Assault on Sicily: Monty and Patton at War

by Ken Ford

On the night of 9/10 July 1943, an Allied armada of 2,590 vessels launched one of the largest combined operations of the Second World War - the invasion of Sicily, Operation 'Husky'. Over the next... This description may be from another edition of this product.

• Format: Hardcover
• Language: English
• ISBN: 0750943017
• ISBN13: 9780750943017
• Release Date: January 2007
• Publisher: Sutton Publishing
• Length: 272 Pages
• Weight: 1.40 lbs.
• Dimensions: 1.2" x 6.4" x 9.5"

Customer Reviews

One of the Best Covered Campaigns on the Sicily Invasion

The definitive review has already been written by Mr Dougherty for he has covered all the key points to this book. It will be hard for myself and others to add substantially to this report. It leaves me the opportunity to confirm this is a good account of this disappointing Allied campaign and to congratulate Mr Ford for writing a fine book on it. The author has not only covered the actual tactical aspects of battle but also the strategic as well. Mr Ford's extensive coverage of the planning stage was particularly enlightening, showing Alexander's subservient nature and Montgomery's unlimited drive to change a decent plan for the greater glory of himself. This vanity is also shown days into the campaign when Montgomery unilaterally changes Army boundary lines, forcing the US 45th ID to fall back to the beach in order that Montgomery's XXX Corps could travel Highway 124. This intrusion will be Montgomery's undoing and will ignite a series of events that will bring Patton to the forefront. The author's analysis of all the key Allied commanders was even handed and to the point. There was no favoring the British position and his comments on Montgomery just like on Patton and Alexander were legitimate. The author points out the poor planning and the poor control Alexander had over his forces. General Eisenhower is also at fault for not intervening when it was necessary. Tedder and Cunninghan also get low marks for their poor performance. They lacked the coordination and resolve to finish off Axis forces; they were unwilling to take reasonable risks. The author clearly shows that during the Sicily campaign, General Bradley's distain for Patton's nature escalated. The Allies had a perfect strategic environment to destroy the Axis on Sicily and due to poor planning and weak leadership the Germans escaped to fight another day and the author clearly brings this out in his narrative. The author does show the skillful evacuation of the Germans off Sicily but I would have liked a little more coverage from the German perspective. That would be my only minor criticism of the book. If you have a similar interest of the German perspective, let me suggest: Carlo D'Este's "Bitter Victory" or Samuel Mitcham's "The Battle of Sicily". All three books are excellent and are highly recommended.

Excellent Work on the Battle for Sicily and the Commanders Involved

This is an excellent scholarly work on the Battle for Sicily by a British historian who takes a very thorough and critical look at all the commanders involved. Author Ford joins the growing number of British historians now agreeing with the general consensus of American historians that British leadership was poor, and that Montgomery's actions prolonged the battle and caused needless allied casualties. Although the subtitle is "Monty And Patton At War", it is much more than that, presenting the ineffective actions by Alexander to control Montgomery, Eisenhower's refusal to become involved, Air Marshal Tedder's timidity in employing his air power, Admiral Cunningham's refusal to risk any of the Royal Navy to cut off the Germans, and the very successful German generalship by Kesselring and Hube that resulted in their being able to evacuate their entire army after minimal losses. Tactically the Germans won; strategically, Italy was forced out of the war and Sicily was lost to the Axis. The author fully develops the evolution of the allied plan of attack from Patton's first plan to Montgomery's scuttling it in favor of his own plan wherein the British Eight Army would be the main attack force with the Americans merely protecting his left flank. Inherent in this was the total British disdain for American military effectiveness, and Montgomery modified the plan, essentially dictating to Alexander what had to happen, several times until he possessed overwhelming force and the Americans were little but a sideshow. At one point he even demanded that Patton's Seventh Army be downgraded to a corps unter his command. Even Eisenhower understood that American pride could not allow Montgomery to have his way (although he was unable to rein in Montgomery until Ike threatened an ultimatum to Roosevelt and Churchill to choose between Montgomery or himself in 1945.) Ford also makes clear the differences in the British and American armies with respect to prerogatives of battlefield commanders. The British expected commanders to object to and even refuse to carry out orders they felt were wrong whereas in the American Army, a commander might object once, but then if overruled, it was his duty to carry out the order to the best of his ability. As a result, when Montgomery convinced Alexander that the main road for Bradley's corps advance should be given to Eight Army so it could outflank the Germans all by itself, Patton objected but then executed Alexander's order without further ado. This was the most egregious blunder by Montgomery in the campaign -- his efforts were ineffective, and Patton then executed an end run over Palermo and actually arrived at Messina, the exit point for the Germans from Sicily, before Montgomery. Montgomery's high-handed actions soured British relations with Americans, and he was given a subsidiary role in the invasion of Italy. Most American commanders, including Eisenhower, felt that Montgomery was highly over-rate