Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001

by Steve Coll

Book Overview

Winner of the Pulitzer Prize for Nonfiction - A New York Times bestseller "The CIA itself would be hard put to beat his grasp of global events . . . Deeply satisfying." --The New York Review of Books... This description may be from another edition of this product.

• Format: Paperback
• Language: English
• ISBN: 0143034669
• Release Date: December 2004
• Publisher: Penguin Books
• Length: 736 Pages
• Weight: 1.51 lbs.
• Dimensions: 1.5" x 5.5" x 8.1"

Customer Reviews

Hard Copy Easier to Read, but Substance is Same: Superb

Edit of 20 Dec 07 to add links including books since published. On balance this is a well researched book (albeit with a Langley-Saudi partiality that must be noted), and I give it high marks for substance, story, and notes. It should be read in tandem with several other books, including George Crile's Charlie Wilson's War: The Extraordinary Story of How the Wildest Man in Congress and a Rogue CIA Agent Changed the History of Our Times and the Milt Bearden/James Risen tome on The Main Enemy: The Inside Story of the CIA's Final Showdown with the KGB. The most important point in the book is not one the author intended to make. He inadvertently but most helpfully points to the fact that at no time did the U.S. government, in lacking a policy on Afghanistan across several Administrations, think about the strategic implications of "big money movements." I refer to Saudi Oil, Afghan Drugs, and CIA Cash. Early on the book shows that Afghanistan was not important to the incumbent Administration, and that the Directorate of Operations, which treats third-world countries as hunting grounds for Soviets rather than targets in their own right, had eliminated Afghanistan as a "collection objective" in the late 1980's through the early 1990's. It should be no surprise that the CIA consequently failed to predict the fall of Kabul (or in later years, the rise of the Taliban). Iran plays heavily in the book, and that is one of the book's strong points. From the 1979 riots against the U.S. Embassies in Iran and in Pakistan, to the end of the book, the hand of Iran is clearly perceived. As we reflect on Iran's enormous success in 2002-2004 in using Chalabi to deceive the Bush Administration into wiping out Saddam Hussein and opening Iraq for Iranian capture, at a cost to the US taxpayer of over $400 billion dollars, we can only compare Iran to the leadership of North Viet-Nam. Iran has a strategic culture, the US does not. The North Vietnamese beat the US for that reason. Absent the development of a strategic culture within the US, one that is not corrupted by ideological fantasy, Iran will ultimately beat the US and Israel in the Middle East. The greatest failure of the CIA comes across throughout early in the book: the CIA missed the radicalization of Islam and its implications for global destabilization. It did so for three reasons: 1) CIA obsession with hard targets to the detriment of global coverage; 2) CIA obsession with technical secrets rather than human overt and covert information; and 3) CIA laziness and political naiveté in relying on foreign liaison, and especially on Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Both Admiral Stansfield Turner and Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski come in for criticism here. Turner for gutting the CIA, Brzezinski for telling Pakistan it could go nuclear (page 51) in return for help against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Although the book does not focus on Bin Laden until he becomes a player in Afghanistan, it does provide much better discuss

A good reason to read non fiction

Since it appears that the U.S. is inexorably involved in this part of the world - a CNN commentator and former general predicted recently that the current war on terror was unlikely to end in our lifetime - I have departed from my usual reading habit of serious fiction and forced myself into a brave new world of non fiction, consuming Ghost Wars (Coll), Against All Enemies (Clarke) and Plan of Attack (Woodward) over the past few weeks. Of the three, I found Coll's the most interesting, immersing myself in the detailed account of mid level CIA operatives, Washington bureaucrats and policy makers focused on the South Asia region, bracketed in time from the take over of the American embassy in Pakistan and the narrow avoidance of massive American casualties at the hands of Muslim extremists in 1979, up to but short of 9/11.Having no expertise in the region, it's difficult to evaluate the accuracy of Coll's account. However, his narrative appears remarkably free of partisan finger pointing as Coll faults Robin Raphel, Clinton's assistant secretary of state for South Asia, for her relative inexperience and naiveté as she serves as apologist for the Taliban while working to keep the U.S. neutral in the Afghan civil war, while highlighting Hillary Clinton's important role in defending women's rights and increasing awareness among the American people of the dangers posed by that regime. Bill Clinton, himself, is shown in both positive and negative aspects as he recognizes relatively early on the dangers that Muslim terrorism poses for the homeland, while at other times, notably in an early meeting in 1993 with Saudi ambassador Prince Bandar and Saudi spy chief Prince Turki, he conducts a "typical Clinton session, more seminar than formal meeting," asking his guests' opinions of where US foreign policy should go, leaving the Saudi's confused, "He's asking us?"Overall, I came away from the book more convinced than ever that America's historic desire to disengage from the world will not be a successful strategy in a post 9/11 world. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, we walked away from Afghanistan, redirecting American aid to Africa, and for long stretches had no CIA personnel located in that country. Our counter terrorism efforts were largely administered through untrustworthy clients like Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, who diverted American resources to their own ends. When faced with overwhelming evidence that Osama bin Laden had planned and executed major terrorist attacks against Americans and our embassies late in Clinton's term of office, we had few military options because we had little ability to project American power into this remote area of the globe. In 1999, we had 60,000 American soldiers stationed in Germany facing a non existent Soviet threat,. but lacked the strength to take out a few terrorist training camps in Afghanistan. Perhaps the most important contribution of this book is remind America citizens that the world is indeed a mu

Amazing insight into south asian policies for 20 years

Wow, I could not put this book down, It was so interesting and enthraling. If you want to know how our intelligence agencies opererate, from our spies on the ground to the budgetary procudures, this is all you need. Steve Coll is an amazing unbiased reporter that lets the reader draw his own conclusions, in many ways he just provides the facts. It starts with the soviet-afghan war, and our clear agenda to help the afgans bleed the soviets. But with the collapse of the soviet union, they United States simply did not seem to care much about afghanistan, nor did it want to get involved in its politics, much to the behest of many career mid to lower level intelligence and diplomatic professionals. IT simply did not seem as important as defining what the post cold war world would look like, Inter agency rivalries, oil contracts, reluctance to use covert ops, mistrust of the CIA outright by clinton, and legal issues regarding killing OBL all got in the way. To make things worse during the 1990's the corporate "silicon valley" cluture somehow managed to find its way to the CIA, infecting it with a deadly mix of political correctness in everything from its operations to hiring, this in turn drove many of the CIA's longtime operatives to go into early retirement. At one point, the CIA was adding little more than 1 new operative in a span of a few months. Coll spends the latter half of the book describing how the CIA and the CTSG tried in vain to kill Osama Bin Laden but were shot down by senior politicians and even the pentagon, who simply did not want to get involved. I overwhelmingly enjoyed this book, if you are remotely interested in the nuts and bolts of US foreign policy, this will provide a great look into its innner wheelings and dealings. There are a few items that Coll does leave out. The biggest issue is pakistans nuclear weapons, he never really discusses them, It would have been great to see what Coll could have dug up if he put his journalistic powers to work on this issue, did pakistani nuclear weapons scientists in conjunction with the Pakistani ISI who were in bed with OBL and the Taliban give nuclear material to them? Second, it is not always clear when CIA agents were directly involved in operations in afghanistan. It always appears murky, and one could go as far to say they were on the ground constantly secretly helping massoud, it would be great for this matter to be cleared up. Go out and buy this book right away...