal is a fascinating one. The South was blessed with more insightful military leaders and less intrusive civilian leadership. So, given that fact, there were ample opportunities for them to win the war had leaders like Stonewall Jackson (the South's strongest advocate for this approach) only been listened to. Instead, Lee, like so many other Civil War leaders, was pre-disposed to follow the Napoleonic axioms that were such a prominent feature of the military doctrine of his day. Lincoln and U.S. Secretary of War Stanton also come off in this book as ham-handed in military matters. At one point, undercutting McClellan's request for more troops on the peninsula and thoroughly botching the disposition of Union troops to the west across northern Virginia - which, in turn, presented the South with one of many opportunities lost. All in all, Mr. Alexander does a civic service in highlighting the difficulties of command in this era - in particular, the relationship between military commanders in the field and the civilian leadership. History is replete with examples of Presidents interfering with military decisions in the field to the detriment of command and country - and we're hardly immune today.

Could have won the war in the East?

The book was well written and easy to read. Excellent maps accompany the chapters allowing the reader to follow the action. The book focuses on the Civil War's Eastern Theater in 1862-63. The author believes that the Eastern Theater was critical to the South and allowed the only opportunity for Victory. The author compares the war fighting styles of Robert E. Lee and Thomas Jackson. His thesis was that Lee's attacking style used up the manpower resources of the South. If the South had followed Jackson's way of war, it would have invaded the northeast, threatening northern cities, used maneuver to dislodge Union Forces, forcing them to attack the Southern Army in a favorable defensive position. Union forces would be broken by losses suffered in attacking a strong defensive position and then shattered by counterattacks. With the North beaten on Northern soil, the North would sue for peace, granting southern independence. (Maybe) The author does some choosing of facts to paint the picture he wants to show. He believes the landed aristocracy of the South was wedded to an aristocratic view of war and established commanders were not replaced by more qualified subordinates of a lower class. True enough, Davis appointed friends for his old military days and did not replace them when they proved inadequate. The author believes that Stonewall Jackson was the best Southern Commander and probably could have won the war by carrying the campaign to the North and pursuing a policy of destruction against the Northern People similar to Sherman's March to the Sea in 1864. Jackson shared this thoughts with no one so the author needs to construct his strategy from collected comments. The author gives credit to Sherman for his campaign of maneuver in the Atlanta campaign and afterwards, but cannot figure out when Sherman decided to pursue this strategy. See Sherman's Mississippi Campaign He does not credit Grant as the Union general who first saw that his forces could live off the southern countryside early in the Vicksburg campaigns and determined to use this strategy. I enjoyed the book. The South probably wouldn't have won the war pursuing a strategy of strategic raids but it certainly would have been a different war. How well would Jackson have fared if he lived and had to face better and better Union generals. Lincoln lost most of his aversion to removing generals who failed him by 1863 and favored those who fought and won. I would recommend this book to those who are interested in how the Confederacy could have won the Civil War

A formidable piece of scholarship

Bevin Alexander's new book, HOW THE SOUTH COULD HAVE WON THE CIVIL WAR, is an analysis of the errors and missed opportunities that led to Union victory. There were plenty of mistakes in the Civil War on both sides, as you might expect from a war in which the majority of the generals were appointed for political reasons. The entire catalogue of the early history of the Army of the Potomac is chock-full of serious and costly errors that led, time and again, to battlefield disaster. But Alexander's focus is on the Confederate mistakes --- how Robert E. Lee, Jefferson Davis and Stonewall Jackson erred, and how those missteps cost the South its independence. Alexander makes the distinction between strategic and tactical mistakes, and how the shortcomings of Southern strategy led to the tactical errors. Faced with a Union strategy that turned out to be very effective --- cutting off Southern supply lines while trying to capture Richmond and evict the Confederate government --- the Confederacy had limited strategic options. Davis's initial strategy (much derided by Alexander) was to try to protect all Southern territory from invasion and play on the defensive. Lee's strategy was to try to destroy the Army of the Potomac with relentless head-on assaults, taking advantage of his men's fighting spirit and drive. But there was a third option, advocated by Jackson and supported by Alexander. Jackson's plan was to invade the Northern heartland, evading the main body of the Union army, and strike against the fat civilian targets of Baltimore, New York and Philadelphia. Jackson reasoned that attacking the North's cities and industrial base would cause Abraham Lincoln to sue for peace --- all the more so if the South was able to isolate Lincoln in Washington by cutting off the rail lines that supplied the city. (This is exactly the strategy, as Alexander points out, that William Sherman used in capturing Atlanta and Savannah, and thereby bringing the war home to the Southern heartland.) Alexander takes pains to describe the tactical consequences of these strategic errors. For example, the author analyzes the impact of Jackson's hugely effective campaign in the Shenandoah Valley, not only in terms of his tactical genius, but in how his campaign kept Union forces out of the hands of General McClellan when he was driving up the Peninsula towards Richmond. Alexander argues that if Jackson had been given free rein to threaten Washington, he would have caused Lincoln to order McClellan back to the defense of the capital, thereby ending the Peninsular Campaign and giving the Confederacy the initiative. However, Lee instead ordered Jackson back to aid in the defense of Richmond, targeting McClellan's army instead of the potentially richer prize of the Union capital. Alexander's talent as a historian is lifting the "fog of war" and explaining the tactical issues of the Civil War in a way that is comprehensible for the armchair general and the military amateur alike.

Mixed Feelings

This is a quite good operational and grand tactical history of the Eastern Theatre of the American Civil War from 1st Bull Run to Gettysburg, complete with a plethora of very useful maps, told from viewpoint of the Confederate high command. For the author, Jackson is a transcendent military genius, Lee is myopic at best, and Davis becomes pretty quickly becomes immaterial. Ordinary soldiers enter the narrative mainly as numbers engaged, and casualties. The author posits that the Army of Northern Virginia could have wandered around eastern Pennsylvania for months in the summer living off the land. On the other hand, he suggests that any Union army would have surrendered almost immediately if cut off from supply. Similarly, he suggests the Union itself would have surrendered upon the capture or cutting off of either Washington, Baltimore, or Philadelphia. The possiblilty that any of these events would have merely riled up the Union against an invader is not even mentioned, much less discussed. So, while I found the book an enjoyable read, I also find it possible to doubt many of the author's opinions and spectulative theses. For me, these things balance out to a four star rating.