Evolutionary Games and the Replicator Dynamics

by Onésimo Hernández-Lerma and Saúl Mendoza-Palacios

This Element introduces the replicator dynamics for symmetric and asymmetric games where the strategy sets are metric spaces. Under this hypothesis the replicator dynamics evolves in a Banach space of finite signed measures. The authors provide a general framework to study the stability of the replicator dynamics for evolutionary games in this Banach space. This allows them to establish a relation between Nash equilibria and the stability of the replicator...

• Format: Hardcover
• Language: English
• ISBN: 1009472305
• ISBN13: 9781009472302
• Release Date: June 2024
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press
• Length: 100 Pages
• Weight: 0.67 lbs.
• Dimensions: 0.3" x 6.0" x 9.0"