Constitutionalism and Dictatorship: Pinochet, the Junta, and the 1980 Constitution

by Robert Barros

Book Overview

It is widely believed that autocratic regimes cannot limit their power through institutions of their own making. This book presents a surprising challenge to this view. It demonstrates that the Chilean armed forces were constrained by institutions of their own design. Based on extensive documentation of military decision-making, much of it long classified and unavailable, this book reconstructs the politics of institutions within the recent Chilean...

• Format: Paperback
• Language: English
• ISBN: 052179658X
• ISBN13: 9780521796583
• Release Date: July 2002
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press
• Length: 368 Pages
• Weight: 1.20 lbs.
• Dimensions: 0.8" x 6.0" x 9.0"

Customer Reviews

Fascinating constitutional theory, but both too long and short

In Constitutionalism and Dictatorship: Pinochet, the Junta, and the 1980 Constitution (Cambridge Studies in the Theory of Democracy), Barros provides some fascinating alternative perspectives on courts in authoritarian regimes. He proposes that the Chilean Junta drafted the 1980 constitution i large part to institutionalize the junta and allocate power among all four branches of the defense services. Contrary to popular opinion, Pinochet did not wield absolute power, but rather all stakeholders in the junta limited their own power in order to convince the other branches that they would abide by the rules. Thus, the Tribunal Constitucional was created to enforce the authority of Pinochet in the executive and of the air force and navy as the legislative branch. As a book though, I found Constitutionalism and Dictatorship: Pinochet, the Junta, and the 1980 Constitution (Cambridge Studies in the Theory of Democracy) both too long and too short. First, for those readers who know nothing about Chile - like me - it doesn't provide much context. Barros frequently referred to other prominent politicians in the junta, but I didn't have the context to appreciate some of his comments. The book seems geared toward readers with an interest and background in Chilean history. However, for readers primarily interested in constitutional theory, the book might seem a bit too long. The intricacies of the constitutional negotiations might be much. Indeed, Barros only gets to the tribunal 2/3 into the book. If you just want to understand his theory, I recommend reading one of his articles instead. If you're interested in theories about courts in authoritarian regimes, I highly recommend Rule By Law: The Politics of Courts in Authoritarian Regimes.