Grant and Lee: A Study in Personality and Generalship

by J.F.C. Fuller

Book Overview

" . . . cuts squarely across the accepted tradition . . . Fuller examines these two great soldiers from a fresh viewpoint and refuses to let himself be bound by tradition." --New York Times Book... This description may be from another edition of this product.

• Format: Paperback
• Language: English
• ISBN: 0253202884
• ISBN13: 9780253202888
• Release Date: October 1982
• Publisher: Indiana University Press
• Length: 336 Pages
• Weight: 0.92 lbs.
• Dimensions: 0.9" x 5.6" x 8.2"

Customer Reviews

Fresh, Stimulating, and Thought Provoking Comparison of Two Remarkable Generals.

Grant and Lee, A Study in Personality and Generalship, published in 1932, compares quite favorably in its detailed research and readability with works by modern writers and historians like Shelby Foote, James M. McPherson, Gary W. Gallagher, and Stephen W. Sears. This work by Major General J. F. C. Fuller is notable for directly challenging the conventional wisdom that Grant was little more than a "butcher" and that his eventual success was almost entirely due to the North's larger population and more abundant resources. In Fuller's view Grant was not only the greatest general of the Civil War, but ranks among the greatest strategists of any age. Fuller generated even more controversy with his contention that Robert E. Lee in several respects had major failings as a military leader. Controversial or not, Major General J. F. C. Fuller was no ordinary soldier writing about the Civil War. Fuller was a highly respected British military strategist and noted author. In the 1920s he collaborated with B. H. Liddell Hart in developing new ideas for the mechanization of armies. Ironically, their recommendations were more readily adopted in Germany than in Britain, France, or the U.S. Grant and Lee, A Study in Personality and Generalship, is a relatively short book, around 300 pages. Fuller writes with clarity and precision. He makes careful use of firsthand accounts; he paid particular attention to opinions of staff officers, as men in these roles were likely to have gained greater insight into the personalities of Grant and Lee. He also utilized the opinions of foreign witnesses of the war, like Colonel Fremantle, as a check on insiders' observations. His sources were identified through extensive end notes as he realized that his findings would be controversial. He includes statistics on battle losses to illustrate that the persistent belief that Grant's losses were abnormally high is simply a myth, and that Lee's percentage losses were actually higher. There are many exceptionally good books on the Civil War, but there are few that are as readable as Fuller's Grant and Lee, and offer such a fresh viewpoint (albeit, now nearly 75 years old, but one that remains stimulating and thought provoking). Grant and Lee, A Study in Personality and Generalship, is available in a reprint edition (1982) by Indiana University Press. Five stars.

Interesting Comparison Between Lee and Grant

Whatever your view of Robert E. Lee and U.S. Grant, Fuller's book will challenge you to think long and hard about your beliefs concerning both generals. As a Southerner, I have to admit that Fuller makes a compelling case for Grant being the better general between the two. One instance is where he confronts the idea that Grant was a butcher because of the heavy casualties during the Wilderness-Spotsylvania Campaign. While Grant indeed suffered the heavier losses, the percentage of losses was acutally lower than Lee. In fact, this was a common occurence in many battles in which Grant commanded. The book's contents are as follows: 1. The Two Causes - the two nations, presidents, armies and other North/South factors both generals had to operate within. 2. The Personality of Grant - modesty, common sense, courage. 3. The Personality of Lee - humility, tact, audacity. 4. The Generalship of Grant and Lee, 1861-1862 - description of the battles fought by both generals during both years (Shiloh, Fort Donelson, Antietam, Fredericksburg, etc). 5. The Generalship of Grant and Lee, 1863 - Vicksburg, Gettsyburg, Chattanooga, Chancellorsville. 6. The Generalship of Grant and Lee, 1864-1864 - Spotsylvania, Wilderness, Cold Harbor, Petersburg, Appamattox. 7. The Two Generals - comparison and contrast between their two styles and personalities. One other interesting point mentioned by Fuller was perhaps making the Confederate capital in Atlanta instead of Richmond. I have often thought how such a move would have affected the fighting in Virginia, Georgia, and my home state of North Carolina. Something interesting to ponder! I highly recommend the book. Read and enjoy.

Unique Unbiased View of the Generalship of Both

If you read the introduction to this book, you will understand that Fuller has set out to write a brief but direct book on the Generalship capabilities of Grant and Lee. In the introduction, Fuller notes that Henderson's classic book on Jackson is more a romantic study than one that is an objective view. He goes further to say that a full study of Jackson gives a different appreciation. A respect for his maneuvering and desire to fight but also his idiosyncrasies and secrecy that Fuller indicates would cause one to question Jackson's sanity. With that introduction, you are prepared for the author's blunt assessment of both Generals. The book is brief concentrating more on strategy than just battlefield tactics. He concentrates on the critical battles of the war and the general effect the war has as a whole not just the eastern theater. In Lee, he notes that he was not a grand strategist but one that fought with intuition. As a General, he excelled on fighting on the defensive as showed in the final campaign. However, Lee preferred fighting aggressively and his errors show at Gettysburg and Malvern Hill. In the case of Chancellorsville, Fuller notes that Lee should have used the wilderness more often as a greater asset for defensive maneuvers instead of coming out in the open into battle. That like a spider, he should have waited for opportunities to attack and withdrawal with the protection of cover. He further indicates that Lee had a poor operating staff and his administration impaired supply and clarity of orders as all were given verbally and minimally. Grant on the other hand was a former quartermaster, was well organized and had a global plan of the war hence his simultaneous operations with the western theater and his multiple prong attacks in the east. Fuller notes that at first his objective was to follow Lee and not concentrate on the Richmond. But later he changed to maneuver so that Lee had to react to him as opposed to the reverse. Grant was often accused of having little imagination but as Fuller notes, he did not have the imagination to inflate numbers that were against him (McClellan) but he was rational in knowing that the Confederates had limited manpower. Through his intuition, Lee had success against the earlier Union generals but as Fuller points out, he could not fathom Grant. The book is critical of both; however, as an overall commander, Grant comes across as much more able and Lee a totally different commander highly capable on the defensive but not as much a hands on commander as most would previously think. Both men are stripped bare; the author offers a unique unbiased view of the war without the human frailty of sentiment.

Outstanding Analysis by the Clausewitz of the 20th Century!

The oft-repeated view, especially from Confederate defenders, is that Grant won though he was a drunken butcher indifferent to high casualties whose triumph was inevitable because of superior manpower and supplies. John Frederick Charles Fuller, the British Major General, and along with Liddel Hart one of the top military strategists of the 20th century, provides overwhelming evidence to lay this view to rest. Grant practiced maneuver warfare when he could, and his Vicksburg campaign (not just a siege, rather a series of five battles), along with Jackson's valley campaign, are the two greatest campaigns of the war. In his final Overland campaign, Grant could not maneuver much because Lincoln required that he keep substantial forces between Lee's army and Washington. By a thorough analysis of Grant's and Lee's battles throughout the war, Fuller makes the case that Grant was among the best generals ever, and greater than Lee, who was also great but had his limitations (after Order 191 was lost and recovered by McClellan's troops before Antietam, Lee would only issue oral orders, and his subordinates were often confused by them; Grant was known for crystal clear written orders, following the example of Zachary Taylor under whom Grant (and Lee) had served in the Mexican War). Rating Grant so highly will of course be heresy for neo-Confederates, but there is no question Grant has received unfair treatment even among historians. Another Fuller book, "The Generalship of Ulysses S. Grant" adds more details to the defense of the claim that Grant was an excellent general. In assessing the relative greatness of Grant and Lee, one should keep in mind their age difference and the difference in upward mobility on the two sides during the war. Lee was 14 years older than Grant, Lee was already a Colonel when the war started and still serving on active duty, whereas Grant had left the army as a captain after the Mexican War. At the start of the war, Winfield Scott, who had served in the War of 1812 and masterminded in the Mexican War the amazing defeat of a country of 20 million people with 12,000 invading troops, was the greatest soldier on either side. However he was old and so fat he could no longer ride a horse; his campaigning days were over. After Scott, Lee was the best soldier on either side at the start of the war--and Lee was offered command of the Union army but turned it down. However Grant rose through the ranks because he learned quickly from his mistakes at Belmont, Forts Henry and Donelson, Shiloh, and Holly Springs. By the end of the war Fuller's analysis shows Grant was clearly the superior general, and not just because he had superior numbers. Even the oft-cited mistake at Cold Harbor, according to Fuller, is exagerrated. Fuller summarizes the overall casualy numbers during the war: the ratio of killed and wounded to total forces engaged for Grant was 10%; for the whole Federal army it was 11%; for the whole Confederate army it was 12%; and fo

A reasoned analysis of Civil War generalship

Fuller methodically compares the generalship of Grant and Lee, arguing Grant's superiority. His unique and thoroughly documented approach makes the case that Grant, contrary to popular belief, efficiently employed his army in a manner that sustained comparatively fewer casualties than those of his opponent. Though not entirely unbiased, Fuller's analysis of generalship in the Civil War has many lessons for both students of history and leaders of today.