For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War

by Melvyn P. Leffler

Book Overview

To the amazement of the public, pundits, and even the policymakers themselves, the ideological and political conflict that had endangered the world for half a century came to an end in 1990. How did... This description may be from another edition of this product.

• Format: Hardcover
• Language: English
• ISBN: 0809097176
• ISBN13: 9780809097173
• Release Date: September 2007
• Publisher: Hill & Wang
• Length: 586 Pages
• Weight: 1.98 lbs.
• Dimensions: 1.3" x 6.5" x 9.2"

Customer Reviews

Very Good

This very good book is a largely successful effort to produce a portrait of the Cold War that is both accurate and accessible to a broad audience. Leffler accomplishes his objective by some smart decisions in limiting the content of the book. He focuses primarily on US-Soviet relations; he limits his discussion largely to the highest levels of diplomacy, particularly the decisions of our Presidents and the Soviet leadership at key moments; and he picks out five key sequences of the Cold War. The five key sequences are the initiation of the Cold War under Truman/Stalin, the end of the Cold War under Gorbachev/Reagan, and 3 periods when there were unsuccessful efforts to end/moderate the Cold War; Malenkov/Eisenhower after the death of Stalin, Kennedy-Johnson/Khruschev after the Cuban Missile Crisis, Brezhnev/Carter and the end of detente. The latter three are discussed as examples of how hard it was to escape the dynamic of the Cold War and explorations of the forces that sustained the Cold War. The title of the book reflects Leffler's conclusion about perhaps the most important element of initiating and sustaining the Cold War - ideology. Leffler argues well that the competing ideologies of liberal capitalism and communism really drove the way the leaderships of the USA and the Soviet Union perceived each other and influenced decisions. Leffler also shows how important the experience of WWII was, particularly the trauma of invasion, for the Soviets. Well into the 1970s, the fear of being confronted by a hostile, aggressive, powerful German (and encircled by a powerful Japanese state) was a major concern of the Soviet leadership. In a good example of how Soviet concerns were often mirrored in the USA, worries about German democratization were a feature of American policy making into at least the 1960s. Leffler sees the Cold War as inevitable. Both the USA and the Soviets required a pacified Europe and Japan to attain security but their conflicting visions of what such security would require resulted in inevitable conflict. While Leffler uses relatively neutral language in describing this fact, it has to be said that the American vision of a democratic alliance was and is considerably more noble than what Stalin had in mind. Leffler is careful to point out that Stalin was initially pragmatic and interested in some form of accomodation. Once initiated, the Cold War proved remarkably difficult to moderate or end. The next 3 episodes discussed by Leffler all show how ideology, the mutual fears inherent in this type of strategic rivalry, entrenched special interests such as interservice rivalries and a powerful defense establishment in the Soviet Union, and the powerful domestic political forces set in train by the Cold War all contributed to sustaining the Cold War. Leffler is generally even handed in dealing with the major actors. All the principal actors, American presidents and major Soviet leaders after Stalin, are shown to hav

Fair discussion of US-Soviet relations during the Cold War

"For the Soul of Mankind", by Melvyn Leffler, is a major study of the Cold War's political diplomacy. As the name would lead one to think, the focus is strongly on the ideological aspects of the political decision-making, but Leffler is fairly pragmatic and pays plenty of attention to issues of military strength, strategic interventions, Third World movements, and so on. There is also a lot of concentration on the personal characteristics of the countries' respective leaders, which sometimes leads it deplorably into "Great Men" historiography. A lot can be said against this book. Not just the above-mentioned excessively biographical approach, but for example it does not actually cover all of the Cold War; Leffler describes it as covering five pivotal "episodes" in it, but in practice this means it is an all-out political history of US-Soviet relations during the Cold War, but with the odd aspect of (relatively) excluding Nixon and Ford. It seems that if one is writing about every other postwar president and leader anyway, one could as well add those too. But that aside, there is the fact that Leffler talks a lot about the economies of the respective countries, but without ever describing these and their development in concrete details. He also pays no attention to cultural and social developments, giving the book a very narrow international relations focus. One would also have liked to read more about the role of European leaders, both East and West, in the diplomatic and ideological struggle, but perhaps that is too much to include in one book. However, this book is nonetheless a clear advance over the Cold War and neo-Cold War style of history writing, as opposed to the likes of Gaddis. Although Leffler excessively demonizes and fulminates against Stalin in the beginning, he treats the Soviet leaders remarkably sanely and accurately for an American historian of the Cold War, at no point falling for "evil empire" style propaganda. He clearly and concisely discusses not just the restraints and problems the American Presidents were facing during negotiations, but also those of the Soviet leadership. Commendable is the way in which he acknowledges the role of important leaders that were not the head of government, like Molotov, Mikoyan, Gromyko, etc. His description of Khrushchov in particular is very good, and in my view quite correctly re-establishes his intelligence, competence, and advanced insight into the problems of the USSR. He has been much maligned because of Stalinists hating him and anti-Communists also hating him, but this is quite undeserved. Some might say that Leffler overestimates Brezhnev's competence perhaps, whom he seems to hold in relatively high regard, but he does not diminish his weaknesses. Leffler is very well informed about the substance of the major negotiation rounds between the US and the USSR, as well as the main points of contention and the periods of major crisis in the Cold War. He dispells some still common my

Outstanding hstorical perspective

This was one of those books that "pulled it all together." I lived thorough these times, this is my history. However, Leffler was able to tell the story so it had meaning and clarity. He did a great job of showing both sides of the story.

good reading, but didn't like the conclusions

I enjoyed the book for its research, and it makes for interesting reading, so I give it 4 stars. I'd recommend that anyone with an interest in this area read it. BUT! Am I imagining things, or did the vast majority of the book blame the United States for the Cold War, and claim the Soviets were always trying to end it? The writer claims that even Stalin honestly wanted friendly relations with the West, and would have behaved peaceably, but Truman killed it. In light of what we know about Stalin, this is difficult to believe. With the exception of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (the author clearly assigns the blame to Brezhnev here), each chapter has the same theme: the Soviets spoke peace, were being honest, and really meant it, while the Americans were always trying to play games,impose their will on the poor Soviets, and get better and better negotiating terms. The conclusions are as one-sided as the old story of blaming "those Russkies" for everything. There is ample recent documentation that the Soviets were offensive-minded in their miltiary plans in Europe, and actually had plans to win a nuclear war. Such documentation is ignored in the book. Instead, Soviet leaders' quotes about desiring peace are taken at face value and quoted quite liberally. It was just too one-sided for me.

Puts John Gaddis to shame

Melvyn Leffler has written an excellent history of the Cold War and how ideology and personality started and ended the Cold War. According to Leffler the Cold War started when Trumman became suspicious of Satlin's actions in Iran and Turkey while Stalin strengthened Soviet rule in Eastern Europe due to the implentation of the Marshall Plan. Malenkov and Eisenhower refused to end the Cold War because the Soviets feared a unifid Germany and the Americans thought that they can take advantage of their nuclear superiority. In the nineteen sixties the Americans feared the Soviet expansion in the Third World and the Soviets thought they could take advantage of the events in the developing world. Leffler believes that the collaspse of detente due to the Soviet leaderhips fear of being encircled by American presence in Afghanistan and China while Carter felt that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was part of a drive for the oilfields in the Middle East. Finally the Cold War ended because Gorbachev no longer feared a unified Germany and Western ideology while Reagan was willing to listen to him and end the Cold War. The only weakness of this book is that Leffler seems to gloss over the ending of the love affair with Communist ideology not only in Eastern Europe, but Western Europe as well during the eighties. Otherwise this is a superbly written account of the Cold War.