Failure of Intelligence: The Decline and Fall of the CIA

by Melvin A. Goodman

Book Overview

The time for serious soul-searching regarding the role of the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence community in general is long overdue. The recent intelligence failures regarding the unanticipated collapse of the Soviet Union, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the run-up to the Iraq war demonstrate a CIA and a $50 billion intelligence enterprise that cannot provide strategic warning to policymakers and, even worse, is capable...

• Format: Hardcover
• Language: English
• ISBN: 0742551105
• ISBN13: 9780742551107
• Release Date: January 2008
• Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers
• Length: 400 Pages
• Weight: 1.60 lbs.
• Dimensions: 1.3" x 6.4" x 9.0"

Customer Reviews

Goodman's Counterintelligence Failure

Most books about the CIA are written either by liberals/leftists, who blame the CIA for every alleged failure, or by conservatives/rightists, who give the Agency credit for every alleged success. (I use the word "alleged" twice because in the field of intelligence and espionage things are seldom what they seem.) Recent extreme examples of this type of books are James Risen "State of War" and Rowan Scarborough "Sabotage." All of these books, without an exception, belong to the trashcan of history. But Goodman's "Failure of Intelligence" is a different kind of book. Despite of the fact that Goodman, like every one of us, has his own biases, his only commitment seems to be to truth -- something quite surprising coming from a person who worked for many years for the CIA, and organization that, like all intelligence services, have made lying an art form. Probably one of the most revealing parts of the book is when Goodman tells how after every "intelligence failure," some of the analysts directly responsible for it are given big cash bonuses and promotions (pp. 91-93, 136, 183). What Goodman does not mention, however, is that this new generation of ethically challenged intelligence analysts at CIA are the direct product of a system of education that brainwashes students by telling them that truth is a social construct and ethics is not absolute, but changes in every different situation. In that sense, this new generation CIA intelligence analysts is not different from the new generation of university professors and scientist who, in order to keep their juicy grants flowing, give their full support to unscientific, religious theories like Darwinian evolution and global warming. Therefore, without even finishing reading the book (I am currently on page 202), I am giving Goodman's book five stars. His serious research and his intellectual honesty deserve it. This doesn't mean, though, that the book is perfect. Actually, it has its shortcomings, like repeating verbatim the fairy tale that Sherman Kent's National Intelligence Estimate of October 14, 1962 (the now infamous "September Estimate") stating that it was unlikely that the Soviets deploy strategic nuclear missiles in Cuba was wrong, because four weeks later "photographic evidence" proved the contrary (p. 94). Despite so many scary "close to the brink" articles and books, and the testimony of drunk ex-KGB liars who told the people who generously paid for their trips to the U.S. what they wanted to hear, the presence of medium-range strategic missiles and their nuclear warheads on Cuban soil in 1962 was never proved. Moreover, as a former intelligence analyst himself, Goodman should know that the so-called "photographic evidence" is not evidence at all. Due to the fact that there were never CIA officers in the field, the "missiles" were never touched, smelled or weighted. Their metal, electronic components and fuel was never tested. Their heat signature was never verified. Even more important

Excellent Insiders View

You'll be impressed with the candid and complicated details of the CIA's loss of independence and evolving politization.

Failure of Intelligence is Goodman's success

After forty years as a CIA insider, Melvin Goodman has produced a sweeping account of the agency's history and political entanglements that combines the solidity of good research with the readability of lively writing. Goodman's rich historical context and depth of detail, and the new insights he brings to familiar figures (and not-so-familiar characters) add dimension to his narrative. But while it's a fascinating read, it's also a dispiriting one. Goodman contends that, not long after the CIA's beginnings, in the Truman administration, the agency was used, not for objective strategic information, but had already devolved into a policy arm of whatever government was in power. (Need political justification for the invasion of X? Call the CIA.) Goodman goes into detail regarding covert operations during the Cold War, the CIA and the threat of terrorism, and he and also goes into great detail about the Iraq War and the political climate surrounding that. It would be wonderful if the information in the Iraq chapters were available to every American (including--and especially--our political leaders!). Interested in politics, history. and foreign affairs since World War II? Read this book! Failure of Intelligence: The Decline and Fall of the CIA

Tough Love for CIA

This is an astonishingly well balanced book that while deeply critical of CIA and its senior management also credits its strengths and successes. The author, Melvin Goodman, spent some 34 years as an analyst within the Directorate of Intelligence (DI) of CIA. His principal criticism is that CIA directors in collusion with the executive branch have routinely politicized not merely intelligence products, but the very processes of research and analysis basic to intelligence production. He further argues that most intelligence `failures' can be traced to the practice of far too many at CIA to distort the intelligence process to support policy decisions and even to suppress sound, contrary intelligence. He also sees the growing `militarization' of the U.S. Intelligence System as further evidence that the Intelligence Community (IC) is moving from producing objective and accurate intelligence to producing intelligence that supports the ideologies and prejudices of its masters. Goodman supports his argument with a remarkably detailed chronicle of CIA intelligence production over the last 35 years. This chronology emphasizes those instances where political pressure and the need to support a particular point of view took precedence over the need to produce accurate intelligence. Also, although he doesn't say so directly, he demonstrates the truth that intelligence is only as good as the system it serves. Unlike so many books on intelligence, this book actually identifies both the good guys and the bad .guys of CIA over the years. In particular he has a fascinating analysis of CIA Directors from Bill Casey (1980-1986) onward that is quite devastating. Although his principal target is the deleterious effect of the politicization and militarization of intelligence, he also effectively criticizes CIA's analytic and clandestine tradecraft. This is an absolutely important critique of the course of CIA and by extension the entire U.S. Intelligence Community. However, given the controversial claims made by Goodman and the fact he actually names his heroes and villains, the reader might ask does he really know what he is talking about? In this reviewer's opinion, the answer is yes he does. Having been personally involved in a number of specific intelligence events that he chronicles, this reviewer would argue that Goodman has accurately described them. This is a book that ought to guide any effort to reform the U.S. Intelligence System.

INTERESTED IN INTELLIGENCE & U.S. FOREIGN POLICY - A MUST READ.

Those who follow U.S. intelligence and its effects on U.S. foreign policy will find Mel Goodman's Failure of Intelligence an important and prophetic read. As an intelligence insider with firsthand experience he has written an insightful and revealing account of the Central Intelligence Agency's failures and clearly explains why it must be reformed. Using the fall of the Soviet Union, 9/11, and the Iraq War, Goodman clearly makes a case for guarding against the politicization of intelligence. Goodman underlines a critical issue if the U.S. is to avoid the consequences of history repeating itself in Iran.