Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad

by Matthew Levitt

Book Overview

The first fully documented portrait of Hamas, which draws aside the veil of legitimacy behind which it hides "Compelling. . . . Levitt's book is a solid guide to a despicable terrorist organization... This description may be from another edition of this product.

• Format: Hardcover
• Language: English
• ISBN: 0300110537
• ISBN13: 9780300110531
• Release Date: May 2006
• Publisher: Yale University Press
• Length: 324 Pages
• Weight: 1.85 lbs.
• Dimensions: 1.1" x 6.5" x 9.3"

Customer Reviews

A solid introduction to Hamas

Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad sets out to put into question and discredit the idea that the Political, Chairitable, and Social Wings of Hamas are seperate and instead offers that they are acting covertly as one large unit with varying wings. Starts off kind of slow, to me at least, but really picks up in the middle. The chapter on the recruitment of suicide bombers within the education system is scary, but facinating stuff. One may ask how could anyone support an organization like Hamas ? The answer as hammered home in this book is that Hamas won the hearts and minds of the Palestinan people by providing the social services like food, school, and medical treatment to their sick and wounded where Fatawh and others had failed and opted instead to line their own pockets greedily. The Hamas model was basic : give the people what they need and you will be rewarded. Due to recent developments in Palestine and Israel's efforts, this book may be a little dated, so it should not be the only book read on Hamas, but it's a pretty good start.

Solid information from the archives

Matthew Levitt takes no prisoners. His starting point is terrorism is terrorism is terrorism. In the context of the Middle East many will argue the toss - that he ignores decades of Palestinian frustration and suffering; that the tactics adopted by Hamas could be from today's update of the manual written by Jewish fighters who carved out the state of Israel; that Washington and Jerusalem's new-found urge to do business with the more secular Fatah movement ignores the historic reality that Hamas' late arrival on the Palestinian scene is proof of so much past failure; that desperation produces more desperation. But for all that, Levitt's exhaustive 324-page HAMAS: Politics, Charity and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad is engrossing, particularly on how Hamas is perceived from the intelligence bunkers of the US and Israel. Its layers of detail, drawn from a mountain of official documents, is as revealing of Hamas as it is of the attempts to thwart its rise - without bravely or deliberately confronting the root causes of the Middle East crisis. Levitt has gone the Izzy (I.F.) Stone route - trawling thousands of documents, many of them on the public record, for a back-story that gels with the post 9/11 mindset that resistance equals terrorism and that resistance movements, somehow, should grow up. But a reader does not have to don a white or black hat to be fascinated by what he draws from the Israeli records of the interrogation of Hamas captives; from documents captured from the Palestinian security agencies and other institutions; and from his revealing analysis of the Hamas global money trail - particularly in the US. An FBI counterterrorism analyst before his appointment as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis at the U.S. Department of Treasury, Levitt now directs a program on terrorism, intelligence and policy at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He argues that Hamas' extensive social welfare work is a cover for terrorism. But there is a subtle distinction in a quote he takes from the senior Hamas figure Mahmoud Al-Zahar - try `adjunct' rather than `cover'. Al-Zahar told Al-Jazeera in 2005: "Hamas responds to all questions related to the life of the citizens not only in the case of confrontation but also in the political, economic, social, health and internal relations field. This movement has proved that it is one organic movement. Mistaken is the one who thinks that the military wing acts outside the framework of Hamas or behaves recklessly". Does it matter? In a time of conflict one man's `overarching apparatus of terror', as Levitt describes Hamas, is another's well-oiled machine. The Israelis' observation in June of the 40th anniversary of the Six-Day War, in which they seized control of the West Bank and Gaza, was marked with much hand-wringing over their failure to capitalise on the 1967 military victory which, in turn, merged with a newer sense of crisis in the aftermath of Israel's bungled invasio

A Serious Study As To How Hamas Is Able To Survive

Matthew Levitt , Senior Fellow and Director of Terrorism Studies at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and who has served since 2005 as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis at the U.S. Department of Treasury has placed the hot-button issue of Hamas into perspective with his exhaustive exposé Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism In the Service of Jihad. It should also be noted that Levitt has also served as FBI analyst providing tactical and strategic analysis in support of counterterrorism operations. He has specialized on fundraising and logistical support networks for Middle East terrorist groups. This is a particularly daunting task where there is a multitude of ideological minefields behind much of the rhetoric that often characterizes the discussion. Levitt devoted three years of research, including several trips to the Middle East and Europe and his information was drawn from newly declassified intelligence, seized Hamas documents, and dozens of interviews on three continents with experts and officials, as well as imprisoned Hamas operatives. The result is a serious study analyzing how Hamas attracts and retains it base of operations and supporters and how it radicalizes, recruits, and dispatches Palestinian suicide bombers while at the same time succeeding in wooing Palestinians to vote it into power as the ruling political power. Levitt also goes to great lengths in elucidating the political, charitable, and terrorist activities of Hamas and how they are reconciled. Commencing with the theme that there is no difference between Hamas' social arm and its terrorist operations, Levitt points out that what Hamas is endeavoring to accomplish is a "muddying of the waters" when they maintain that they are in fact separate entities- as nothing could be father than the truth. From an extensive list of documentation, we are shown how inside the Palestinian territories the battery of mosques, schools, orphanages, summer camps, and sports leagues sponsored by Hamas are all an integral part of its overarching apparatus of terror. These institutions are in the main breeding grounds for the recruitment of future suicide bombers, as well as serving Hamas in incitement and radicalizing Palestinian society. Readers are then taken on an extensive journey where Levitt delves into the origins of Hamas, its relation to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and how the exploitation of the dawa tradition has most influenced the movement in a twisted manner. It should be noted that dawa in Islamic tradition is the obligation on the part of all Muslims to submit themselves to God (ibadah) and to preach or propagate (dawa, literally mean "a call to God) true Islam. The dawa that is manipulated in a cynical fashion provides Hamas with strong popular support as well as opportunities to carry out suicide attacks. From here we learn about the many well-organized charitable foundations found in every corner of the world finances terror

Hamas : Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad

Hamas's election victory shocked the West."I don't see how you can be a partner for peace if you advocate the destruction of a country as part of your platform," President Bush said at a January 26 news conference after the results were announced. Subsequently,Washington cut off aid money to the new Hamas-dominated government, yet the White House's resolve was not matched elsewhere. Two weeks after the election, Turkey's ruling Justice and Development Party feted Hamas political leader Khalid Mishaal, a wanted terrorist. And earlier this month the Swedish government broke European consensus to issue a visa for a Hamas minister to attend a conference calling for the Jewish state's destruction. Moscow has even suggested supplying arms to Hamas. How timely it is then to read Matthew Levitt's "Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad" (Yale University Press, 334 pages, $26). In an age of instant experts and television terrorism analysts, Mr. Levitt is the real thing. A former FBI counterterrorism analyst, he currently serves as deputy assistant secretary of the Treasury for intelligence and analysis. Mr. Levitt parses many news reports, NGO studies, court proceedings, and legal documents (although he draws on very little Arabic-language material) to separate the false rhetoric from the reality about Hamas. He lays bare the popular notion preached by European diplomats that Hamas sports distinct political, social, and military wings, or that it differentiates between military and civilian targets. For example, the political leader of Hamas in Tulkarm, Abbas al-Sayyid, put on his military hat to mastermind the March 27, 2002, bombing of a Netanya hotel Passover Seder, a civilian target. Hamas participates in the political process and supports social networks only to advance its core mission, the destruction of Israel. Mr. Levitt's sketch of Hamas's history and development is also useful. It has become trendy in certain circles to suggest Hamas's rise to be blowback from earlier support by Israel. A Center for Strategic and International Studies Middle East analyst, Tony Cordesman, for example, told United Press International that Israel "aided Hamas directly--the Israelis wanted to use it as a counterbalance for the PLO." Mr. Levitt corrects such musings in a chapter tracing the group's deep roots in the Muslim Brotherhood. It is true that Israeli officials lent support to nonviolent Islamist organizations during the first intifada (1987-93), but Hamas was not among them, even if Hamas later absorbed once non-violent civil society organs. Perhaps Israeli officials were naive to engage moderate Islamists, but if so, Western calls for outreach to Hamas simply replicate past mistakes. Mr. Levitt's analysis is nuanced further through its juxtaposition of the seeming moderation of some Hamas officials inside the West Bank and Gaza and the external radicals. Here he warns against comparison: In the West Bank and Gaza, Hamas moderat