Economic Gangsters: Corruption, Violence, and the Poverty of Nations

by Ray Fisman and Edward Miguel

Book Overview

Getting inside the heads of the developing world's dictators, warlords, and corrupt politicians

Meet the economic gangster. He's the United Nations diplomat who double-parks his Mercedes on New York City streets at rush hour because the cops can't touch him--he has diplomatic immunity. He's the Chinese smuggler who dodges tariffs by magically transforming frozen chickens into frozen turkeys. The dictator, the warlord, the unscrupulous...

• Format: Paperback
• Language: English
• ISBN: 0691144699
• ISBN13: 9780691144696
• Release Date: January 2010
• Publisher: Princeton University Press
• Length: 256 Pages
• Weight: 0.60 lbs.
• Dimensions: 0.6" x 6.3" x 8.4"

Customer Reviews

Investigative economists on the trail of gangsters

Behavioural economists have been bringing us a lot of interesting books recently, and this book continues that trend. There are numerous reasons why poor countries are poor, and grand corruption is one of them. The authors see themselves as investigative economists, engaging in forensic analysis of statistical evidence to track economic gangsters. The book explains how Tommy Suharto, the former Indonesian president's son, made his money, how lucrative smuggling between Hong Kong and China has been, how the mayor of Bogota used embarrassment as a tool against lawlessness, the relationship between a country's corruption and the failure of the country's diplomats to respect parking laws, the relationship between drought and war, economic contributing factors to violent crimes, and many other interesting puzzles. As the first chapter explains, there is no singular explanation for why poor countries are poor. That does not stop the authors from offering their own idea for tackling at least one aspect of poverty: Rapid Conflict Prevention Support, in which foreign aid provides a form of insurance to African farmers against a sudden drop in income attributable to drought or other adverse circumstances. This idea seems to have some merit, and the book is definitely entertaining to read.

witty, clever, upbeat, all while tackling some of international development's most difficult issues

Eight years ago, as I crossed the Uganda-Kenya border, I was sequestered in a shack, interrogated, threatened with prison, and ultimately required to pay a bribe by border guards. After that harrowing experience, I returned to my hotel and recounted the story to the first friendly face I saw: my sympathetic colleague Ted Miguel. Ted and his colleague Ray spent the succeeding years studying violence and corruption in poor countries; and this sweet book is the latest fruit of those labors. What can economics tell us about corruption and violence around the world? More, perhaps, than you'd expect. Ray and Ted use surprise changes in a dictator's health to measure the value of political connections in Indonesia, rainfall to capture the effect of recessions on violence in Africa, and tricks in the trade data to reveal smuggling. (That's not to mention the parking tickets - Chapter Four.) They present their clever research in surprisingly clear English, and they draw on the related research of other economists as well. They really know how to tell a story: I was captivated by the opening recounting of Kenyan author Ngugi's woes and delighted by the creative policy making of Antanas Mockus, mayor of Bogota. It's hard not to compare popular economics books today to Freakonomics: Gangsters has the advantages of Ted and Ray's witty, pleasant voice, more of a thematic focus, and none of the self-adulation that took away some Freakonomics' shine. Despite the focus on corruption and violence, ultimately the book is presenting a miscellany of work that is related but isn't (and perhaps cannot be) circumscribed into a larger theory. Occasionally I found myself wishing a central theory like you find in Malcolm Gladwell's books. But then again, those theories usually aren't convincing for exactly the reason that Ted and Ray don't have one: they are careful and big, broad theories are not. I really enjoyed the clear policy recommendation of Rapid Conflict Prevention Support in Chapter 6, and I look forward to more clear recommendations in the next book. Again, Ted and Ray are careful and tend not to recommend policies that don't have clear evidence to stand on. Not all scholars are comfortable laying out strong recommendations on limited evidence; two books by scholars who are more comfortable are The Bottom Billion and The End of Poverty. (As I recall, that's also the self-definition given by an economic hit man!) The main policy recommendation, ultimately, is more evidence-based policy making, particularly randomized trials of development programs (but with a healthy view of the realistic scope for these kinds of trials). This book won't just show you that economists can be clever (although it will show you that): It shows that economics, cleverly applied, can illuminate some of the most intractable development problems of our time. I strongly recommend it. And if you don't trust me, Publishers Weekly said that in this "surprisingly spry" r

Incentives matter--to gangsters too

As Raymond Fisman and Edward Miguel explain at the beginning of their book, there are two main currents of thinking among those who opine on the wisdom of foreign aid: the "poverty trap" view, which holds that aid must be injected to end a vicious cycle in which inability to save leads to disaster in lean years, and the view that more such aid is simply sending good money after bad, straight into the hands of corrupt officials to be funneled away or otherwise wasted. Fisman and Miguel aim to look at corruption and violence in developing countries to determine how prevalent such evils are, how they are caused, and how they can be prevented--and, therefore, what the best way, non-ideologically-speaking, of raising up poor nations might be. The funny thing about corruption is that it tends to exist out of sight--at least, out of sight of official statistics and public measurements. No one reports the bribes he takes on his income tax returns. So Fisman and Miguel have to come up with creative means of measuring corruption of various types, and this is the most fun part of their book. Economic Gangsters is completely accessible to the general reader, with virtually no economic jargon or concepts more difficult than "incentives matter," but it perfectly captures the exciting, puzzle-solving nature of this kind of academic research. Fisman and Miguel's biggest, and most important, suggestion is the basic one that foreign aid and other solutions to developing-nation poverty be studied and implemented in an evidence-based manner. Without experimental data it's very difficult to determine whether a particular program is actually effective or not (or cost-effective or not). Randomized trials, like those carried out for developing medicines, are rare in the field of poverty reduction. But sometimes they are carried out. For example, local democratic control of public works projects is often touted as an antidote to corruption and skimming of funds. But in Indonesia a test was conducted to compare road building under local control, the thread of a federal audit, and no corruption prevention. Local control did little better than the control group, while those projects that were audited involved significantly less stolen money. The authors adhere to their intention to remain non-ideological, and their interest is clearly in going where the evidence leads them. Unfortunately, large-scale economic experiments are often impossible and unethical, so some things can never be tested. But those interested in solutions that actually work should use what information they can. Economic Gangsters provides some of that information, and an interesting look at how to find it. It also tells some great stories about the incentives economic gangsters respond to, the strange circumstances that sometimes create these incentives, and how governments and other groups can play with them to aim for better outcomes.