Hitler's War: Germany's Key Strategic Decisions 1940-1945; Could Germany Have Won World War Two?

by Heinz Magenheimer

Book Overview

This is the book that answers the question: Could Germany have won World War Two? This is a closely argued and wide-ranging assessment of just how, with so many alternatives open, the German High... This description may be from another edition of this product.

• Format: Paperback
• Language: English
• ISBN: 0304353396
• ISBN13: 9780304353392
• Release Date: January 2000
• Publisher: Cassell
• Length: 352 Pages
• Weight: 1.30 lbs.
• Dimensions: 1.2" x 6.1" x 9.2"

Customer Reviews

Interesting Facts, Dry Reading

I think that the book is a very interesting concept. It shows basically the last straw that the German army could take. Not too surprising where this final straw was at.... Stalingrad. It seems that that was the ultimate turning point on the Eastern Front. Everyone pretty much knows this. It shows what decisions could have been taken, but it also shows that due to the circumstances, the German General Staff and Hitler took a path that was just as bad as any other, or they had no real evidence that another path was better. This alleviates many bad decisions from the Fuhrer and the General Staff. The book also has some good quotes in the beginning, showing the British hatred of the German Reich. One quote shows a high ranking British official saying that Naziism is not the true enemy, but the entire German Reich. It says that the Reich had been a curse on Europe for 75 years. This shows the amount of German hatred, even at the top echelons of british political society. Altogether, the book has a lot of statistics, and it doesn't really have a narrative flare. But, if you are sincerely interested in the subject material you will be able to finish the book. Altogether, I think it is the best book out there on the key strategic decisions. The closest books out there are simply outlines of the war. I definitely recommend this if you are hardcore into WW2 German history. If you are simply wanting a passing knowledge of the major battles and theatres of operation in WW2, go for a more general outline of WW2 history. This is simply too in-depth for people's interests. Good job Magenheimer, excellent scholastic study! I was initially going to give the book a 4 because the lack of narrative flare, but I decided against it... there is much to be learned from this book, and if you don't like it, it is because you are not interested enough in the subject to wade through the material. This is not historical fiction, it does not need to be necessarily exciting.

This clear & concise book is required reading for historians

Strategy is a concept that is abstract, complex and open to different interpretations, but this book steers the reader away from these problems. At the other extreme, more readable books about WW2 tend to be packed with historical detail, with the result that they tend to obscure the strategic considerations behind the war. Magenheimer's book breaks the mould, because the author takes a step back from the detail of history to reveal the reasoning behind Hitler's decision making. In the process has revealed that Nazi Germany may have come closer to defeating the Allies (or ending WW2 in stalemate) than has been previously thought. In short, this clear and concise book is required reading for historians studying WW2 strategy who ask the question, "why did Hitler loose the war?". Where this book is fresh and provides new insight is the way the author clearly analyses events that lead up to "turns" (the points at which circumstances change) in the war, and whether Hitler's decisions could have altered the outcome. For this reason alone, this book is well worth reading, as the threats and opportunities facing Hitler and his commanders at each "turn" become transparent. The main focus Magenheimer's book is understandably on the Eastern front, where the balance of power in the East shifted back and forth between Hitler and Stalin, and when the opportunity to take the strategic initiative was open to both, making the outcome of the war far from certain. It is Magenheimer' view that it might have been possible for German invasion to have reached Moscow by before the winter of 1941, in which case Hitler dream of European hegemony might have been realised. Despite the German ability to wage "lightning war" in the East and North Africa (as well as the submarine war in Atlantic), Magenheimer argues that Germany lost the initiative to the Allies, not just because they adapted quickly to the changing situation more quickly (which they were good at doing), but because Hitler did not "invest" both military and diplomatic resources to available him to bring the war a successful conclsion for Germany. Where the book is weak is in the author's own argument (used frequently by historians elsewhere) is that the German industrial-military complex was not ready for total war in 1941. This book does not answer the question why Hitler did not (or could not?) plan for total war, despite his political programme being based on the stuggle for "living space" would be inevitable.

Hitler's War (Magenheimer 1999)

Magenheimer, member of the editorial staff of der Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift (ÖMZ) presents a readable, up-to-date and lucid survey of the strategic options available to the German leadership in the various phases of World War II. The dust jacket question »Could Germany have won World War II?« has been raised earlier for instance by Max Klüver (»Den Sieg verspielt?«), a book curiously not mentioned in the bibliography. Magenheimer carefully revises many seemingly established notions of key strategic decisions, for instance the »Haltebefehl« of the Dunkirk encirclement commonly but according to Magenheimer (and convincingly) wrongly attributed to Hitler's alleged anglophile penchant. In German (that means »BRD«-) political correct terminology Magenheimer's book in some passages approaches much loathed »revisionism« but exactly this in turn may qualify the treatise as a realistic and sober analysis of Hitler's strategic options not obstructed by ideological preconceptions. Remarkably up till now the book is not reviewed in the »Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen« edited by Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, Potsdam. In my view it is a surprising fact that despite the huge literature on World War II it is still an unsettled question which motives underly Hitler's political and military actions for instance in the decision to stage »Unternehmen Barbarossa«. Magenheimer rightly opposes the communis opinio that Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union was the apogee of a »Drang nach Osten«- and »Lebensraum«-ideology allegedly conceived in »Mein Kampf«. Hitler's decision-making was guided by the immediate political circumstances and by much improvisation, not by an ideological plan of the twenties invariably carried through in the fourties . Magenheimer consequently dismisses the usage of the term »Vernichtungskrieg« (war of annihilation) with respect to the »Ostfront«. In my view it is a term of propaganda, since any full-scale war is an attempt at the destruction of the bases of livelihood of the opponent and might be -- but is not -- applied with the same justification to the Anglo-American strategic bomb offensive against German cities. In the light of new documents discovered in Russia during the last decade Magenheimer discusses and summarizes the much disputed thesis of »Barbarossa« as a preventive strike designed within a very short time span as a contingency plan and which he concurs in the framework of geopolitics and grand strategy, but not on the strictly military level of the Eastern theatre (p. 56-7) since the Germans only learned very late of the real magnitude of the Soviet build-up. There can be no longer any doubt that in June 1941 the Soviet army was nearing completion of an overtly offensive deployment and that Stalin was not really surprised by the German attack (actually he seems to have learnt of German preparations as early as December 1940), perhaps only by its short-t

Fresh Insights on Military Decisions and Strategy

Heinz Magenheimer is Austria's pre-eminent military historian and strategist. In his recent volume, HITLER'S WAR, gracefully translated into English, he analyzes in depth a series of significant decisions made by the German military High Command and Hitler, himself, that determined the course of World War II. Having examined and sifted through the vast quantity of material, files, reports, memoirs, and archives available to historians, including information recently declassified or only recently made available to Western historians, Magenheimer does much more than simply discuss military decisions. Indeed his volume explores reasons BEHIND these decisions, examines how the decisions were reached, and what could have happened if alternative options had been followed. Nevertheless, unlike some of the "what if" books on World War II that have recently been published, Magenheimer avoids the more speculative or fantastic aspects of such efforts; his judgments are generally conservative and based firmly in an understanding of the very legitimate opportunities that were missed or discarded by the High Command. Additionally, Magenheimer's encylopedic knowledge and familiarity with his subject enables him to offer superb--and often very personal--illustrations supporting the points he makes. I did not find this study dry or stiff at all. Rather, the situations and history Magenheimer recounts are sharply and crisply discussed--at times I couldn't put the volume down. Excellent bibliography, good notes, and index. A very important contribution to our understanding of WWII, how it was fought--and how it was lost.