Bloody River: The Real Tragedy of the Rapido (Rapido River operation near Monte

by Martin Blumenson

Book Overview

In the shadow of Monte Cassino on January 21-22, 1944, the U.S. Army's 36th "Texas" Division tried to cross Italy's Rapido River. The rout of this former National Guard unit from Texas was one of the... This description may be from another edition of this product.

• Format: Hardcover
• ISBN: B002JZ4WAS
• Release Date: January 1970
• Publisher: Houghton Mifflin Company
• Weight: 1.00 lbs.

Customer Reviews

A fine analysis, covering every aspect of the battle of the Rapido

This books follows the usual excellent and thoroughly analytical style of Martin Blumenson, and albeit a litte bit dated, it is probably the finest account available for the tragedy of the US 36th Infantry Division at the Rapido river in January 1944. The authos is at its best when he describes the various personalities involved and the terrible friction in the command mechanism of the US forces, from Gen, Mark Clark at the top to the company and battalion commanders at the bottom. Only in John Ellis' massive and marvellous book "Cassino: A Hollow Victory" did I find some more unknown details about that battle. The book features some black and white photographs of medium quality, as well as a few good maps. It is certainly a valuable addition to any World War II library.

Bloody disaster

Martin Blumenson was a top rank military historian. He wrote the U.S. Army's official account of the June '44 D-Day invasion. Blumenson is considered the foremost authority on the life and career of Gen. George S. Patton Jr. having been attached as historian to Patton's 3rd Army. Blumenthal was also an accomplished concert pianist who appeared at Carnegie Hall. Among his 23 published books is this small volume, BLOODY RIVER: THE REAL TRAGEDY OF THE RAPIDO. BLOODY RIVER is divided roughly into thirds: a prologue that introduces several generals with brief bios (these include 36th Texas Division's Fred Walker and his superiors, Geoffrey Keyes and Mark Clark). Part two is the actual operation, a catastrophe that unfolded over two highly uncoordinated days. The last 20 pages cover this action's aftermath, the survivors' post-war attempts to place blame on Mark Clark, and an investigation's conclusion that the Rapido crossing was necessary despite results. The aim of crossing the Rapido was to gain access to the Liri Valley-- a plain ideally suited for armored movement. The first stop (had this action been successful) would have been Anzio, as backup to a planned beach landing there, and then on to Rome. None of this came to fruition, as German defenses were too overwhelming while American forces were never able to concentrate on the eastern side of the Rapido. Even if they had, it's most unlikely they would have succeeded in either repelling the strongly entrenched enemy, or making the 40-plus mile march to Anzio. BLOODY RIVER is a fast read (143 pages in hardcover) that succinctly describes the essentials of this doomed-from-the-start maneuver that badly damaged the 36th Texas National Guard division. Includes one clear and one somewhat blurry map plus several pages of photos. In this book's appendix, Martin Blumenson called "Bloody River" the companion to his ANZIO: THE GAMBLE THAT FAILED. He described it as "the other side of the coin."

Bloody disaster

Martin Blumenson was a top rank military historian. He wrote the U.S. Army's official account of the June '44 D-Day invasion. Blumenson is considered the foremost authority on the life and career of Gen. George S. Patton Jr. having been attached as historian to Patton's 3rd Army. Blumenson was also an accomplished concert pianist who appeared at Carnegie Hall. Among his 23 published books is this small volume, BLOODY RIVER: THE REAL TRAGEDY OF THE RAPIDO. BLOODY RIVER is divided roughly into thirds: a prologue that introduces several generals with brief bios (these include 36th Texas Division's Fred Walker and his superiors, Geoffrey Keyes and Mark Clark). Part two is the actual operation, a catastrophe that unfolded over two highly uncoordinated days, The last 20 pages cover this action's aftermath, the survivors' post-war attempts to place blame on Mark Clark, and an investigation's conclusion that the Rapido crossing was necessary despite results. The aim of crossing the Rapido was to gain access to the Liri Valley-- a plain ideally suited for armored movement. The first stop (had this action been successful) would have been Anzio, as backup to a planned beach landing there, and then on to Rome. None of this came to fruition, as German defenses were too overwhelming while American forces were never able to concentrate on the eastern side of the Rapido. Even if they had, it's most unlikely they would have succeeded in either repelling the strongly entrenched enemy, or making the 40-plus mile march to Anzio. BLOODY RIVER is a fast read (143 pages in hardcover) that succinctly describes the essentials of this doomed-from-the-start maneuver that badly damaged the 36th Texas National Guard division. Includes one clear and one somewhat blurry map plus several pages of photos. In this book's appendix, Martin Blumenson called "Bloody River" the companion to his ANZIO: THE GAMBLE THAT FAILED. He described it as "the other side of the coin."

When and why Texans were used as 'cannon fodder' in Italy

This is a superb essay on the nature and perils of command, aptly explaining how a well-trained infantry division was thrown into an unwinnable battle with its commander and men left to flounder and die in confusion. It's somewhat shallow, but only because the focus is so narrow. Blumenson has taken a tough and sensitive topic, the deliberate sacrifice of good men in a futile battle as part of a larger effort to win elsewhere, and attempted to explain it based on his opening sentence, "Nothing is too tough for Texans." Well, one thing that's "too tough for Texans" is expecting a commanding officer to sacrifice his fellow Texans as a diversion so that an operation elsewhere can succeed. This is why the almost suicidal attack across the Rapido river was ordered, to draw German forces to the Gustav Line rather than being available to counter-attack the Anzio landings. As it turned out, other attacks had already succeeded in creating a diversion, and the Anzio landings were successful though unexploited once the troops were ashore. There are lots of mistakes in war. It's why men are hurt, and even killed. The commander of the Texans who made the attack was deeply committed to the welfare of his men and realized the impending failure. Blumenson sums up the situation nicely, "The anxieties of the division commander, his pessimism, his expectation of failure had somehow, imperceptibly, permeated his troops and robbed them of their belief in victory and the will to win." Elsewhere he writes the commanding general ". . . saw himself and the men to whom he was greatly attached as victims of the indifference and incompetence of his superiors." It's what happens when politicians or commanding generals, are incompetent. War is hard. Allied politicians wanted Rome captured before the June 6 landings in Normandy; thousands of men died to achieve that goal. Several hundred, from a Texas National Guard division, died on the Rapido as little cogs in the great big scheme of events. For the Germans, it was almost a non-event that simply "prevented enemy troops from crossing [the Rapido River] at S. Angelo." It's what happens, and Blumenson tells it well. No politician was injured on the Rapido.

Well-written and thought provoking!

Blumenson's prowess as a military historian is well known and, while I would not rank this book among his greatest works, it clearly shows the skill of the author.The focus of this monograph is the failed attempt by the 36th Infantry Division (Texas National Guard) to cross the Rapido River in Italy in January 1944. This particular battle was, of course, merely one small facet of the larger campaign to capture Monte Cassino and, ultimately, to capture Rome. Blumenson does a good job of both presenting a chronological study of the battle itself and dealing with the individual personalities at play in the various U.S. Army officers. These personalities are crucial to the understanding of any endeavor, but are even more important in battle, as officers are more than mere computers that make decisions based purely on their training, background, and education. Officers make decisions based on ego, personality, fear, hatred, and a concern for the lives of their men (which is an underlying theme of this volume). The caution (if one can call it that) that Blumenson gives to students of military history is that a commander must value the lives of his men, but he can never allow the men to be more important than the mission.The principle characters of Blumenson's drama are Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark, commander of the 5th Army, Major General Geoffrey T. Keyes, commander of the II Corps, and Major General Fred L. Walker, commander of the 36th Infantry Division. One of the sources of contention between Clark, Keyes, and Walker was their difference in age. Now it is important to note that U.S. Army officers have always been taught to respect the chain of command and be loyal to their superiors. Nevertheless, it is easy to understand how an officer might feel slighted by having as his commander someone who is actually younger than him. This situation occurs most frequently during wars, since the rapid expansion of the Army accelerates promotions. In this instance, Clark was almost 10 years younger than both Keyes and Walker, while Keyes was a year younger than Walker. Keyes and Walker, therefore, were both somewhat resentful of Clark's rapid promotion, while Walker himself harbored a similar attitude toward Keyes. Another source of contention between Clark, Keyes, and Walker were their differences in personality. Blumenson describes Clark as, "aggressive, impatient, imperious in bearing, and inclined to be sharp of tongue," while he also had, ". . . a flair for publicizing himself and his activities." (19) Keyes was a just more pleasant individual, who had, ". . . a gift of tact," but Walker believed that he was, ". . . too impulsive, too restless, too flighty - in short, too cavalry - in outlook." (39-40) Walker, unlike his compatriots, was, ". . . diffident and self-effacing, patient and mild-mannered." (20) It is with these, as other issues, as a backdrop that Blumenson begins his examination of the battle itself.During the Battle of th